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Abstract
The American public continues to be concerned about medical privacy. Policy research
continues to show people's demand for health organizations to protect patient-specific
data. Health organizations need personally identifiable data for unhampered decision
making; however, identifiable data are often the basis of information abuse if such data
are improperly disclosed. This thesis shows that health organizations may use
deidentified data for key routine organizational operations.
I construct a technology adoption model and investigate if a for-profit health insurer
could use deidentified data for key internal software quality management applications. If
privacy-related data are analyzed without rigor, little support is found to incorporate more
privacy protections into such applications. Legal and financial motivations appear
lacking. Adding privacy safeguards to such software programs apparently doesn't
improve policy-holder care quality. Existing technical approaches do not readily allow
for data deidentification while permitting key computations within the applications.
A closer analysis of data reaches different conclusions. I describe the bills that are
currently passing through Congress to mitigate abuses of identifiable data that exist
within organizations. I create a cost and medical benefits model demonstrating the
financial losses to the insurer and medical losses to its policy-holders due to less privacy
protection within the routine software applications. One of the model components
describes the Predictive Modeling application (PMA), used to identify an insurer's
chronically-ill policy-holders. Disease management programs can enhance the care and
reduce the costs of such individuals because improving such people's health can reduce
costs to the paying organization. The model quantifies the decrease in care and rise in the
insurer's claim costs as the PMA must work with suboptimal data due to policy-holders'
privacy concerns regarding the routine software applications. I create a model for
selecting variables to improve data linkage in software applications in general. An
encryption-based approach, which allows for the secure linkage of records despite errors
in linkage variables, is subsequently constructed. I test this approach as part of a general
data deidentification method on an actual PMA used by health insurers. The PMA's
performance is found to be the same as if executing on identifiable data.
A b stract ............................................................................................................................... ii
A cknow ledgem ents ............................................................. ........................................ v
1 Introduction ................................................................................................................. 1
1.1 Health Privacy Concerns Continue .................................................................. 1
1.1.1 Legal and Organizational Privacy Protections............................ 2
1.1.2 Privacy Protection Connected to Finance and Healthcare ................... 3
1.2 O utline of T hesis..................................................................................... ......... 4
1.3 Privacy Concerns within Health Organizations ........................................ 5
1.3.1 Basic Quality Management Software Applications ............................. 6
1.3.2 Basic Quality Management Applications Privacy Concerns .................. 9
1.4 Factors in Technology Adoption by Organizations ..................................... 12
1.5 Insufficient Support for Adoption of Privacy-protecting Practices .................. 13
1.5.1 Legal Analysis ........................................................................... 13
1.5.2 Financial Perspective ..................................... ..... ............... 16
1.5.3 Organizational Perspective ........................................ ........... 22
1.5.4 Technical Perspective ................................................................ 23
1.6 Chapter Conclusion.................................................... 23
2 Contextual, Financial, and Organizational Support for Stronger Privacy
Protections in Routine Applications ....................................................................... 24
2.1 Contextual Support for Privacy Protection in Routine Applications ................ 25
2.2 Financial Support .............................................................. 26
2.2.1 "Competitive" Profitability ........................................ ........... 26
2.2.2 Reduction in Loss from Information Abuse ..................................... 30
2.2.3 Paying Out-of-pocket Dynamics................................. .......... 33
2.2.4 Disease Management Implications ......................................... ...... 38
2.2.5 Reduction in Data Error ......................................... ............. 47
2.2.6 Cost of Deidentification Technology............................. ........ 48
2.2.7 Net Benefits to the Health Insurer ......................................... ...... 50
2.2.8 Sensitivity Analysis .................................................................... 51
2.2.9 Additional Financial Benefits ....................................... ......... 57
2.3 Organizational Support ........................................................ 59
2.4 Chapter Conclusion..................................... ................................................ 61
3 Providing Data Privacy..........................................................62
3.1 Applying the Safe Harbor Principle............................ .............. 62
3.1.1 Deidentifying the UB92 Claim Record................................... ...... 66
3.2 Quantifying the Value of Information ....................................... ......... 72
3.2.1 Addressing Data Privacy.................................... ............... 73
3.2.2 Record Linkage of Data ......................................... ............. 75
3.3 Threat Fram ework................................................................................... 88
3.3.1 Cryptographic Threat Model.................................... ............ 89
3.3.2 Brute Force Attacks .................................................................... 93
3.4 Securing Record Linkage................................................ 95
3.4.1 Assessing Security of Solution ....................................... ........ 97
3.4.2 Other Approaches to Protect Record Linkage ................................. 101
3.5 Predictive Modeling Experiment ..................................... 112
3.5.1 Deidentifying Claims Data ........................................ 114
3.5.2 Improving Linkage of Claims Data ..................................... 115
3.5.3 Additional Techniques for Claims Deidentification ........................ 116
3.6 Chapter Conclusion............................... 121
4 Thesis Conclusion and Future Research .............................. .............. 123
4.1 Future W ork .................................................................................................. 123
4.1.1 Confirming Consumer Behavior............................. 124
4.1.2 Research to Frame "Partial" Privacy Protection .............................. 125
4.1.3 Future Technical Enhancements ........................................ 126
4.2 Thesis Conclusion............................... ......... 128
G lossary ..................................................................... ....... ....................... . . .... 129
B ib liography ................................................. .. ... .................. ............................... 13 1
Acknowledgements
A variety of people should be thanked for the completion of this work. I must thank MIT
Professor Peter Szolovits for his wisdom, endless patience, and the freedom which he
provided me as I explored ideas that ultimately made sense to me. I owe him significant
debt. I must thank Meghan Dierks, on faculty at Harvard Medical School, for helping me
with the clinical and insurance aspects of this work. Her assistance got me much closer to
understanding the financial and operational aspects of US health insurance organizations,
grounding my work in a realistic US healthcare perspective. I really thank you for the
advice, Meghan. I must also thank MIT Professors Nazli Choucri and Hal Abelson for
their social science and mathematical suggestions, respectively. Both Professors gave me
advice on the cohesion and rigor of this work, and how to make it both human and
analytical simultaneously. I am very thankful for the help, Professors. Different
individuals who helped me along the way, either by reviewing parts of my work or being
a sounding board as I developed my thoughts, must also be thanked. They include MIT
Professors Ronald Rivest and Shafi Goldwasser; MIT graduate students Matthew
Lepinski, Nick Harvey, and David Woodruff; University of Louisville Professor
Marianne Hutti; and all the past and current students within the Clinical Decision-Making
Group at the Computer Science and Artificial Intelligence Laboratory at MIT of which I
am part. These students include: Mike McGeachie, Ronilda Lacson, Delin Shen, Lik Mui,
Min Wu and a number of others who at times only stopped by for a brief conversation but
whose suggestions were still useful for my work. I appreciate the advice, friends! I am
also very thankful for Susan Spilecki's editing advice regarding the thesis.
I must also thank those who may not have contributed to this work directly but still
wished me well when our paths crossed in different contexts during my MIT career. My
friends who I knew for many years, including my best friend Michael Koss, or others
who I met over the past 6 years, thank you for the encouragement. There are too many of
you to mention but I can say that your many "Good Luck" wishes have had the intended
impact.
I must also thank all those whom I've interviewed for this thesis. Thank you for your
time; your assistance is appreciated.
Finally, I must thank my parents, especially my Dad, without whose support the
completion of this long, extremely challenging, and personally-changing endeavor would
have been much more difficult. Thank you, Mom and Dad for your continued support-
love you always!
This work was supported by a National Library of Medicine (NLM) Biomedical
Informatics Training Grant (LM 07092) and an MIT Research Assistantship funded by
the National Multiprotocol Ensemble for Self-scaling Systems for Health (NO 1-LM-3-
3515), also a program of the NLM.
1 Introduction
1.1 Health Privacy Concerns Continue
Individuals continue to be concerned about medical privacy.1 2 3 4 5 As a number of
commentators indicate, privacy, in general, refers to information control. 6 7 8 9 10 A
consumer should be able to control information available about her. Concerns have
festered for over a decade about how health organizations inadvertently publicize
sensitive information, improperly dispose of protected health information (PHI), or
improperly use software to manage PHI, undermining data control."
Center for Democracy and Technology, "Statement of Janlori Goldman, House Committee on
Government Reform and Oversight," 1996, <http://www.cdt.org/testimony/960614goldman.html> (9
October 2003).
2 Health Privacy Project, "Health Privacy Polling Data," 2001,
<http://www.healthprivacy.org/content2310/content.htm> (9 October 2003).
3 Janlori Goldman and Zoe Hudson, "Virtually Exposed: Privacy and E-health," Health Affairs, 19 (2000):
141.
4 Harris Interactive, "Privacy On and Off the Internet: What Consumers Want," 2002, 64-65,
<http://www.aicpa.org/download/webtrust/priv rpt 21 mar02.pdf> (10 October 2003).
5 HIPAAps Privacy and Security, "Examples of Privacy Violations," 2003,
<http://www.hipaaps.com/main/examples.html> (31 March 2005).
6 See Donna L. Hoffman, "The Consumer Experience: A Research Agenda Going Forward," 14 May 2003,
<http://elab.vanderbilt.edu/research/papers/pdf/manuscripts/FTC.privacy.pdf> (31 March 2005).
7 Tamara Dinev, "Privacy Concerns and Internet Use - A Model of Tradeoff Factors,"
<http://wise.fau.edu/-tdinev/publications/privacy.pdf> (31 March 2005).
8 Eve M. Caudill and Patrick Murphy, "Consumer Online Privacy: Legal and Ethical Issues," Journal of
Public Policy & Marketing, 19 (2000): 10.
9 Secretariat, Treasury Board of Canada, "So, What Exactly Is Privacy?" 26 September 2003,
<http://www.cio-dpi.gc.ca/pgol-pged/piatp-pfefvp/course 1/modl/modl-2 e.asp> (31 March 2005).
10 H. Jeff Smith, Sandra J. Milberg, and Sandra J. Burke, "Information Privacy: Measuring Individuals'
Concerns About Organizational Practices," MIS Quarterly, 20 (1996): 172, 181.
" In this thesis, we follow the definition of the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act
(HIPAA) in defining "protected health information" (PHI): individually identifiable health information
relating to a physical or mental health condition of an individual, the provision of his care, or the payment
for that care, as will be discussed later on in the text. (Taken from Centers for Disease Control and
Prevention, "HIPAA Privacy Rule and Public Health," 2003,
<http://www.cdc.gov/mmwr/preview/mmwrhtml/m2e41 lal.htm> (3 April 2005)). Not all organizations
define PHI with similar specificity or content. (Office of Technology Assessment, Protecting Privacy in
Computerized Medical Information (Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office, 1993), 2-5;
American Association of Health Plans, "Statement on the Confidentiality of Medical Information and the
Medical Information Protection Act of 1998," 1998,
<http://www.aahp.org/Content/ContentGroups/Testimony/Confidentiality and Protection of Medical Inf
ormation (Feb 26, 1998).htm> (31 March 2005); American Medical Association, "The Ethical Force
Program," December 2000, 13, <http://www.ama-assn.org/ama/upload/mm/369/ef privacy rpt.pdf> (2
September 2005)). Nevertheless, all health organizations recognize the need to protect health information in
a secure manner. In this thesis, "PHI" will be used to aggregate related terms.
1.1.1 Legal and Organizational Privacy Protections
Until recently, the laws requiring organizations to protect PHI have been inconsistent.
Federal and state regulations were fragmented, addressing different entities that manage
information, individuals, practices, or medical conditions without broad comprehensive
solutions. 12 13 14 For example, the 1997 Balanced Budged Act required Medicare+Choice
organizations to create safeguards to protect personally identifiable information. 15 The
Veteran 's Benefits Section of US law provides for medical record confidentiality when
involving cases of drug abuse, HIV infection, or sickle cell anemia.16 In February 2000,
President Clinton's Executive Order banned usage of genetic information in federal
hiring and promotion decisions. 17 Almost all states have specific laws to protect genetic
information and certain health conditions including mental illness, communicable
diseases, and HIV/AIDS. 18 19 However, only about half of states have a general law that
prohibits one entity from disclosing health information to another without patient
authorization. 20
Legal consensus has appeared in the form of the Health Insurance Portability and
Accountability Act (HIPAA) regulation which went into force on April 14, 2003. HIPAA
offers basic national health privacy protection to individuals across several types of
health organizations as opposed to the prior inconsistent protection in the US. 21 We will
discuss HIPAA and its effectiveness later on in the text.
Health organizations try to protect privacy. The American Association of Health Plans
(AAHP) represents health plans-organizations that pay for and manage care-covering
170 million lives.22 In 1998 comments on federal privacy legislation, AAHP stated that
health plans already follow AAHP's "Code of Conduct."23 The Code follows federal and
state laws, and AAHP member plans are required to provide safeguards for PHI,
confidentiality training to staff, and a disciplinary policy for employee non-compliance.
12 US Department of Health and Human Services (HHS), "Standards for Privacy of Individually
Identifiable Health Information" (part 1), 28 December 2000, 82469, 82473,
<http://www.hhs.igov/ocr/partl.pdf> (10 October 2003).
13 Health Privacy Project, "Exposed: A Health Privacy Primer for Consumers," 1999, 5,
<http://www.healthprivacy.org/usr doc/34775.pdf> (13 October 2003).
14 See Health Privacy Project, State Privacy Law Summaries, <http://www.healthprivacy.org/info-
url nocat2304/info-url nocat search.htm> (13 October 2003).
" HHS (part 1), 82469.6 HHS (part 1), 82469.
"7 HHS (part 1), 82469.
18 Health Privacy Project, "Exposed: A Health Privacy Primer for Consumers," 5.
19 See also different state laws in Health Privacy Project, State Privacy Law Summaries.
20 HHS (part 1), 82473.
21 HHS (part 1), 82463-82464.
22 American Association of Health Plans, "About AAHP," 2003,
<http://www.aahp.org/template.cfm?section=About AAHP> (12 October 2003).
23 American Association of Health Plans, "Statement on the Confidentiality of Medical Information and the
Medical Information Protection Act of 1998."
Many health plans have already implemented PHI security safeguards such as unique log-
on passwords, audit trails, and PHI access based on a "need to know" rationale. 24 25 As
another example, the National Association of Insurance Commissioners (NAIC) aims to
protect insurance consumers but also maintain a competitive insurance industry in each
state.26 The NAIC adopted a Health Information Privacy Model Act in 1998. A model for
state legislation, it allows for individuals to examine PHI and modify it under certain
circumstances, and requires insurers to provide security for health information and send a
notice to individuals about how health information will be used.27
1.1.2 Privacy Protection Connected to Finance and Healthcare
Despite laws and organizational practices violations persist. The following types of
problems were reported by local newspapers from around the country over the past
decade: 28
1) Accidents, such as when about 400 pages of detailed psychological records of at
least 62 youths were accidentally posted on the University of Montana Web site
in 2001;
2) Unclear privacy policies, such as when a patient at Brigham and Women's
Hospital in Boston, MA found that employees had accessed her medical record
more than 200 times in 2000;
3) Poor security practices, such as when a Tampa, FL public health worker took a
computer disk containing the names of 4,000 HIV positive people from work and
sent the disk to two newspapers in 1996.
4) Unclear data sharing practices, such as when in 1995 in Pennsylvania, the
drugstore Rite-Aid provided to a state agency information about prescriptions
being filled by agency employees, including one employee's medication
indicative of his HIV positive status. In the employee's unsuccessful ensuing
lawsuit against the agency, the court indicated that the employer should be
allowed to know details of how its employees used the health plan.
Health organizations may be struggling to maintain profitability and not impact quality of
care while protecting privacy. Incorporating technologies and policies which protect
privacy appears to undermine net income. In a 1997 study, several health organizations
indicated that the protection of health information does not serve as a market
differentiator. 2 9 Others believe the financial costs of installing privacy and security
24 HHS (part 1), 82478.
25 American Association of Health Plans, "Statement on the Confidentiality of Medical Information and the
Medical Information Protection Act of 1998."
26 National Association of Insurance Commissioners, "NAIC Mission Statement,"
<http://www.naic.org/about/mission.htm> (31 March 2005).
27 American Medical Association, "The Ethical Force Program," 11.
28 HIPAAps Privacy and Security.
29 National Research Council, For the Record: Protecting Electronic Health Information (Washington, DC:
National Academy Press, 1997), 156.
safeguards are too "burdensome." 30 Quality of care might suffer as proper diagnosis or
treatment decisions are undermined due to limited information flow.31
1.2 Outline of Thesis
This thesis explores such questions. Does incorporating privacy protections restrict
profitability or impair improvement of care? This thesis will show that, if data are not
analyzed with rigor, it is difficult to show financial and quality of care benefits associated
with installing privacy-protecting policies and technologies, and this difficulty
undermines the adoption of such safeguards. However, if data are analyzed in more
depth, financial and care improvement benefits may be shown, which should encourage
the use of privacy-protecting practices.
In this thesis, I will create a technology adoption and decision analytic model for a
hypothetical but realistic for-profit health insurer. The term insurer will refer to health
insurer throughout this thesis. I will examine a subset of the insurer's internal software
applications used for key routine operations. There is no legal requirement to provide
extended privacy protection within these software applications, which help reduce the
insurer's expenses and enhance the care of its policy-holders. To examine the incentives
for the adoption of privacy-protecting practices, I will examine the impact of adding a
privacy-enhancing technology, which I design in this thesis, on the insurer's profitability
and ability to support the improved care of its policy-holders. First, I will show how an
unrigorous data analysis demonstrates to the insurer no financial or health improvement
benefits of adding extra privacy protection to the routine applications. Second, I will
explore data in more depth to show how financial and quality of care benefits may exist.
Third, I will create a threat framework describing the protections that must be offered to
data depending on their organizational context. If data are to be protected by the same
organization that generated them, as is the case for our routine software applications,
more data protections must be created. Organizational employees may know some of the
security processes involved in the data protection, against which a security approach must
guard. Fourth, I will describe my new privacy-enhancing technology, which preserves
privacy during data linkage in software applications in general while handling errors of
organizationally- internally- and externally-generated data. Finally, I will test this
technology by incorporating it into one of the applications used by the insurer, one of the
key routine software applications we examine, and investigate the application's
performance on its required computations.
30 Janlori Goldman, "Protecting Privacy to Improve Health Care," Health Affairs, 17 (1998): 51.
31 US Department of Health and Human Services (HHS), "Standards for Privacy of Individually
Identifiable Health Information" (update), 14 August 2002, 53209,
<http://www.hhs.gov/ocr/hipaa/privrulepd.pdf> (24 September 2005).
1.3 Privacy Concerns within Health Organizations
The analysis below demonstrates how an unrigorous investigation finds no benefits to
health organizations from adding more privacy protections. We describe a context in
which a set of health organizations currently do not protect privacy as much as may be
possible. We explore when privacy-protecting practices promoted by standards
organizations are not fully implemented by health organizations. Health privacy is
instantiated within organizations by a set of managerial and technical processes to ensure
PHI protection. We will rely on the practices suggested by the Ethical Force Program
(EFP). The EFP is a program of the American Medical Association and aims to improve
health care by encouraging more ethical behavior among all stakeholders. 32 The EFP
tenets, below, are useful as they provide for considerable consumer control over PHI,
which forms the basis of individuals' understanding of medical privacy, as described in
Section 1.1. EFP's tenets were also adapted from the more widely accepted Fair
Information Practices. 33 Many national and international organizations have adopted
versions of the Fair Information Practices for their own constituents concerning data
management and privacy. 34 Based on a 1998 expert panel convened by the EFP,
comprised of a variety of physician, hospital, patient, insurance, legal, public health, and
IT leaders and experts, in 2000, the EFP issued the following set of recommendations
detailing how to protect PHI:
35 36 37
1) Trustees. The following practices apply to all "health information trustees." A
trustee is an individual or organization that creates, stores, transmits, or uses
PHI.38
2) Deidentification of PHI. If the PHI is adequately deidentified, then the health
information trustees may use the data; there should be no associated privacy
concerns.
3) Transparency. Health information trustees should make publicly available
explanations of their policies and procedures for the collection and use of PHI.
4) Consent. Whenever possible, health information trustees should obtain informed
consent from individuals with regard to the collection, use, and storage of their
PHI. Otherwise a publicly formal process should be used to waive such consent.
5) Collection Limitation. Health information trustees should limit the collection of
health information only to current needs or reasonably anticipated future needs
that are made explicit at the time of consent.
6) Security. Health information trustees should protect PHI using reasonable means
of security. An internal security program guiding such decisions should be
established.
32 American Medical Association, "About the Ethical Force Program," 18 July 2005, <http://www.ama-
assn.org/ama/pub/categorv/14401 .html> (17 September 2005).
33 American Medical Association, "The Ethical Force Program," 10.
34 American Medical Association, "The Ethical Force Program," 10-12.
35 American Medical Association, "The Ethical Force Program," 3-5.
36 Matthew K. Wynia, Steven S. Coughlin, Sheri Alpert, Deborah S. Cummins, Linda L. Emanuel, "Shared
Expectations for Protection of Identifiable Health Care Information," Journal of General Internal
Medicine, 16 (2001): 100.
37 American Medical Association, "The Ethical Force Program," 6.
38 American Medical Association, "The Ethical Force Program," 13.
7) Individual Access. People should be granted viewing and copying rights
concerning their PHI. They may amend their PHI if the information appears
incorrect. 39
8) Data Quality. Health information trustees should seek to ensure that the PHI in
their care is accurate and up-to-date, including conducting periodic data accuracy
audits.40
9) Information Use Limitation. Health information trustees should limit the
disclosure and use of PHI to purposes made explicit at time of consent or by
authorization via a publicly accountable formal process, such as in step 4 above.
10) Accountability. Policies should exist to ensure that health information trustees be
accountable for adhering to the standards for the collection, storage, and use of
PHI, including the responsible transfer of such data to other accountable
information trustees.
1.3.1 Basic Quality Management Software Applications
We find that a set of internal software applications within for-profit insurers might not
fully follow such practices. A health insurer can be defined as an organization that pays
for the care offered to patients by providers-physicians, clinics, hospitals, or
pharmacies-often by processing health care claims.4' 42 Often a health insurer
"manages" the care received by patients such as by entering into various contractual
afreements with provider organizations to share the "risk" associated with patient care.43
We will examine what I call the insurer's basic quality management applications
(BQMA) which the insurer uses to monitor its organizational efficiency. These are
internal software applications that link and compute results based on medical and
pharmacy claims data.45 46 47 There may be several BQMA within an average insurer. We
look at four common applications:
39 American Medical Association, "The Ethical Force Program," 19.
40 American Medical Association, "The Ethical Force Program," 20.
41 See National Research Council, 66.
42 See The Kansas Department of Health and Environment, "Charitable Health Program Overview,"
<http://www.kdhe.state.ks.us/olrh/CHPoverview.htm> (31 March 2005).
43 National Research Council, 66.
44 W.K. Kellogg Foundation, "Frequently Asked Questions... Insurance and Managed Care," 2,
<http://www.wkkf.org/Pubs/Devolution/NCSL FA Insurance and managed care 00331 02768.pdf> (2
September 2005).
45 See American Health Information Management Association, "Sizing up HEDIS: Experts Take System's
Measure," 2002,
<http://library.ahima.org/xpedio/groups/public/documents/ahima/pub bok 1 009714.html> (12 October
2003).
46 FACTS Services, Inc, "Products At-a-glance," <http://factsservices.com/products/products glance.asp>
(31 March 2005).
47 See DxCG, "Disease Management and Quality Improvement Report," May 2003,
<http://www.dxcg.com/press/DMOualityReport.pdf> (31 March 2005). For example, the Ingenix Procise
Predict product mentioned in this DxCG article is a Predictive Modeling software platform which analyzes
claims and is one of the BQMA based on how I define the BQMA, in the text. (See Ingenix Corporation,
1) Utilization Review. This application permits the insurer to ensure that relevant
and cost-appropriate medical care is given by a provider to a policy-holder. For
example, an important purpose of managed care organizations is to control
growing US health care expenditures.48 Insurance organization analysts review
policy-holder care and costs to authorize payment only for those treatments that
meet appropriate cost-management and treatment guidelines. 49
2) Provider Profiling. This is similar to Utilization Review but focuses on the
providers. The insurer's staff examines information regarding provider practices.
The intent is to comprehend and potentially influence providers connected with
the insurer. 50 Provider Profiling information may be used to select which doctors
become part of the insurer's managed care network, or possibly even investigate
inappropriate treatment prescribed by providers. 51
3) Health Plan Employer Data and Information Set (HEDIS). HEDIS is a collection
of various organizational operational data used to quantify the insurer's
performance. Statistics on breast cancer screening, births, customer satisfaction,
and other measures are captured by HEDIS. 52 Such measures may be publicized
so that individuals and organizations can compare insurer performance such as
when purchasing health benefits.
53 54
4) Predictive Modeling (PM). PM attempts to identify people for disease
management. Disease management is a set of clinical and management protocols
to improve the health status and reduce costs of individuals with chronic
conditions such as congestive heart failure or chronic obstructive pulmonary
disease.55 PM examines claims data to predict which individuals, without
intervention, might have worsening health status and costs at a future period.56 57
"Improve Your Medical Management and Underwriting Effectiveness,"
<http://www.ingenix.com/esg/products.php?pid=l 10> (20 April 2005)).
48 Alain C. Enthoven and Sara Singer, "The Managed Care Backlash and the Task Force in California,"
Health Affairs, 17 (1998): 95-6.
49 See Thomas G. Kremer and Ellis Gesten, "Confidentiality Limits of Managed Care and Clients'
Willingness to Self-Disclose," Professional Psychology: Research and Practice, 29 (1998): 558.
50 Bettermanagement.Com, "Effective Provider Profiling: Enhancing Care, Improving Costs," Webcast
reviewed on December 16, 2004.
51 Bettermanagement.Com.
52 National Committee for Quality Assurance, "HEDIS 2005 Summary Table of Measures and Product
Lines," <http://www.ncqa.org/Programs/HEDIS/HEDIS%202005%2OSummary.pdf> (26 March 2005).
53 Implied, National Committee for Quality Assurance, "The Health Plan Employer Data and Information
Set (HEDIS)," <http://www.ncqa.org/Programs/HEDIS/> (12 October 2003).
54 Joseph W. Thompson, Sathiska D. Pinidiya, Kevin W. Ryan, Elizabeth D. McKinley, Shannon Alston,
James E. Bost, Jessica Briefer French, and Pippa Simpson, "Health Plan Quality-of-Care Information Is
Undermined by Voluntary Reporting," American Journal of Preventive Medicine, 24 (2003): 69.
55 Disease Management Association of America, "Definition of Disease Management," 2003,
<http://www.dmaa.org/definition.html> (14 October 2003).
56 See Case Western Reserve University, "Disease Management Programs,"
<http://www.case.edu/med/epidbio/mphp439/Disease Management.htm> (2 September 2005).
57 Privacy Sector Advocacy, "Disease Management and Chronic Diseases," November 2002, 2.
58 Disease management staff intervenes with the identified individuals using
standards-based care to prevent health decline.
1.3.1.1 Disease Management and Predictive Modeling
We will explore privacy concerns regarding disease management and PM, extending our
analysis to the other BQMA. Note, one assumption we make in this thesis is that PM
software is used to identify disease management candidates. There are other approaches
to identifying such candidates, including physician referral and a review of the patient's
medical record. 59 60 However, using software to scan claims may be more tenable for an
insurer. For example, in some cases, the health plan is organizationally separate from the
physicians providing care. 61 Thus having access to medical records or obtaining
physician referral might be less possible for the insurer.
We describe disease management and PM in depth. The Disease Management
Association of America defines disease management as "a system of coordinated
healthcare interventions and communications for populations with conditions in which
patient self-care efforts are significant." 62 Disease management arose from the need to
manage chronic patient care and associated costs better than they were being managed.
Today, caring for the chronically ill consumes a disproportionate share of national health
spending.63 By 2010, an estimated 120 million Americans will have chronic conditions.64
In the past ten years, disease management programs have arisen to ensure that health
professionals and patients alike follow "evidence-based guidelines" and that patients are
encouraged to monitor their own care. 6 5 A key reason for current suboptimal care is
inconsistent care. Evidence-based guidelines exist for many of the common chronic
conditions such as diabetes or acute lower-back pain. However, the US health care
system is decentralized and such standards are not always followed. 66 Patients themselves
58 Susan L. Norris, Phyllis J. Nichols, Carl J. Caspersen, Russell E. Glasgow, Michael M. Engelgau,
Leonard Jack, Jr, George Isham, Susan R. Snyder, Vilma G. Carande-Kulis, Sanford Garfield, Peter Briss,
and David McCulloch, "The Effectiveness of Disease and Case Management for People with Diabetes. A
Systematic Review," American Journal of Preventative Medicine, 22 (2002), 20.
59 W. Pete Welch, Christopher Bergsten, Charles Cutler, Carmella Bocchino, and Richard I. Smith,
"Disease Management Practices of Health Plans," The American Journal of Managed Care, 8 (2002): 358.
60 Joshua J. Ofman, Seonyoung Ryu, Jeff Borenstein, Stephen Kania, Jay Lee, Amy Grogg, Christina
Farup, and Scott Weingarten, "Identifying Patients with Gastroesophageal Reflux Disease in a Managed
Care Organization," American Journal ofHealth-system Pharmacy, 58 (2001): 1608.
61 Pacific Business Group on Health, "Disease Management Effectiveness Project," November 2002, 4,
<http://www.pbgh.org/programs/dmep/disease mgmt report 11-02.pdf> (2 September 2005).
62 Disease Management Association of America.
63 California Healthcare Foundation, "E-disease Management," November 2001, 6,
<http://www.chcf.org/documents/ihealth/EDiseaseManagement.pdf> (2 September 2005).
64 Robert Wood Johnson Foundation, "Chronic Care in America: A 2 1st Century Challenge," November
1996, <http://www.rwif.org/files/publications/other/ChronicCareinAmerica.pdf> (24 February 2006).65 Disease Management Association of America.
66 Institute of Medicine, Crossing the Quality Chasm (Washington, DC: National Academy Press, 2001),
28.
don't always comply with necessary treatments. 67 By following standards-based care, a
disease management program hopes to improve a patient's clinical status. 68 Further, costs
should be reduced as maintaining the health of healthier people may cost less. 69 70 Some
clinical and economic successes have been reported concerning certain chronic
conditions, such as diabetes and asthma. 7 1 Still, the overall business case has not been
developed for all health contexts.
72 73 74
Claims data are duplicated for PM. After the claim is paid by the insurer, it is stored in a
master database or file. Ultimately, a copy of this record is made available to pM. 75 In
this thesis we will call such a secondary database the copy data store. PM is run against
the copy data store to identify disease management candidates.
After identification, PM frequently stratifies the individuals based on their "risk." 76 The
purpose is to align limited resources commensurately with the "risk" presented by such
patients; the insurer can optimize its resources.
77 78
1.3.2 Basic Quality Management Applications Privacy Concerns
PM uses identifiable data and some people have concerns about the security of such data
within organizations. 79 Identifiable data are needed for PM operations. Data values must
67 Government of British Columbia, "Chronic Disease and Your Health: Information for Patients," Chronic
Disease Management, 2003, <http://www.healthservices.gov.bc.ca/cdm/patients/index.html> (10 October
2003).
68 Case Western Reserve University.
69 Case Western Reserve University.
70 Privacy Sector Advocacy, 2.
71 American Association of Health Plans/Health Insurance Association of America, "The Cost Savings of
Disease Management Programs: Report on a Study of Health Plans," November 2003,
<http://www.aahp.org/Content/ContentGroups/Homepage News/Disease Management Short Report.doc>
(25 August 2005).
72 Norris, 20.
73 Pacific Business Group on Health, 4.
74 Geoffrey B. Baker, "Integrating Technology and Disease Management: The Challenges," Healthplan, 43
(2002): 63.
75 The point is to preserve the original data so that they are not potentially modified during PM analysis.
Such extraction can also be done by the staff operating PM, as will be described in the text, simply by
downloading a local copy of the master database when it needs to use the data. The original master
database remains unaffected. (Manager, Medical Informatics, Pacificare, telephone interview with author,
May 12, 2004).
76 Pacific Business Group on Health, Appendix, 5.
77 "Predictive Modeling, Integrated Disease Management Emerge as Popular Strategies," Data Strategies
and Benchmarks, 6 (2002).
78 Welch, 359.
79 PM, and the other BQMA, currently use identifiable PHI. (See American Association of Health Plans,
"Statement on the Confidentiality of Medical Information and the Medical Information Protection Act of
1998"; Government Accounting Office, "Medical Records Privacy: Access Needed for Health Research,
But Oversight of Privacy Protections Limited," February 1999,
<http://www.gao. gov/archive/1999/he99055.pdf> (3 April 2005); America's Health Insurance Plans,
be examined to add new applications or refine PM techniques.80 PM is often managed by
a staff that performs such tasks. Identifiable data may also be needed for quality control.
The claims data may have errors in them. Data entry mistakes may create incorrect
values. 81 Software upgrades may lead to bad data formats. Sometimes errors are due to
the financial arrangements under which the insurer operates. 82 Under "capitated"
arrangements, the insurer pays providers a flat fee per enrollee per month.83 In this
environment, claims may not be submitted for direct provider reimbursement but mostly
for administrative or management purposes. Therefore, extensive adjudication, that is,
error cleaning and resolution in claims data for reimbursement purposes, might not get done
and remaining data may be more prone to error. 84 PM staff cleans some errors. 85
However, it cannot identify all errors. The claim record contains the patient's name,
diagnosis, length of stay in a hospital, and other sensitive data, as will be shown later86 87
on.
People have concerns about the misuse of identifiable data within organizations. Concerns
exist about organizations insufficiently protecting data from outside "hackers" as well as
from internal employees. In 2005, almost 50.5 million records on individuals and families
have been exposed in the US due to lax organizational IT security practices. Personal data in
a variety of organizations, including health care, have been subject to theft, hacking, and
poor data transmission. 88 Health care organizations have been subject to such faults over the
past decade specifically. 89 The insurer should be aware of problems stemming from
internal PHI abuse in particular. 90 Across all industries, including health care, it is
important to protect IT assets from the "insider threat," a threat from a regular or contract
organizational employee who misuses the information he is authorized to use, or, based
on his knowledge of the organization's operations, information to which he should have
"Personal Health Plan Information, Health Plans, and Consumers," AHIP Center for Policy and Research,
August 2001. <http://www.ahipresearch.org/PDFs/24 CRAfinalreportPriv-Conf.pdf> (25 August 2005)).
80 Implied, Pacificare, Medical Informatics staff, telephone interview with author. August 1, 2003.81 See similar concepts in A. J. Dalrymple, L. S. Lahti, L. J. Hutchison, and J. J. O'Doherty, "Record
Linkage in a Regional Mental Health Planning Study: Accuracy of Unique Identifiers, Reliability of
Sociodemographics, and Estimating Identifier Error," Journal of Mental Health Administration, 21 (1994):
187-8.
82 For example, see Capitation Management Report, "Are You Ready to Take on Claims Adjudication?"
September 1999, <http://www.phoenixservice.net/Articles/article6.pdf> (3 September 2005).83 W.K. Kellogg Foundation, 11.84 HealthcareIndustryPulse, "Payment Errors Cost MCOs Big Money," January 2005,
<http://www.bdo.com/about/publications/industry/hcp jan 05/claims.asp> (4 September 2005).
85 IS Manager, Tufts Health Plan, telephone interview with author, November 12, 2004.86 See Centers for Medicare and Medicaid services, "Health Insurance Claim Form" (HCFA 1500),
<http://cms.hhs.gov/providers/edi/cmsl 1500.pdf> (10 October 2003).87 Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services, "Uniform Bill" (UB92),
<http://cms.hhs.gov/providers/edi/hl 1450.pdf> (10 October 2003).
88 Privacy Rights Clearinghouse, "A Chronology of Data Breaches Reported Since the ChoicePoint
Incident," 30 August 2005, <http://www.privacyrights.org/ar/ChronDataBreaches.htm> (2 September 2005).89 HIPAAps Privacy and Security.
90 Deborah Radcliff, "Invisible Loot," Industry Week, 2 November 1998,
<http://www.industryweek.com/CurrentArticles/ASP/articles.asp?Articleld=298> (24 September 2005).
no access. 91 92 93 A 2000 analysis mentions that the Federal Bureau of Investigations
Computer Crime Unit reported that over 80% of network security breaches are "inside
jobs" by disgruntled or dishonest employees. 94 HIPAA itself encourages the use of
deidentified data whenever it is possible within health care. 9 5
Concerns about errors exist, too, which is another privacy concern, as item 8 the Data
Quality tenet from the Ethical Force Program list of privacy protections, demonstrates. In
this thesis, we focus on errors in identifiers such as the medical record number, used for
linking records in the BQMA. 96 97 Such errors can have clinical impact. In the case of
PM, individuals may not be identified or may be improperly risk-stratified and receive
improper disease management services, lessening care enhancement effects. One
company that has worked on many master patient indices-efforts to accurately merge
patient-level data despite potentially lack of consistent identifiers within health
organizations-estimates a medical record number "duplication" rate of 10%. 98 99
Duplication is defined as multiple medical record numbers assigned to the same patient
or two or more different patients assigned the same medical record number. One of the
company's studies discusses patient clinical decline that can take place as a result of
errors in identifiers. 100
The same information processing exists for the other BQMA. Therefore, those
applications may be subject to the same privacy concerns. The other BQMA often have
their own staff specializing in their functionality, too. 0' All the BQMA may even be
associated with the same claims data set, one copy data store with identifiable PHI
driving all the BQMA. 10 2
The insurer provides general privacy protection for all data within the organization. For
example, it follows HIPAA. According to a 2005 survey, a number of HIPAA tenets are
obviously in place, with most health plans distributing a Notice of Privacy Practices and
91 David Katz, "Elements of a Comprehensive Security Solution," Health Management Technology, 21
(2000): 12.
92 Radcliff.
93 See National Research Council, 59-60.
94 Katz, 12.
95 US Department of Health and Human Services (HHS), "Standards for Privacy of Individually
Identifiable Health Information" (part 2), 28 December 2000, 82543, <http://www.hhs.gov/ocr/part2.pdf>
(10 October 2003).
96 See similar concepts in AJ Dalrymple, 187-8.
97 Lisa I. lezzoni, Risk Adjustment for Measuring Healthcare Outcomes, second edition (Chicago, IL:
Health Administration Press, 1997), 224.
98 Healthcare Informatics Online, "Will Your Patient Data Merge With You?" 1997,
<http://www.healthcare-informatics.com/issues/1997/04 97/merge.htm> (31 March 2005).
99 Lorraine Fernandes, Celia Lenson, Joe Hewitt, Jerry Weber, and Jo Ann Yamamoto, "Medical Record
Number Errors," White Paper from Initiate Corporation, April 2001, 3.
100 Fernandes, 3.
0o' Landacorp staff, telephone interview with author, October 16, 2003.
102 Landacorp staff, telephone interview with author, October 16, 2003.
obtaining patient authorizations for use and disclosure of PHI. 103 Some errors are
cleaned, as discussed earlier. Yet privacy concerns continue. Why doesn't the insurer
offer more privacy protection than it currently provides?
1.4 Factors in Technology Adoption by Organizations
We construct a technology adoption model to understand how the insurer might view
BQMA privacy protection. Reviewing the literature on organizational technology
adoption, we discern four criteria by which an organization may adopt technology. In this
discussion, the word "technology" means any technical or procedural mechanism, not
only technical, used to improve organizational operations. Organizations will adopt
technology due to: 1) the external environment-the technology is required in response to
external pressure such as standards dictated by a parent organization or pressure from the
community in which the organization operates; 2) economic efficiency-the technology
will improve the organization's financial position; 3) organizational context-the
technology aligns with the "reputation" the organization wants, its mission, the desires of
key employees, and similar organizational factors; and 4) technical efficiency--the
technology possesses superior technical characteristics as compared to currently used
approaches. 104 105 106 107 108 109
103 Healthcare Information and Management Systems Society, "U.S. Healthcare Industry: HIPAA
Compliance Survey Results: Winter 2005," <http://www.himss.org/Content/files/WinterSurvey2005.pdf>
(25 August 2005).
104 Vivian Carpenter and Ehsan H. Feroz, "Institutional Theory and Accounting Rule Choice: An Analysis
of Four US State Governments' Decisions to Adopt Generally Accepted Accounting Principles,"
Accounting, Organizations, and Society, 26 (2001): 571.
105 Paul Jen-Hwa Hu, Patrick Chau, and Olivia Liu Sheng, "Investigation of Factors Affecting Healthcare
Organization's Adoption of Telemedicine Technology" (Proceedings of the 33 rd Hawaii International
Conference on System Sciences, 2000), 2, 4.
'
06 Md. Mahbubur Rahim, G. Shanks and R.B. Johnston, "Understanding Motivations for IOS Adoption"
(Proceedings of the Twelfth Australasian Conference on Information Systems).
107 A. Zutshi and A. Sohal, "Environmental Management System Adoption by Australasian Organizations:
Part 1: Reasons, Benefits and Impediments," Technovation, 24 (2000): 342.
108 Rand Corporation, "How MCO Medical Directors See the System," Managed Care and the Evaluation
and Adoption of Emerging Medical Technologies, 2000, 33,
<http://www.rand.org/publications/MR/MR 195/MR1195.chap4.pdf> (31 March 2005).
'09 Rand Corporation, "How Might Technology Adoption be Improved," Managed Care and the
Evaluation and Adoption of Emerging Medical Technologies, 2000, 49,
<http://www.rand.org/publications/MR/MR 1195/MR 1195.chap6.pdf> (27 March 2005).
1.5 Insufficient Support for Adoption of Privacy-protecting
Practices
If technology adoption data regarding privacy-preserving practices are analyzed without
rigor, little support is found for adding additional privacy protections to the BQMA.
1.5.1 Legal Analysis
We find that the external environment does not encourage BQMA privacy protection
beyond what the insurer currently provides. We focus on the external driver of
regulation.'1 0 111 The insurer, like all US organizations, must abide by appropriate federal
and state requirements.112 113 114 Any organization might not be viable otherwise, due to
the costs of litigation or potential criminal prosecution. HIPAA is the main regulation
affecting health privacy practices in the US. HIPAA does not require extended BQMA
privacy protection. HIPAA defines which entities are covered by its provisions and what
kinds of data are to be protected:
A) Health plans, health care providers, and health care clearinghouses are the
primary "covered entities" that must abide by HIPAA. 115
B) Protected Health Information (PHI) is individually identifiable health information
relating to a physical or mental health condition of an individual, the provision of
his care, or the payment for that care.11 6
C) If PHI is de-identified such that it is impossible to identify the data subjects in the
data, HIPAA tenets do not apply.
HIPAA requires the following health privacy practices from covered entities:"17 118
1) The Consent requirement for Treatment, Payment, and Operations (TPO) was
made optional in the latest version of HIPAA. 19 Many individuals would like
10 Implied, Md. Mahbubur Rahim, "Understanding Motivations for IOS Adoption."
l. S.R. Elliot, "Adoption and Implementation of IT: An Evaluation of the Applicability of Western
Strategic Models to Chinese Firms," in Diffusion and Adoption of Information Technology, ed. Karlheinz
Kautz (London: Chapman & Hall, 1996), 18.
112 For example, see General Accounting Office, "Health Insurance Regulation: Varying State
Requirements Affect Cost of Insurance," 1999, <http://www.gao.gov/archive/l996/he96161.pdf> (22
March 2005).
113 Roland Strum and J. Unutzer, "State Legislation and the Use of Complementary and Alternative
Medicine," Inquiry - Blue Cross and Blue Shield Association, Winter 2000/2001, 425-6.
114 Managed Care Magazine, "State Mandates Promote Contraceptive Coverage," 2004,
<http://www.managedcaremag.com/archives/0408/0408.formularvfiles.html> (18 March 2005).
"15 A "health care clearinghouse" is a public or private entity that transforms nonstandard data or health
care-related transactions received from another entity into "standard" transactions or data elements. (See
Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, "HIPAA Privacy Rule and Public Health").
116 As was defined in the beginning of the thesis.
117 Taken from Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, "HIPAA Privacy Rule and Public Health."
118 US Department of Health and Human Services, "Protecting the Privacy of Patients' Health Information:
Summary of the Final Regulation," 2000, <http://www.hhs.gov/news/press/2000pres/00fsprivacy.html> (18
October 2003).
119 HHS (update), 53208-10.
organizations in the health industry to ask for consent before they disclose PHI.
However, many health care providers indicate that consent should not be required
for payment, treatment, or routine organizational operations as it might impair
care delivery. 12 0 Providers offering direct care to patients are obliged to make a
good faith attempt to receive a patient's acknowledgement of receipt of Notice as
will be described in point 3 below. The patient mai also request restrictions to
PHI use as will be discussed in point 6 below. 2 ' 1 2 Ultimately, however, PHI
may be used for TPO without difficulty.
2) Authorizations are required, with some exceptions, for several types of data
handling functions not explicitly permitted by HIPAA.123 For example, using PHI
for marketing purposes requires an individual's authorization.124
3) "Covered entities" must provide:
b. Notice. Individuals must be given notice describing their privacy rights
and how their PHI will be used or disclosed.
c. Access. Individuals have a right to access their health information,
including certain rights to amend their PHI.
d. Security. The covered entity must have in place appropriate
administrative, technical, and physical safeguards to protect the privacy of
health information.
4) Some of the covered entities' staff must be designated to implement the
organization's privacy practices and receive complaints about them.
5) Individuals may request an "accounting" of some PHI disclosures by the covered
entity for certain transactions, except for TPO and some other transactions.1
25 126
6) Individuals may request restrictions on use of PHI. These requests can be directed
toward TPO functions.127 However, the covered entity is not obligated to agree to
such requests.
7) Covered entities may disclose PHI without authorization when required by law,
for public health, or for other special reasons.
8) Use or disclosure of information by the covered entity is limited to the minimum
necessary for the work associated with the use or disclosure.
9) Civil and criminal penalties are prescribed for various violations, the most
egregious of which carries a penalty of $250,000 plus 10 years in jail if the intent
was to sell PHI for personal gain.
10) Covered entities that conduct business with "business associates," such as third-
party claims processors, external consultants and auditors, and lawyers, and
120 HHS (update), 53209.
121 University of Miami, "Privacy/Data Protection Project," 15 August 2002,
<http://privacy.med.miami.edu/glossary/xd consent.htm> (7 April 2005).
122 American Academy of Ophthalmic Executives, "Final HIPAA Privacy Rule,"
<http://www.aao.org/aaoesite/promo/compliance/hipaa final.cfm> (9 April 2005).
123 HHS (update), 53220.
124 HHS (update), 53220.
125 HHS (part 1), 82559-82560.
126 HHS (update), 53243-53245.
127 See HHS (update), 53211.
transfer PHI to them must sign contracts with them with privacy protection
requirements.128 129
11) Stronger state privacy laws continue to apply as HIPAA just provides a federal
baseline standard.
1.5.1.1 Basic Quality Management Applications Under HIPAA
The BQMA copy data store(s) uses identifiable data, item (C) above. We again focus on
PM for our privacy analysis and extend the results to the other BQMA. PM is subject to
HIPAA compliance points 1 through 11 due to identifiable PHI use. Tenets 1 through 5
do not prevent the copy data store from being identifiable, thus potentially leading to the
information abuses discussed before. Legally, the PM part of disease management is
considered Treatment, Payment, and Operations (TPO). Analyzing claims to find
individuals who could benefit from goods or services designed to improve health care or
reduce cost, the PM part of disease management, is considered health care operations. 130
Per point 1, a covered entity may optionally ask for consent. We assume the insurer will
not ask for it regarding PM because it may be financially disadvantageous. Using
identifiable PHI for PM may be profitable to the insurer because disease management
might reduce the costs of policy-holder care. If the insurer asks for consent and policy-
holders in some way prevent PM from using identifiable data, the insurer's profitability
might be impacted, hence minimizing its interest in consent. Point 2 indicates that for
several types of data handling functions not permitted by HIPAA, the covered entity must
seek authorization. However, since the usage of PM falls under TPO, an allowed data
practice, the need for an authorization is bypassed. Point 3 requires a covered entity to
give Notice. However, the Notice is in no way a consent mechanism. Policy-holders have
no opportunity to agree or disagree with the process. Point 3 also requires a covered
entity to provide Security. In the PM context, a person must not be able to see PHI
inadvertently. 13 This requirement alone does not prevent identifiable PHI use.
Identifiable data are needed to operate and update the PM application, as explained
before. The insurer must provide general security surrounding PHI. However, once
employees who run the PM platform access the data legitimately they are allowed full
access to those data, in this case identifiable PHI. Point 5, an "accounting" of disclosures
made, does not apply because PM is part of TPO and TPO functions are exempted by this
tenet.
128 See University of Texas Health Science Center at San Antonio, "Evaluation for Business Associates,"
HIPAA Compliance Program, 10 October 2005, <http://www.uthscsa.edu/hipaa/assoc-who.html> (23
December 2005).
129 US Department of Health and Human Services, Office for Civil Rights, "Business Associates," 3 April
2003, <http://www.hhs.gov/ocr/hipaa/guidelines/businessassociates.rtf> (23 December 2005).
130 For example, see Atlantic Information Services, "HIPAA Compliance Strategies," 2003,
<http://www.aishealth.com/Compliance/Hipaa/MCWDMTraining.html> (13 October 2003).
131 US Department of Health and Human Services (HHS), "Standards for Privacy of Individually
Identifiable Health Information" (part 3), 28 December 2000, 82561-2, <http://www.hhs.gov/ocr/part3.pdf>
(13 October 2003).
Tenets 6 through 11 also do not prevent identifiable PHI use, again allowing for potential
information mishandling. Point 6 allows for individuals to restrict how PHI is used or
disclosed. Even if the individual specifies desired restrictions the covered entity is not
obligated to agree. Again, using identifiable PHI for PM may be profitable, therefore,
agreeing to any PHI restrictions may not be in the insurer's interest. HIPAA's point 8 the
minimal use requirement does not apply either. The covered entity must limit data access
in a manner consistent with the employee's need. 132 The classes of people who need PHI,
the types of PHI, and the conditions appropriate to the access must be understood.
"Reasonable" determinations should be made to restrict PHI access consistent with a
user's job. PM staff can run and modify the PM application. As implied from a
conversation with staff of the US Department of Health and Human Services Office for
Civil Rights which enforces HIPAA, granting identifiable PHI access to PM staff for
such functions should be permitted. 133 HIPAA allows for even stricter state law to take
precedence. However, in general, state statues do not support a strong notion of consent
when it comes to using health information internal to an entity. 134 Per state law, it appears
that internal information use is even less constricted.
Similar analysis can be made for the other BQMA. They can also be shown to permit the
usage of identifiable data, as they are also part of TPO.13
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1.5.2 Financial Perspective
Providing extended BQMA privacy protection also does not appear profitable, another
important component of the technology adoption model. We use a decision analytic
framework to demonstrate financial implications. Operationally, decision analysis uses
the values and perceived uncertainties of decision makers to choose an action providing
maximal expected value to the decision makers. 137 138 We model the making of a
financial decision per the descriptions in Thompson, Barr, and Hunink:139 140 141
132 HHS (part 2), 82544.
133 Implied, HHS, Office for Civil Rights staff, telephone interview with author, September 25, 2003.
134 HHS (part 1), 82473.
135 See for example Alcohol, Drug, and Mental Health Board for Franklin County, "Info for Consumers,"
<http://www.adamhfranklin.org/consumers/hipaaPolicy05.php> (19 April 2005).
136 Jack A. Rovner, "Don't Let Fear of HIPAA Keep You from Crucial Data," Managed Care Magazine,
March 2003, <http://www.managedcaremag.com/archives/0303/0303.legal.html> (5 April 2005).
137 Mark S. Thompson, Decision Analysis for Program Evaluation (Cambridge, MA: Ballinger Publishing
Company, 1982), 8.
138 Judith Barr and Gerald Schumacher, "Using Decision Analysis to Conduct Pharmacoeconomic Studies,"
in Quality ofLife and Pharmacoeconomics in Clinical Trials, Second Edition, ed. B. Spilker, 1198
(Philadelphia: Lippincott-raven Publishers, 1996).
139 Mark S. Thompson, 11-12.
140 Barr, 1197-1214.
141 Myriam Hunink and Paul Galsziou, Decision Making in Health and Medicine. Integrating Evidence and
Values (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2001), 251-266.
1) Determine from which point of view the decision should be made, such as a
patient's, a company's, or society's. Costs and benefits will be modeled from this
perspective.
2) Identify the overall decision, including the relevant timeframe. 142
3) For each decision path, a choice to make within the decision, structure the actions
and associated consequences over time.143
4) Assess the probability and economic outcome of each consequence in each
decision path. 144 145
5) Combine the probabilities and associated magnitudes of all events to arrive at a
final expected value for each path.
6) Select the path with the greatest expected value.
7) Conduct a sensitivity analysis to determine decision robustness based on
underlying financial parameters.1 46
We apply the framework to BQMA privacy protection. The time frame considered for
step 2, regarding whether additional BQMA privacy protections should be adopted, will
be 12 months. This is a relatively short time frame. We may assume the insurer will be
focused on decisions with short-term impacts because it might better control such
decisions.
Steps 4 and 5 require quantifying and combining the probabilities and magnitudes along
each decision path. We explore if available data permit quantifying the gains and losses
of adopting versus not adopting extra BQMA privacy protections.
1.5.2.1 Difficulty in Measuring Privacy Benefits
Unfortunately, it's difficult to quantify the benefits of providing privacy protection. Some
benefits are hard to uncover. Avoiding litigation would be a key financial benefit; the
insurer faces fewer lawsuits. Yet enforcement under HIPAA has been lax. Health
organizations have less to fear financially because they can address breaches and face
limited financial repercussions. HIPAA does not provide for a private cause of action. 147
Consumers must complain to the US Department of Health and Human Services (HHS),
which will investigate their complaints. Because consumers may not recognize privacy
violations and are not part of health organizations to understand how health information
might be misused, the number of complaints may not be large. 14 8 Furthermore, the intent
142 Barr, 1203.
143 Barr, 1205.
'44 Barr, 1207-8.
145 See for example Hunink, 40.
146 Hunink, 19.
147 Wiley Rein & Fielding LLP, "A New Era for HIPAA Enforcement," May 2004,
<http://www.wrf.com/publication newsletters.cfm?sp-newsletter&year-2004&ID=10&publication id=98
25&keyword> (29 August 2005).
148 iHealthbeat, "Enforcement of HIPAA Privacy: Making it Real," 19 November 2003,
<http://ihealthbeat.org/index.cfin?Action=dspltem&itemlD= 100262> (29 August 2005).
of HHS' enforcement approach is to seek voluntary compliance from covered entities.
Punishment may only come if voluntary reconciliation is ineffective.
The benefits of incorporating privacy-protecting policies and technologies may be
categorized. The losses stemming from inadequate privacy protection may be delineated
into measurable loss categories despite the "intangible" nature of privacy. 149 150 151 152
How customers purchase fewer goods or services from an organization; how customers
recommend an organization to others less often; or how an organization cannot acquire as
many new customers over time as before could be the measurable loss categories. 153 154
155 A measure can be obtained for each category. Implementing stronger privacy
protections would reverse such losses, quantifying the benefits of stronger privacy
protections.
Unfortunately, the data needed for such categories are often unavailable, and available
data are not robust. The biggest problem is simply data availability. Several
commentators have pointed out that there are disincentives for organizations to publish
information about their security breaches, which is needed for quantifying the losses
described above. 156 157 The organization may face legal liability as customers become
aware of how their data have been abused, or loss of reputation among business partners
who perceive lax security practices. The data that are available are not gathered based on
sound research principles. Worries regarding the publication of security data and other
reasons skew available statistics. The CSI/FBI survey is a popular annual survey on IT
abuse. Among other features it contains financial loss categories into which respondents
may place their financial losses for IT security for that year. Sabotage, System
Penetration, and Net Abuse are some of such categories. 158 The 2002 CSI/FBI survey
confirms that over the years, the response rate to the CSI/FBI survey has been low. Out of
the approximately 3500-4000 annual questionnaires mailed out, the response rate has
been about 14% from 1999-2002.159 Using the loss categories from the survey may lead
149 G. Stevenson Smith, "Recognizing and Preparing Loss Estimates from Cyber-Attacks," Information
Systems Security, 12 (2004); 47.
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159 Computer Security Institute, "2002 CSI/FBI Computer Crime and Security Survey," 2002,
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to bias because actual losses could be higher or lower than published results due to
significant non-response.
Another problem is the difficulty in measuring losses solely due to privacy. For example,
the US Post Office rents out 18 million post office boxes (PO boxes) for $500 million per
year. 160 The US Post Office explicitly lists privacy as one motivator for such rental. Even
if one can quantify a person's "willingness to pay" (WTP) for such privacy-that is,
quantify people's valuation of privacy based on how much they're willing to pay for
mailbox rental-professional appearance may be another reason why people rent PO
boxes. 16 1 The just computed WTP value would have to be further divided into a
"privacy" WTP and a "professionalism" (or something similar) WTP so that one can
extract the privacy-specific WTP.
Of course to avoid the difficulties with published studies, the organization can carry out
its own research. It can quantify its own measures of privacy protection. However, this
endeavor would be complex, too, requiring robust social research. HIPAA and other
federal and state laws have been passed. Consumer surveys continue to show people's
desire for medical privacy.162 163 Yet there appear only few current valuations of privacy
protection, medical or otherwise, regarding costs and especially benefits. In 2003, the
federal government's Office of Management and Budget (OMB) asked experts around
the country how to measure the "costs" of potential civil liberties and privacy intrusions
in the Bush Administration's push for tighter domestic security for better counter-
terrorism.164 How can one value lost time, lost privacy, and similar concepts so that the
price of increased security can be better ascertained and compared with "benefits"? The
OBM acknowledged that the end results may not necessarily even be quantifiable in
dollars.
The challenge in valuation, to which OMB's request points, is that the valuation effort
might not be simple. From the definition of privacy earlier, privacy protection is
ultimately defined by the consumer. Her perspective should be sought regarding whether
privacy protection is properly provided. The Ethical Force Program (EFP) guidelines
earlier underpin such a perspective. Policies promulgated to protect privacy within
organizations are inconsistent, limiting basic understanding of privacy safeguards
provision. The EFP guidelines mention that a variety of Fair Information Practices-type
of definitions exist in the US and the world. 165 The Joint Commission on Accreditation of
Healthcare Organizations and the National Committee for Quality Assurance which
create accreditation standards for health organizations; the American Bar Association;
and the HIPAA statute itself all suggest somewhat different ways of instantiating privacy
within organizations. Consumers may not have a consistent notion of what is "privacy."
160 Adam Shostak, "'People Won't Pay for Privacy,' Reconsidered," 14 March 2003,
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Further, as mentioned before, many consumers might not know the nature of PHI use
within health organizations.166 Health industry terms, specific organizations, and the
health industry itself might have to be explicated to consumers to solicit specific privacy
valuations.
Such work may take time and could lead to error. Smith et al. spent four years, from late
1989 to late 1993, constructing a privacy survey instrument measuring individuals'
attitudes towards organizational privacy practices. 167 They interviewed hundreds of
people across the US, computing standard survey internal and external validity
metrics. 168 Their focus is not completely appropriate for this thesis as they focused on
somewhat broader organizational issues. Nevertheless, what is relevant is that Stewart et
al. administered this survey in 2002. Stewart et al. showed that consumers may have
additional privacy concerns beyond those that Smith and his colleagues originally
thought. 169 Smith originally posited that people are concerned about too much data
collection, unauthorized secondary use of data, improper access to data, and that data
errors are not sufficiently cleaned. 170 Stewart found that this is true. However, consumers
may have additional information control concerns. They may want to exercise more
direct control over their data, such as getting access to them or being asked permission to
collect their personal information from the collecting organization. 171 Can the insurer
handle the associated methodological issues?
1.5.2.2 Cost of Solutions for Privacy Protection
The costs of adopting privacy-enhancing technologies and policies are easier to estimate
than their benefits. To address the BQMA privacy concerns, data must be deidentified,
errors must be handled in linkage identifiers, and ultimately data must be reidentified in
some cases, such as for disease management, so that staff can follow up with policy-
holders as needed. The main approach explored in this thesis is new deidentification
techniques that allow the BQMA to function, potentially, without loss of performance.
We will discuss the techniques in the technical part of this thesis. Outside of such
technical solutions, however, as we will see, there are few current solutions to provide
needed BQMA privacy protections. One solution to privacy concerns raised by BQMA is
the simple but extreme alternative of terminating the applications. Identifiable data would
no longer be used. However, the BQMA may currently save the insurer money; therefore
this solution is clearly not viable. An extended review of privacy-protecting solutions
166 C. Shawn Tracy, Guilherme Coelho Dantas, and Ross EG Upshur, "Feasibility of a Patient Decision Aid
Regarding Disclosure of Personal Health Information: Qualitative Evaluation of the Health Care
Information Directive," BMC Medical Informatics and Decision Making, 3-4 (2004),
<http://www.pubmedcentral.gov/picrender.fcgi?artid=518970&blobtype=pdf> (29 August 2005).
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shows few other possibilities. Another idea would be to "wait" for the problem to
dissolve. PHI concerns may be time sensitive, such as being dependent on family context
or care setting.172 One survey shows that those who spend time online and those who
have more rather than less online experience have fewer privacy concerns than non- or
new Internet users. 73 As individuals become more comfortable with computer
technology and perceive how heath information might be used within health care, they
might trust current health data management practices. Over time, privacy concerns
regarding an insurer might lessen.
In practice, such a solution would also be unworkable. Concerns about privacy have not
declined. 74 Some surveys show some associated levels of health privacy concern over
time. In 1993, 85% of the respondents to a Louis Harris and Associates survey said that
protecting the confidentiality of medical records was "absolutely essential" or "very
important."' 75 In a 2000 MedicAlert Foundation survey, 77% of the respondents stated
that the privacy of their health information is very important.176 In early 2003, I
informally surveyed eight genetic counselors who dealt with the rare genetic disorder
Huntington's disease. The counselors said between 20-80% of their patients getting tested
for the Huntington mutation paid for the test out of pocket due to privacy fears. 177
Other surveys imply an increase in privacy concern. A 2002 Harris Interactive survey
indicated that people may be divided into three categories regarding privacy
protection. 178 The privacy "fundamentalists" are those who feel privacy protection is a
core right and many organizations should generally not get the personal information they
seek. The privacy "pragmatists" are those who weigh the potential benefits provided by
organizations against costs of supplying personal information. The privacy
"unconcerned" are those who don't care much about privacy safeguards and more
willingly provide personal information despite warnings of potential privacy abuse. From
the second half of the 1990s to 2001, the percent of people self-identifying as
"fundamentalists" went up from 25% to 34% while the percent self-identifying as
"unconcerned" went down from 20% to 8%. Indeed, privacy concerns might be
increasing.
The other privacy-protecting solutions in the literature are prevention technology-based
solutions, which are mechanisms to prevent individuals from accessing data.179 180 181
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These solutions include encryption, data access controls, or query or output restrictions.
We will discuss these solutions, including the identifier error problem, in the technical
part of the thesis.
However, what is clear is that any solution will have a cost. Procedures or technical
upgrades will have to be incorporated into employees' workflows. These changes will
have a financial impact. Management, operations, and maintenance costs have been the
assumed costs of integrating security measures into the IT environment. 182
Following step 6 in our financial decision model, choosing the best alternative, not
providing additional BQMA privacy protection may be financially most advantageous for
the insurer. Methodological difficulties and unavailable data hamper the financial
valuation of practices that protect privacy. Whether from a 12-month perspective, or even
from a longer-term perspective, providing extra BQMA privacy protection does not
create a clear return on investment for the insurer because benefits are vague whereas
costs are less so. We will show later how a stronger financial case can be made for
adopting stronger BQMA privacy protections when data are analyzed more rigorously.
However, an unrigorous data analysis does not demonstrate clear financial benefits.
1.5.3 Organizational Perspective
Regarding the organizational context of the technology adoption model, we will focus on
the insurer's motivation to improve quality of care. The insurer's environment may be
focused on quality of care, encouraging the insurer to focus on the goal. Within the US,
health care organizations are encouraged to offer quality care. Consumers; the
government, including a President's Commission; accreditation organizations; and
national organizations that monitor US care quality all promote US health care quality.183
184 185 186 187 Health insurance organizations may also have such a goal. 188 For example,
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one study showed that if an HMO was profitable in a prior period, its quality of care
metrics were improved in a subsequent period. As the study concluded, HMO
profitability may allow the HMO to invest its resources in improving services which in
turn might enhance care.189
From a quality of care perspective, problems similar to those for identifying financial
benefits exist in identifying how extra BQMA privacy protection may improve care. Few
studies assess the impact of using privacy-protecting policies and technologies on care
provision, lessening demand for such protections. The company that created the master
patient indices discussed earlier indicates that many organizations may not be aware of
the care delivery impact of identifier errors.190 191 The degree of suboptimal PM linkage
or the reduction in medical effectiveness due to poor linkage within software applications
may be unclear to organizations.
1.5.4 Technical Perspective
Technical efficiency in the context of our technology adoption model will mean utilizing
a more secure and efficient technology in providing privacy protection. As we mentioned
before, there are apparently few current technical solutions that meet the requirements of
BQMA privacy protections. We will create new technology to provide such protections
later on. However, without new approaches few other solutions appear to exist, lessening
demand for needed protections.
1.6 Chapter Conclusion
A less rigorous analysis of data does not demonstrate the benefits to the insurer of adding
additional BQMA privacy protections. From a regulatory, economic, organizational, and
technical perspective available data do not support adopting such protections. Federal law
does not require them; such protections do not appear to provide financial or quality of
care benefits; and technically they appear difficult to create. A more convincing argument
can be made for adopting such protections when analyzing existing and new data in more
depth. We conduct such an analysis in chapters two and three.
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2 Contextual, Financial, and Organizational Support for
Stronger Privacy Protections in Routine Applications
Upon closer inspection, available data support adding extra BQMA privacy protections.
In this chapter, we will more closely investigate the legislative, financial, and quality of
care benefits. The technical mechanisms to provide such protections will be given in
chapter three. The outline of this chapter is as follows. We will first highlight the new
laws which are being considered because identifiable data have been significantly
recently misused in the US. A new cost model will be subsequently presented
demonstrating the detailed financial benefits and costs of adding stronger BQMA privacy
protections. Capturing a somewhat realistic competitive health insurance market, the cost
model first describes how some policy-holders may switch to a competitive insurance
organization which offers extra BQMA privacy protections. Next, the financial benefit
from reducing the ability of BQMA staff to misuse the copy data store(s) because it is in
identifiable form will be computed. In the third part of the model, we will explain how
the insurer should handle the increase in claims liability it will face should it offer
stronger BQMA privacy protections. Some policy-holders will stop paying for medical
services out-of-pocket because the insurer provides better privacy safeguards, increasing
the insurer's claims expenses. We will describe the steps the insurer should take to obtain
the funds to pay for such expenses. Fourth, a disease management model will be
constructed to show how improving BQMA privacy protections will allow the insurer to
enroll candidates into disease management programs in a timely manner. Expenses to the
insurer should be reduced because it has a greater opportunity to prevent complications
arising regarding its policy-holders' medical conditions. In the fifth part of the cost
model, the same disease management model will be invoked to show how reducing errors
in linkage identifiers will also allow for timely enrollment of policy-holders into a disease
management program and thus again likely reduce the insurer's expenses. Sixth, the costs
of data deidentification will be computed. This is the mechanism we will use to provide
the stronger BQMA privacy protections, as will be shown in chapter three. Seventh, the
last part of the cost model, will be a sensitivity analysis to demonstrate the contextual
parameters impacting the insurer's financial benefits from adding better privacy
protections. Finally, to demonstrate improvements in quality of care to policy-holders,
another component of our technology adoption model, we will again rely on the disease
management model. By enrolling more policy-holders into a disease management
program the insurer enhances their care. We will quantify the improvement in care that
policy-holders experience as a result of the insurer's efforts to improve their privacy.
2.1 Contextual Support for Privacy Protection in Routine
Applications
From the insurer's environmental perspective, by voluntarily embracing more BQMA
privacy protections the insurer might avoid new administrative burdens stemming from
external regulations that might be passed. The privacy aspects of HIPAA as well as other
federal and state laws protecting general privacy have been passed due to rising recent
and past concerns about the ease of data collection, transmission, and misuse within
health care and other organizations in the US.192 Democratic- and Republican-sponsored
bills have been passing through Congress in 2005 to better protect the privacy of
identifiable data within different organizations in the wake of the most recent data
breaches at ChoicePoint, Bank of America, and LexisNexis.1 93 194 These laws will affect
insurance organization practices because insurers utilize such identifiable data.
Additional laws, specific to the health industry, may be passed if internal data within
health organizations continue to be subject to misapplication. If the insurer adopts
stronger BQMA privacy protections it might lessen the opportunity for the passage of
such legislation.
The following is a sample of 2005 bills currently passing through Congress, offering a
description of bills that might become laws due to poor privacy protections. These bills
would affect insurer practices. Bill S.768, the "Comprehensive Identity Theft Prevention
Act," prescribes the following actions, out of an extended list, for a "covered person," i.e.
any commercial entity, to follow regarding IT security breaches.195 If the covered person
is subject to a breach wherein there is reason to believe the sensitive information taken
can be used to reidentify data subjects, the covered person must notify all people who are
believed to have been subjects of the breach as well as the Federal Trade Commission
(FTC). Further, consumers, upon receiving such a notice, may request that the covered
person expunge their sensitive information from the entity's internal records. There is
also a prohibition from soliciting Social Security Numbers (SSN) by any individual
unless this is necessary for normal business and no other identifying number can be used.
S.1408, the "Identity Theft Prevention Act," also requires a covered entity, i.e., any for-
profit or nonprofit organization, to notify consumers, the FTC, and all consumer
reporting agencies, such as the national credit agencies Experian or Trans Union, if there
is a reasonable basis to conclude some identity theft has happened involving the covered
entity's data.196 197 There is also a prohibition from soliciting SSNs unless there is a
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specific use for them for which no other identifier exists. S.1332, the "Personal Data
Privacy and Security Act of 2005," also provides for consumer notification when data
have been stolen.'19 Credit reporting agencies must again be notified. The business entity
that suffered the breach must pay for a monthly credit report and credit monitoring
services for each consumer who was notified about the breach for a period of 1 year after
the notice was sent to the consumer. A business entity cannot require an individual to
provide his SSN as an account number to obtain goods or services after the passage of
this Act. Goods or services must be provided if a person does not or cannot supply the
SSN. It's important to note that these bills' SSN-usage limitations might make uses of the
SSN more challenging for insurers. Per the Government Accountability Office, as we will
later see, some insurers use SSNs as the primary policy-holder identifiers. Modifications
to insurers' information systems might be necessary to minimize SSN use. All the bills
above prescribe penalties if the tenets described above are not appropriately followed.
2.2 Financial Support
2.2.1 "Competitive" Profitability
From an economic point of view, this thesis demonstrates a new analysis to quantify
some financial advantages of installing additional BQMA privacy protections. We
quantify some intangible benefits of utilizing privacy safeguards, demonstrating positive
returns to a health insurer. Note, in the presentation of a cost model below, we present
specific averages of values based on particular assumptions. We relax these assumptions
in the sensitivity analysis which follows the construction of the basic model. Also, we
present our computed results with one extra significant digit. To extract the "final value"
of any computed result one only needs to round off the very last non-zero digit of a
completed computation.
Consider the following somewhat hypothetical cost model, which is based on the national
health insurance market in 2001. According to Kaiser Foundation research, the total
number of non-elderly people in the US in 2001 was 247.5 million.' 99 Of these, 64.7%,
that is, about 160.1 million individuals, received employment-based insurance. In 2001,
in this population 60%, or about 96.0 million people, had a choice of at least two health
197 Federal Trade Commission, "Nation's Big Three Consumer Reporting Agencies Agree To Pay $2.5
Million To Settle FTC Charges of Violating Fair Credit Reporting Act,"
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199 The Henry J. Kaiser Family Foundation. "Health Insurance Coverage in America, 2001 Data Update,"
January 2003,
<http://www.kff.org/uninsured/loader.cfr?url=/commonspot/security/getfile.cfm&PagelD=14309> (1
April 2005).
plan options through their workplace. 20 0 We focus on these individuals, approximately a
third of the US population in 2001. Assume such individuals are part of the health
insurance "group market" as employers typically purchase insurance for their employees
as a group rather than sponsor the employees' purchase of "individual" insurance. 20 1
We examine two competing insurers in this marketplace. We make several simplifying
assumptions regarding available marketplace data to synthesize our model. According to
2001 research, all states had a number of insurers in the group market serving people in
those states.202 The market penetration of the top three group health insurers varied from
96% to 30%, and on average was 66%. The penetration of the largest group insurer
varied from 91% to 11%, and on average was 39%.203 Comparing the two different
market shares suggests that our 96-million person cohort must have been served by at
least two different insurance organizations. Building our hypothetical cost model on these
data, our top company would have a 39% market share. We can assume the second
company would have a 14% market share, approximately half of the 27% difference
between the 66% and 39% penetrations. We assume that the second and third largest
insurers had roughly equal distributions of the remaining market share, for simplicity. In
our hypothetical model, the total market share of the first and second insurance company
would be 53%. To simplify the computations, we will assume equal populations across
all US states. Thus, in our model, on average the total number of covered employees per
state was 96 / 50, or roughly 1.92 million. Often employees chose their health benefits
every 12 months. 2 04 We therefore also assume that the total number of employees
annually choosing only one of the two companies mentioned above was 1,920,000 * 0.53
or approximately 1,010,000 individuals. The 39% penetration means the larger insurer
enrolled roughly 748,000 policy-holders, while the smaller insurer, at 14% penetration,
enrolled roughly 268,000 policy-holders in 2001.
First, we estimate how many people join the insurer because it provides extra BQMA
privacy protection. This helps us quantify in our hypothetical model how much of a gain
market share an organization might achieve through the intangible "improvement in
reputation" relating to privacy protection, one benefit of incorporating extra privacy
protection.205 206 27 To obtain a quantitative estimate for our model, we will use data
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derived from two privacy notification studies administered in 2001. These studies were
not specific to the health care industry but queried people's responses to offline privacy
notices from financial institutions including banks, insurance companies, and credit card
organizations. The studies explored people's response to such privacy notices. While the
studies were not limited to insurance companies, the survey contexts and our contexts do
overlap to a degree. One 2001 survey of 2468 adults indicated 25% (n=617) either
"frequently read" or "always read" the privacy notices from such institutions (defined as
institutions that send out a bill, credit card, bank, or other financial statement, as, for
example, a health insurer, which deals with the financial aspects of healthcare, may).20 8 A
second 2001 survey of 2053 adults indicated that approximately 12% (n=246) "most of
the time...carefully read" the privacy notices concerning their financial institutions
(defined as banks, investment companies, or insurance companies). 209 This second survey
also queried all respondents, asking what action they would take after reading a privacy
notice sent to them from their financial institution. Nineteen percent would use "more
discretion in choosing which financial institution with which to interact." 210 We can
combine the results of both surveys to obtain an estimate in our model of the percentage
of individuals who might "frequently" or "always" read such privacy notices and who
might react based on the content of such notices. The combined estimate of the
percentage of people who would "frequently" or "always" read such notices becomes
19%. If we assume that the 19% of all individuals who use more discretion in choosing a
financial institution after reading a notice, from the second survey, is distributed
uniformly across the different categories of readership regarding privacy notices within
the second survey, then our hypothetical model would indicate that approximately 3.6%
of adults would read a privacy notice and react based on content.
What is the impact of the roughly 3.6%? This is the number of people who would switch
to the insurer that offered extra BQMA privacy protection. We focus on the larger insurer
first but then focus on the smaller insurer. Imagine that the larger insurer installs
additional BQMA privacy safeguards before the smaller one. It wants to explore any
potential benefits of offering more policy-holder privacy. During annual reenrollment,
about 3.6% of current enrollees of the smaller insurer would notice the larger insurer's
privacy practices and switch health plans, if the smaller insurer lacked such practices.
How would policy-holders notice the larger insurer's practices? They may read about
them in the insurer's information distributions. In the interests of obtaining privacy
benefits the larger insurer may want to advertise its practices. One advertising method
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would be through workplace marketing efforts. These are informational efforts wherein
the insurer relays its health benefit offerings through employers and allows employees to
select more individualized coverage if they wish.2 1 The insurer may also publicize its
privacy practices in its Notice. HIPAA requires covered entities to send Notices to their
constituents as per HIPAA's tenet 3, described earlier. Roughly 3.6% of individuals are
attuned to and may take action based on such "notices." About 3.6% of policy-holders
would notice the differences between the two insurers based on the content of any larger
and smaller insurer's information distributions and switch health plans to the preferable
insurer.
2.2.1.1 Plan Switching Complexity
We should mention that health plan switching may be more complicated than as
explained above. Health plan benefits and price as well as privacy practices may be
reasons why people switch plans. Further, how well privacy protection is advertised; how
quickly it's implemented; and if it's provided for other internal insurer applications,
which would enhance privacy protection, would all need to be computed to understand
plan switching behavior.21 2 Still, the roughly 3.6% computed above is triangulated by
several evidentiary sources. In the 1999 California HealthCare Foundation Survey, a
similar number of people did not merely say they would act based on PHI protection
practices for applications such as the BQMA; they actually acted accordingly, in that case
paying out of pocket to protect privacy in such applications. We will examine these data
below. In a 2000 survey, 5% of the public used special software that hid its identity from
the websites it visited.2 13 Several health industry organizations have pointed out recently
that patients may be concerned about disease management's privacy implications, and
1%-2% of individuals have opted out of such programs at one large health insurance
organization recently potentially due to privacy. 214 215 A lawsuit was filed in 2003 against
the US Department of Health and Human Services alleging that the removal of the consent
requirement for Treatment, Payment, and Operations in the latest version of HIPAA was a
privacy violation. 216 The plaintiff, representing individuals and health care practitioners,
wanted more control over PHI within health institutions. The plaintiff was a coalition of
consumers and health care practitioners representing approximately 750,000 individuals
in the US.217 According to one of the lead plaintiff attorneys, the number of individuals
211 See for example Allstate, Workplace Division, "Workplace Marketing,"
<http://www.ahlcorp.com/ProdIndWork.asp> (Apr 1, 2005).
212 For example, see analogous concepts in "Living Large," Health Management Technology, 24 (2003):
32-33.
213 The Pew Internet & American Life Project, 10.
214 Laura Benko, "Long-range Forecast: Partly Healthy, Chance of Storms," Modern Healthcare, 34
(2004): 28.
215 William Atkinson, "Making Disease Management Work," Society for Human Resource Management,
47 (2002), <http://www.shrm.org/hrmagazine/articles/0102/0102atkinson.asp> (24 July 2005).
216 Deborah Peel, "Lawsuit Challenges HIPAA," MSPP News, 13 (2003),
<http://www.mspp.net/hipaa lawsuit.htm> (30 August 2005).
217 Peel, "Lawsuit Challenges HIPAA."
who might have been represented could have been several million as the coalition had to
turn away organizations to efficiently coordinate the litigation. 218 If up to several million
individuals were concerned, up to one percent of the US population in 2003 were
concerned. 219
Profitability can be computed as follows. The larger insurer would capture 0.036 *
268,000 or about 9640 people from the smaller insurer during annual re-enrollment. 220 In
2003, the typical profit per member per month for an insurer of any size was $5.15.221
The annual profit therefore becomes $61.8 per member. The annual profit to the larger
insurer from attracting such individuals becomes 9640 * 61.8 or approximately $595,000
in 2003. This number must be converted to 2001 figures for consistency. Using the
Consumer Price Index, the total becomes about $572,000.222 The smaller insurer would
lose approximately this same sum. It would continue losing such a sum annually until it
also offered similar privacy protections. Of course, if the smaller insurer installed such
protections first, its potential gains (and the corresponding losses of the larger insurer)
would be considerably larger. The same percent of people from the larger insurer would
now switch to the smaller insurer. However, such gains would have to be moderated by
the smaller insurer's capacity. The smaller insurer may not be able to take on 0.036 *
748,000 or about 26,900 additional policy-holders quickly due to infrastructure
limitations. Nevertheless, a considerably larger profitability and loss for the smaller and
larger insurers, respectively, is possible if the smaller insurer installs such protections
first. We examine the probability of such profitabilities later in the text.
2.2.2 Reduction in Loss from Information Abuse
Next we measure the loss from having an employee abuse identifiable PHI because he
has access to it. This quantifies the intangible "increase in operating costs" an
organization may face if it offers less privacy protection, one loss of not providing strong
protection.223 22 Preventing the loss would create the benefit. Data on the precise
magnitude of such losses are difficult to find. However, an estimate can be derived for
the purposes of our model using a combination of an unpublished data set of privacy
violations at East Coast health institutions, spanning over 15 years, made especially
218 Jim Pyles, attorney, telephone interview with author, July 26, 2005.
219 US Census Bureau, "National and State Population Estimates,"
<http://www.census.gov/popest/states/tables/NST-EST2005-01.xls> (Microsoft Excel file, 28 January
2006).
220 Once again, as per a reference earlier, it is assumed that children belonging to the same health plan as
their parents would go along with the health plan choice of their parents, who would be making the choice
to switch during annual re-enrollment.
221 National Association of Insurance Commissioners finance staff, email to author, April 7, 2005.
222 Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis, "What is a Dollar Worth?"
<http://minneapolisfed.org/research/data/us/calc/> (13 April 2005).
223 G. Stevenson Smith, 47.
224 Thomas R. Shaw, "The Moral Intensity of Privacy: An Empirical Study of Webmasters' Attitudes,"
Journal of Business Ethics, 46 (2003): 307.
available for this thesis research, and a public survey with less perfect data. The data set
regarding East Coast health institutions will be called the East Coast malpractice data set
from now on due to its malpractice costs information content.
The East Coast malpractice data set contains data on the legal and administrative costs to
manage the breach of confidentiality claim and any damages paid out for the East Coast
health institutions.225 Other intangible losses, such as a particular institution's lost market
share or decline in reputation, are not in the data. I performed a content analysis of the
violations in the East Coast malpractice data set and included incidents in which an
employee obtained PHI in paper or electronic form, as opposed to obtaining PHI by, for
example, treating patients if he was a clinician. I also included cases where an employee
used PHI without consumer authorization or in an obviously abusive manner, such as
stealing someone's identity, as opposed to using PHI under a legal context where
consumer "rights" might be less enforceable. In this case, the consumer might not have
privacy protection "rights" even if better protection were to be implemented. For each
year in the data set, I spread the costs across all employees, across all institutions. For a
given year, the loss per employee was never more than one or two dollars. 226 For a
number of years it was considerably smaller.
The second data source, the 2001 CSI/FBI survey, enabled us to come up with an
estimate of per employee losses related to technical and infrastructural patches required
after an insider security breach. The data from this survey only appear to focus on the
financial costs to recover from breaches at the technical infrastructural level and do not
quantify intangible losses. 227 We extract the information necessary from the CSI/FBI
survey to compute the per-employee losses. The CSI/FBI survey lists 10 categories of IT
violations into which respondents may place their annual financial losses.228 Some of
these categories, such as Sabotage or System Penetration, were mentioned before.
Although there is not an exact one-to-one mapping between any of these specific
225 Unpublished data from Executive Information System database, Controlled Risk Insurance Company
(CRICO)/Risk Management Foundation (RMF). Obtained on March 4, 2005.226 Note, the actual computation was as follows. We need a loss per employee per year. We must handle the
case when organizational employees can only cause damage to their own, not other organizations. Risk
must be properly apportioned to an organization's own employees. Thus an "average organization" was
created. It contained an average number of employees and an average IT abuse loss per year. We use the
computations associated with the "average organization" to obtain an average loss per employee in the East
Coast malpractice data set. We first found the average number of employees for the average organization.
We divided the total number of employees across all organizations by the total number of organizations in
the data set. We next obtained "average loss" for the average organization. We divided the total losses
across all organizations for every year by the number of organizations in the data set. Finally, to obtain the
average loss per employee in the data set, the average organization's average loss was divided by its
average number of employees. However, the number of organizations in the data set canceled each other
out in these computations. The average number of employees and average loss were both divided by the
total number of organizations: since the average loss is divided by the average number of employees, the
total number of organizations is divided by itself, leading to 1. The final computation in the text
representing average IT abuse loss per employee can therefore be simplified to: total losses across all
organizations per year divided by all employees across all organizations, as presented in the text.
227 Computer Security Institute, "2005 CSI/FBI Computer Crime and Security Survey,"
<http://i.cmpnet.com/gocsi/db area/pdfs/fbi/FBl2005.pdf> (30 August 2005).
228 See Computer Security Institute, "2001 CSI/FBI Computer Crime and Security Survey."
categories and IT losses due to PHI access we will use the "Financial Fraud" category for
our analysis. Another 2004 e-crimes survey regarding PHI abuse appears to place internal
PHI abuses into a similar category. Internal employees could abuse PHI in several ways,
such as committing identity fraud or improperly disposing of PHI. 229 230 231 The authors
of the 2004 E-Crime Watch Survey placed a number of such incidents into a "fraud"
category of their own for analysis. 23 We mimic this approach, utilizing "Financial
Fraud" within the CSI/FBI survey. Of the CSI/FBI respondents who reported a monetary
loss in the Financial Fraud category, the average loss per organization was $4,420,738.
Further, of all breaches, approximately 50% were due to insider attacks. 234 Therefore, the
average loss per organization from insider loss was roughly $2,210,000.
We must also know the number of employees per respondent to quantify per-employee
losses. The CSI/FBI survey collected data on the 534 company respondents. The number
of employees varied widely.235
Percent of the 534 CSI/FBI Number of employees per
company respondents respondent
16% 1 - 99
16% 100 -499
8% 500- 999
22% 1000 -5000
11% 5001 -9999
27% 10,000 or more
Company respondents and their number of employees
For the purposes of our hypothetical model, let's assume the number of employees was
distributed normally within these ranges and we'll take the mean number of employees
for each of these ranges. Thus: 16% of the respondents had 50 employees; 16% had 300;
8% had 750; 22% had 3,000; 11% had 7,500; and 27% had 10,000 or more employees.
To obtain a conservative upper limit on the number of employees in companies with
10,000+ employees, I will use the 2001 data from the list of the largest Fortune 500
companies: the top 10 companies had on average 436,300 employees, assuming a normal
distribution of employees. 2 6 Therefore, for our model, the average number of employees
per organization becomes about 119,000. Using the previously derived estimate of
organizational losses due to insider breaches, and this estimate of the average number of
employees per organization, we can now estimate the annual technical/infrastructure loss
per employee due to internal attacks to be 2,210,000 / 119,000 or about $18. Combining
this technical infrastructure loss with the breach of confidentiality management costs
229 HIPAAps Privacy and Security.230 CRICO/RMF data.
231 CSO Magazine, "2004 E-Crime Watch Survey,"
<http://www.cert.org/archive/pdf/2004eCrimeWatchSummary.pdf> (10 April 2005).232 CSO Magazine.
233 Computer Security Institute, "2001 CSI/FBI Computer Crime and Security Survey."234 Computer Security Institute, "2001 CSI/FBI Computer Crime and Security Survey."235 Computer Security Institute, "2001 CSI/FBI Computer Crime and Security Survey."
236 "Fortune 500 Largest US Corporations," Fortune, F-31, April 15, 2002.
derived from the East Coast malpractice data set we come up with a global estimate of
per-employee loss due to identifiable PHI access. This estimate is no more than $20 per
year.
The following are the cost implications. From one PM vendor, the number of people
required to operate PM may be from 2 to 5.237 The larger values would hold especially
for larger organizations. Such people run the PM platform, ensure data integrity, and
perform other functions. If an organization develops and programs its own PM
application, an additional approximately 3-4 people annually may be required to provide
the needed business, clinical, and IT expertise. We use 4 people for our computations;
this includes the average number of basic staff; this also includes less than one in-house
PM platform development staff person. Assuming operational similarity across the
BQMA, as explained in Section 1.3.2, for the larger insurer, a total of 16 people might be
employed operating the four BQMA. The upper bound on the annual loss due to insider
PHI abuse becomes roughly 16 * $20 or $320. This will be approximately true for the
smaller insurer, too, although potentially lower.
2.2.3 Paying Out-of-pocket Dynamics
The next intangible loss we quantify represents the impact of using privacy-protective
policies and technologies on an organization's reputation. If an insurer implements
procedures to better protect privacy in the hopes of improving its reputation, it may
reverse people's "defensive" behavior. People are paying out of pocket to protect privacy.
If the insurer offers better privacy protection, it may reverse people's payment behavior,
increasing the insurer's cost as the insurer must pay for policy-holders' healthcare. The
insurer can target different groups of policy-holders in attempts to recover the funds
necessary to pay for the extra claims expenses.
Consider people's "willingness to pay" (WTP) for BQMA anonymity. One of the
California HealthCare Foundation Survey questions specifically asked respondents
whether they paid out of pocket instead of submitting claim records to their insurer to avoid
having their "employer or someone else" gaining access to their medical information.
Looking at these responses as a function of the type of insurance a respondent had, 11.4% of
individuals (61 out of 535 individuals) who were in "strict" managed care paid out of
pocket to prevent such a disclosure; approximately 5.1% of individuals (i.e., 55 out of
1073 individuals) who were in "loose" managed care paid out of pocket to prevent this
disclosure; and 4.2% of individuals (9 out of 217 individuals) who were in "traditional
237 MEDecision staff, telephone interview with author, March 22, 2005.
238 Some organizations rely on such in-house development although the trend may not be rising. (Director,
Clinical Informatics, large health insurance organization in the South East, telephone interview with author,
April 1, 2005). As the PM market matures, vendors are improving PM platforms, requiring less need for
organizations to develop their own applications. Still, if the insurer wants to differentiate itself in the health
insurance market or serve special populations it might modify the PM application in-house.
plans" paid out of pocket to prevent such a disclosure. 239 We will combine the "loose"
managed care and "traditional plans" into a new derived category. The percent of
individuals in the "looser" managed care arrangements is approximately 4.96%. The
difference between the "looser" managed care arrangement and "strict" managed care is
6.44%. Why this more than double difference in out-of-pocket payment? One possible
explanation is BQMA information practices which vary between these two insurance
groups. As some analysts point out, managed care organizations rely on applications such as
the BQMA to contain costs. 24 0 241 For example, Utilization Review can be used to approve a
referral by a primary care physician or approve treatment for patients, as explained before.
The California HealthCare Foundation Survey defines individuals to be in "strict"
managed care if their health insurer enforces similar practices. "Strict" managed care
individuals are those who pay less "if [they go to] a doctor from a list, but...pay more if
[they] go to a doctor not on the list... [and they] sign up with a specific primary care doctor
or group of doctors who provide all [their] routine health care...[and they must] have a
referral by a primary care doctor before [they] can see a medical specialist...[or they must]
have approval or a referral before [the health plan] will pay for any of [their] costs for
visiting a doctor who is not in the plan." 242 That is, those in strict managed care may be
aware of the greater oversight provided by their insurance company using applications such
as Utilization Review and this may be one of the explanations of the different responses
regarding privacy protection within the California HealthCare Foundation Survey.243 244
We assume that of people in strict managed care who are paying out of pocket, 1 -
0.0496, or approximately 95% will pay out of pocket due to BQMA information
practices. We remove from the strict managed care group all out-of-pocket payment
behavior regarding those in "non-strict" managed care arrangements. That is, we remove
those in "looser" managed care arrangements who presumably would not be worried as
much about BQMA information practices. The total percent of individuals in strict
managed care paying out of pocket only due to the BQMA information practices
becomes 0.95 * 0.114 or approximately 10.8%.
We quantify the WTP for analysis. A secondary analysis of the California HealthCare
Foundation Survey revealed that in 1998 of the respondents who said they paid out of
239 Larry Hugick, staff, Princeton Survey Research Associates International, fax to author, December 11,
2003.
240 See Kremer, 553-554.
241 See Bradford Kirkman-Liff, "Restoring Trust to Managed Care, Part 1: A Focus on Patients,"
<http://www.aimc.com/files/articlefiles/AJMC2003feb 1Kirkman 174-180.pdf> (1 April 2005).
242 "Strict" managed care is defined as answering affirmatively to questions 48 and 49 as well as to
questions 50 or 51 in the California Healthcare Foundation Survey. (Larry Hugick, staff, Princeton Survey
Research Associates International, telephone interview with author, March 21, 2006; California Healthcare
Foundation, "Medical Privacy and Confidentiality Survey," 1999,
<http://www.chcf.org/documents/ihealth/topline.pdf> (Apr 1, 2005)). The verbiage for these questions in
the Survey is in the text.243 See, for example, Kremer, 553-554, 556.
244 See Kirkman-Liff, "Restoring Trust to Managed Care, Part 1: A Focus on Patients."
pocket and were in strict managed care, the following sums were paid in order to avoid
divulging their PHI to an "employer or someone else:" 245
-63.2% of individuals paid 0
-15.2% of individuals paid less than $100
-10.1% of individuals paid $100 - $500
--4.2% of individuals paid $500 - $1000
-3.6% of individuals paid $1000 - $5000
-3.8% of individuals refused to answer
Assuming that the dollar amounts were normally distributed within each range and taking
the mean within each of these ranges, we come up with the number of dollars paid out of
pocket by each of these respondents--the total is about $170. We conservatively assume
the same behavior in 2001 for such individuals because privacy concerns have not abated
and might have even increased since 1998, the year of the California HealthCare
Foundation Survey. Converting via the Consumer Price Index, the 2001 value is about
$180. The California HealthCare Foundation Survey also indicates that 28% of all insured
individuals nationwide belonged to strict managed care in late 1998. Therefore, we assume
28% of the 10.8% or about 3.02% of individuals nationwide were concerned about the
BQMA privacy practices regarding an insurance organization. 246 We assume membership in
strict managed care should be the same in 2001 as in late 1998, only two and a half years
later.247 We return to our model of the hypothetical larger insurer. It's approximately
750,000 policy-holders annually pay 748,000*180*(0.0302) or about $4,060,000 out of
pocket to avoid identifiable PHI use for the BQMA. 248 The policy-holders at the smaller
insurer have a proportionally smaller WTP.
245 Larry Hugick, fax to author. In fact, the secondary analysis provides these statistics for individuals and
their immediate families paying out of pocket. Since we are computing for individuals only, I conducted
another secondary analysis of the data. (Princeton Survey Research Associates staff, email to author, June
20, 2003). The percentages for individuals paying out of pocket across the payment categories in the text,
such as paid less than $100, paid $100-$500, etc., as will be shown in the text, were roughly similar to
those of such categories representing individuals and their immediate family members. Therefore, we
assume strict managed care statistics for individuals should be similar to strict managed care information
for individuals and immediate family members. We rely on the secondary analysis statistics for individuals
and immediate family members to present, in the text, individuals' payments out-of-pocket regarding strict
managed care.
246 Note, the assumption is that often health insurance organizations offer multiple products, such as
"traditional" (indemnity) plans and various types of managed care offerings. (See James Robinson, "The
Future of Managed Care Organization," Health Affairs, 18 (1999): 7-24). Therefore, for a given insurer,
some policy-holders should purchase its "strict" managed care offerings, some its "loose" managed care
offerings, etc. This allows us to use the 28%, which represents the percent of all insured individuals
belonging to strict managed care, as implying what percent of a typical insurer's policy-holders purchase its
strict managed care products. Afterwards, we can apply the 10.8%, which represents people's WTP
behavior towards organizations which have only strict managed care products, to the 28% for a typical
insurer, which has strict managed care as well as other products. The result is the percent of people
nationally concerned about strict managed care BQMA information practices within an insurer.
247 California Healthcare Foundation, "Medical Privacy and Confidentiality Survey," 25.
248 We assume that the children who belong to the roughly 748,000 members of the large insurer also have
a "willingness-to-pay" for privacy. That is, the assumption is that the children may pay for their care
themselves, as implied by Ford. (See Carol Ford, Abigail English, and Garry Sigman. "Confidential Health
Care for Adolescents: Position Paper of the Society of Adolescent Medicine," Journal ofAdolescent
At first, such a WTP appears to benefit the insurer. The health plan avoids paying
roughly $4 million of its own resources; it avoids this large loss. 24 9 250 However, such a
perception is reversed if the insurer installs and publicizes the new BQMA privacy
protections to obtain any benefits from such protections. It might suddenly face an
increase in annual claims of about $4 million. People who paid out of pocket to protect
privacy may now stop paying out of pocket and start submitting claims. They are getting
BQMA privacy protection, which is what they wanted, for free, by relying on the
insurer's new advertised process.
2.2.3.1 Managing Out-of-pocket Payments
The significance of the $4 million to an insurer is unclear. The expense might be large.
The financial literature points to the "medical loss ratio" as one indicator of an insurer's
financial performance. This ratio is computed by dividing health care expenses, the
claims paid out, by the total premiums collected by the insurer.25 1 A rise in a few percent
or even half a percent of the medical loss ratio might be meaningful to an insurer,
potentially signifying that the insurer cannot control expenses. 25 The WTP might
produce a small rise in the medical loss ratio. For example, for two large health insurers
in New England, Harvard Pilgrim and Blue Cross and Blue Shield of Massachusetts, in
2004, a roughly $4.3 million in additional claims (2004 dollars) would signify a roughly
0.2% or 0.1% change in the medical loss ratio, respectively, which might be
significant. 253 254 In 2004, profits for Harvard Pilgrim would fall from $38,619,000 to
about $34 million, a drop of about 11% because of such an expense.
On the other hand, the $4 million might be less of a concern to very profitable insurers.
Several large health insurers had net incomes from over $240 million to over $340
million in the early 2000s and in 2004, of which the roughly $4 million would be a very
small percent.255 256 If the $4 million impact is not financially significant, the insurer
might absorb it.
Health, 35 (2004): 160-7). Alternatively, parents may pay for their children's care to protect the privacy of
the children's medical information. Both assumptions are also made regarding the smaller insurer.249 Laura Benko, "Less is Not More," Modem Healthcare, 30 (2000): 41.
250 Laura Benko, "...You Pay," Modern Healthcare, 33 (2003): 8.
251 Paul Grimaldi, "The Versatile Medical Loss Ratio," Nursing Management, 29 (1998): 12.
252 Joe Niedzielski, "Rising Expenses Nip at Results of Public HMOs," National Underwriter, 100 (1996):
4,9.
253 Harvard Pilgrim Health Care, "Annual Report 2004," <http://www.harvardpilgrim.org/hpimages/HP-
2004Annual.pdf?SMSESSION=NO> (30 August 2005).
254 Blue Cross and Blue Shield of Massachusetts, "Annual Report 2004,"
<http://www.bcbsma.com/common/en US/repositories/CommonMainContent/aboutUs/AnnualReport/BC
BSMA 04 Financials.pdf> (30 August 2005).
255 Laura Benko, "Earnings at a Premium," Modern Healthcare, 32 (2002): 22-23.256 Blue Cross and Blue Shield of Massachusetts.
If the insurer wants to recover the new dollars lost due to increased claims from the
population who were previous paying out of pocket, there may be several recovery
methods. The easiest would be to divide the $4 million by all policy-holders and raise
everyone's premium by the same amount. Everyone would pay for privacy protection
desired by some. In 2001, an average covered employee paid $360 per year for health
insurance. 257 In 2001, adults represented 69.1% of all the non-elderly individuals who
had health insurance.258 We focus on adults since they, as opposed to children, would
probably be the ones paying for health insurance, including any for that of their families.
The large insurer therefore had 748,000 * 0.691 or about 516,000 adult members. If the
WTP were fully passed on to such employees, 4,060,000 / 516,000, or about $7.86,
would be the additional annual cost to such employees, policy-holders of the large
insurer. Note, this assumes the employee is responsible for the entire premium cost. If the
employer pays for part of the premium, as is common, the employer would be responsible
for part of the premium increase. 259 Compared to the $360, the $7.86 would represent an
annual payment increase of approximately 2.1% for health insurance for the adults.2 60
The insurer can target groups that contain individuals with a WTP and charge them
premiums to cover the WTP. The author named Perry 6 lays out a psychological
framework of how individuals may react to risk.261 Some look at risk fatalistically, others
try to encourage the passing of legislation to protect against risk, and still others protest
risks. Perry 6 segregates individuals' reaction to privacy concerns based on such risk
profiles. Some perceive privacy exposures as demeaning, others look at data collection as
a nuisance rather than a threat, and still others look at privacy risks as injustice or a
violation of principles. The insurer can assess which of current employer groups are more
likely to contain individuals with such risk profiles and charge them premiums
incorporating their constituents' WTP. The insurer can identify other health coverage or
services individuals would want based on the risk profiles. It can create new health
benefit products offering such services in which premiums include the costs of the
services as well as the costs of privacy protection. The insurer can collect the WTP as
people join the new groups to obtain new health benefits.
The insurer can also try individualized approaches. Higher deductibles could be set to
incorporate the WTP plus the regular deductible associated with health plan benefits in
some of the more "individualized" insurance products that insurance organizations are
257 The Henry J. Kaiser Family Foundation. "Employer Health Benefits, 2001 Annual Survey," 1.258 The Henry J. Kaiser Family Foundation. "Health Insurance Coverage in America, 2001 Data Update,"
21.
259 For example, see the Henry J. Kaiser Family Foundation. "Employer Health Benefits, 2001 Annual
Survey," 1.260 In fact, this computed 2.1% would probably be smaller. The $360 represents individual coverage. If
family coverage would be taken into account, representing adults paying for their children, the annual
premium would be considerably higher. (See the Henry J. Kaiser Family Foundation. "Employer Health
Benefits, 2001 Annual Survey," 1). Thus, the computed $7.86 would represent considerably less than one
percent of this higher premium, and thus an even smaller relative payment, for each adult.
261 Perry 6, "Who Wants Privacy Protection and What Do They Want?" Journal of Consumer Behavior, 2
(2002): 86-87.
considering today.2 6 2 263 Under such coverage, employees can choose more tailored
health benefits rather than the more homogenous products typically offered via managed
care. When a consumer first sees the provider, she can pay out of pocket for the
deductible, into which her WTP would be incorporated.
2.2.3.2 Policy-Holder Welfare Maintained
Note, when individuals or small groups are targeted with increasing expenses to
incorporate the WTP, the targeted parties should not fear the increased expense. The
insurer should publicize the equivalent if not better insurance environment the policy-
holders may be gaining should they stop paying out of pocket and start submitting claims.
Financially, policy-holders should not be worse off. If, in the past, they paid amount X
for premiums and Y out of pocket to protect privacy, now they will be charged a
premium not far from X+Y, a similar outlay. However, the additional benefit policy-
holders can experience is better insurance services. By allowing the insurer to know
information about policy-holders, because they are now submitting personal health
information, the insurer may create better health benefits for them. Recall one goal of the
insurer may be improved policy-holder care quality. The insurer can better learn about its
policy-holder base and its needs to create better insurance products. It will certainly want
to do so in a competitive environment, wherein through better services it may attract
more customers. Indeed, one evident benefit to policy-holders from submitting claims
data is the more optimal administration of disease management which can improve
policy-holder care quality, as will be discussed below.
The insurer will most likely acquire sufficient funds to pay for all newly incoming claims
from policy-holders under the above solicitation methods, and may capture the
consumers' WTP. The smaller insurer will face considerably less WTP withholding as it
has fewer policy-holders.
2.2.4 Disease Management Implications
The insurer will need to encourage the submission of claims to itself as otherwise it may
suffer a different financial loss. Using the same WTP analysis as above, we quantify a
different intangible "increase in operating costs" to the organization. Out-of-pocket
payments may undermine the creation of records needed by a PM-like process, lessening
the financial savings from the associated disease management program to the insurer. We
note, however, the loss computed below will not be large, but will be buttressed by other
losses in the discussions later on.
262 Stephen Parente, Roger Feldman, and Jon B. Christianson, "Employee Choice of Consumer-driven
Health Insurance in a Multiplan, Multiproduct Setting," Health Services Research, 39 (2004): 1092, 1095,
1106-1107.
263 James Robinson, "Reinvention of Health Insurance in the Consumer Era," JAMA, 291 (2004): 1880.
We examine one possible disease management-like program as a case study: using
telemedicine to manage women with high-risk pregnancies. Using telemedicine can
significantly reduce the costs of managing high-risk pregnant women to the insurer. With
the use of a special device attached to the woman's abdomen to electronically monitor
her growing fetus, and subsequent transmission of these data through a
telecommunication line to a nurse assessing her symptoms, a telemedicine program can
identify pregnancy abnormalities when the woman is at home far from a care provider.
Appropriate interventions can be initiated based on symptoms by staff monitoring her
care. Women can be selected into a telemedicine program by a PM-like process that can
monitor their claims or other data signifying their high-risk status. Those identified as
high-risk can be enrolled in telemedicine. Women have privacy concerns regarding their
high-risk pregnancies. Another analysis of the California HealthCare Foundation Survey
shows that for people who were ill in some way, there was a slightly higher likelihood
that they paid out of pocket to prevent an "employer or someone else" from knowing
their PHI. 264 A 2002 study of prenatal practices in New York State showed that of
women in prenatal care, those with the highest education attained, women of color,
women who were older, or those who presented late for prenatal care were all more likely
to not want to share birth information of their children with their obstetrician,
pediatrician, and particularly the New York State immunization registry.265 The women's
reasons could reflect suspicion of government use of PHI or concern about PHI use for
"unknown" reasons. The California HealthCare Foundation Survey suggests women will
pay out of pocket to protect their privacy, as explained in Section 2.2.3. PM will not be
able to locate the data needed to enroll the high-risk pregnant women into disease
management because complete data are not available to the application. We examine this
phenomenon using a particular telemedicine study. 266
We should mention the key assumptions we make in the analysis below. We first assume
that the PM platform used to identify the high-risk pregnant women relies on risk
assessment data for identification. Risk assessments are questionnaires or associated
pregnancy tests identifying the risk factors that might place women at risk for poor
childbirth. If there are no risk assessment visits, i.e., all the women's prenatal care visits
collect roughly the same or non-specialized data, or PM relies on all prenatal data for
identifying such women instead of relying on only the specialized risk assessment data,
the insurer might still get the financial benefits of disease management despite women's
defensive behavior regarding disease management. PM will rely on other "identification"
264 Larry Hugick, fax to author.
265 Timothy Dye, Martha Wojtowycz, Mary Applegate, and Richard Aubry, "Women's Willingness to
Share Information and Participation in Prenatal Care Systems," American Journal ofEpidemiology, 156
(2002): 288.
266 We should point out that although we are using telemedicine as an example for this analysis it is not
necessarily the best current practice and may not always be currently administered for women with high
risk pregnancies. However, interventions for high risk pregnant women with similar cost implications as
telemedicine are being utilized. Therefore, our analysis, although focused on telemedicine is still relevant
because even under other interventions, cost implications to the insurer, as will be described in the text,
may be the same. (Marianne Hutti, Doctor of Nursing Science, Professor, School of Nursing, University of
Louisville, email to author on November 15, 2005).
data, e.g. data from other prenatal care visits, to identify the women and enroll them in
telemedicine despite their privacy-motivated out-of-pocket payments, creating financial
benefits from disease management for the insurer.
A related assumption is that each risk assessment visit will generate one record which
will feed the PM software. One author demonstrates the atomicity of electronic risk
assessment data. 267 Another author implies that risk assessment data are collected on a
single paper form.268 Therefore, we might assume one transcribed electronic form might
be consequently generated. If there is more than one record for each risk assessment visit,
then from an identifier error point of view, as will be shown below, the non-linkage of
some records due to record identifier errors may not completely prevent a high-risk
woman from being identified for telemedicine. The insurer will therefore obtain some
financial benefits from the existing context, which would not pressure the insurer to offer
additional privacy protections by reducing errors. Other data might suggest a woman will
not have a "normal" pregnancy because multiple records are available for each risk
assessment visit. PM might identify the woman to some degree because these records can
be linked, potentially creating financial benefits from disease management for the insurer
despite any errors in linkage identifiers.
Another assumption is that women can recognize the difference between risk assessment
visits and other prenatal care. For example, they may recognize the different pregnancy
tests they must complete or the different questions from providers they must answer
during the risk assessment visits. If the women cannot separate the risk assessment visits
from other prenatal care, the risk assessment data may remain intact because the women
may be paying out-of-pocket for different visits. The insurer would again feel less
financial pressure to add privacy protection to the BQMA because it is not losing money
in the current context. PM can enroll the women in disease management because needed
"risk" data are not absent since women cannot differentiate the risk assessments visits
from other prenatal care. Therefore, PM again can enroll the women in telemedicine and
create financial benefits from disease management for the insurer because the women are
paying out-of-pocket for non-risk assessment visits.
Finally, the women also want to payfor the risk assessment visits as opposed to paying
for as many initial prenatal care visits as they can to protect their privacy. The California
HealthCare Foundation Survey states that medical visits are paid for out of pocket due to
privacy concerns but it doesn't specify which visits are paid for out of pocket. If the
women chose to pay for all initial prenatal care visits to protect their privacy by
preventing the transmission of their PHI from the beginning of their pregnancy they
might not be able to afford to pay for the risk assessment visits. The $180 out-of-pocket
payment computed using the California HealthCare Foundation Survey in Section 2.2.3
267 Michael Ross, Catherine A. Downey, Rose Bemis-Heys, Men Nguyen, Debbie L. Jacques, and Gary
Stanziano, "Prediction by Maternal Risk Factors of Neonatal Intensive Care Admissions: Evaluation of
>59,000 Women in National Managed Care Programs," American Journal of Obstetrics and Gynecology,
181 (1999): 835.
268 John Morrison, Niki K. Bergauer, Debbie Jacques, Suzanne K. Coleman, and Gary J. Stanziano,
"Telemedicine: Cost-Effective Management of High-Risk Pregnancy," Managed Care, 10 (2001): 43-44.
would only cover several initial prenatal visits. By the time the subsequent risk
assessment visits arrive the women may no longer have sufficient funds. Again, there
would be less financial pressure on the insurer to add privacy protection to the BQMA
because it is not losing money in the current context. PM should find the risk assessment
data and enroll the women in telemedicine because they cannot afford to pay out-of-
pocket for the risk assessment visits, again creating financial benefits from disease
management for the insurer because risk assessment data are present.
2.2.4.1 Telemedicine and Privacy Interactions
In 2001, Morrison et al. retrospectively analyzed data demonstrating the cost savings to
an HMO when the HMO offered telemedicine services to high-risk pregnant women. 269
This study, called "2001 study" from now on, examined 1992-1994 health outcomes and
cost data to understand one HMO's efforts to reduce preterm births. Based on a diagnosis
of preterm labor, the HMO identified women with preterm labor and suggested that a
telemedicine program be adopted for their care. This program linked a woman's home to
a care provider and transferred her home uterine activity monitoring, via a device
attached to her abdomen, over a standard telephone line to a patient service center. The
information was interpreted by an obstetric nurse who assessed the woman's symptoms
of preterm labor. The 2001 study compared clinical and cost outcomes for two similar
high-risk groups: women who received telemedicine services and those who did not. For
the control group the average cost of the pregnancy was $21,684, while for the
intervention (telemedicine) group the average cost was $7225.
Although the 2001 study used the diagnosis of preterm labor as the method to identify the
women, enrollment into telemedicine also happens through risk assessments. 270 271 Poor
risk "scores" on such questionnaires or on corresponding pregnancy tests imply higher
probability of pregnancy complications. Indeed, in the 2001 study, the HMO analyzed
data collected before the preterm labor diagnosis and prescribed telemedicine if
appropriate, suggesting such data can be useful for needed intervention.272 There are two,
sometimes three, risk assessments done for all pregnant women to understand any risks
associated with their pregnancies.273 274 275 276 277We will use two assessments for our
269 Morrison, 42-49.270 Morrison, 43.
271 Michael Corwin, Susan M. Mou, Shirazali G. Sunderji, Stanley Gall, Helen How, Vinu Patel, and Mark
Gray, "Obstetrics: Multicenter Randomized Clinical Trial of Home Uterine Activity Monitoring:
Pregnancy Outcomes for All Women Randomized," American Journal of Obstetrics and Gynecology, 175
(1996): 1281.272 Matria healthcare staff, telephone interview with author, March 24, 2005.
273 Ross, 836.274 Deanna Lear, Laura C. Schall, Gary M. Marsh, Ken S. Liu, and Yvonne Yao, "Identification and Case
Management in an HMO of Patients at Risk of Preterm Labor," The American Journal of Managed Care, 4
(1998): 866.
275 Morrison, 43.
276 Marianne Hutti and Wayne M. Usui, "Nursing Telephonic Case Management and Pregnancy Outcomes
of Mothers and Infants," Lippincott's Case Management, 9 (2004): 290.
analysis. One risk assessment typically takes place before any home uterine activity
monitoring is administered; the other at approximately the same time as such monitoring
is administered. Typically, home uterine monitoring is administered at 24 weeks
gestation.278 In the 2001 study, the HMO performed three risk assessments during the
pregnancy at 12, 24, and 30 weeks gestation to improve the management of pregnant
women.
A PM process can be set up to wait for the risk-assessment data. The data can be stored
electronically. 280 281 A PM or similar process can be set up to regularly monitor the
digital data and find the collation of records that identifies women as high risk. The risk
assessment data can indicate the degree of risk. The PM-like process can be run
frequently so that identification may happen quickly, such as weekly or even daily, after
which the women could be enrolled in a telemedicine program.282
Due to women's privacy concerns, the insurer may not record risk-assessment data for
the first risk assessment and at times the second risk assessment. Women will either pay
out of pocket for risk assessment visits or they may avoid their provider altogether during
those prenatal care visits, limiting the transmission of risk assessment data to the insurer
and thus to its PM platform. Risk assessments can be done by providers or non-
providers.2 83 284 28 Clinicians may be more capable of adding more detailed risk-
assessment information, especially any clinically-related data. 286 At other times, the
insurer's staff or disease management staff hired by the insurer to manage high-risk
277 John J. Fangman, Peter M. Mark, Leslie Pratt, Kathleen K. Conway, Margaret L. Healey, John W.
Oswald, and Donald L. Uden, "Prematurity Prevention Programs: An Analysis of Successes and Failures,"
American Journal of Obstetrics and Gynecology, 170 (1994): 744.
278 Allison Kempe, Benjamin P. Sachs, Hope Ricciotti, Arthur M. Sobol, and Paul H. Wise "Home Uterine
Activity Monitoring in the Prevention of the Very Low Birth Weight," Public Health Reports, 112 (1997):
433.279 Morrison, 43.280 Hutti, 290.
281 See Ross, 835.
282 Indeed, such a process may even be called "medical management" rather than Predictive Modeling per
se. In this context, it's not uncommon for a provider to electronically request permission from the insurer,
for example, to provide a certain medical service to a patient. The insurer's software can automatically
grant permission based on the nature of the request and service arrangements between provider and insurer.
(Implied, MEDecision staff, telephone interview with author, April 11, 2005). Such software can also be
used for disease management-like monitoring and associated intervention. (See MEDecision, "Advanced
Medical Management," <http://www.medecision.com/page.cfm?page=advanced> (12 April 2005)).
However, even in today's PM context, health insurers are trying to devise PM-like systems as suggested in
the text, such as, for example, Humana. (Matria healthcare staff, telephone interview with author, March
24, 2005).
283 Health Alliance Plan. "Healthy Living, Prenatal Care Chart,"
<http://www.hap.org/healthy living/teenadult/prenatca.php#High%20Risk> (17 April 2005).284 Lear, 866.
285 Morrison, 44.
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pregnant women can perform the risk assessments, such as, for example, via phone.287 288
289 290 291
2.2.4.2 Paying for Risk Assessments, and Other Privacy "Defensive" Behavior
If the risk assessments are performed in provider offices, the California HealthCare
Foundation Survey data imply that the women will pay for the risk assessments out of
pocket, via the $180 WTP as computed before, to protect their privacy. The risk
assessments suggest they have a high-risk pregnancy because the data collected may
indicate the women's high-risk status. The women do not want a stigma. The California
HealthCare Foundation Survey data suggest such women will pay the WTP sum but then
start submitting claims forms to the insurer to suppress any information which might
suggest their status.
The women can afford to pay for the risk assessments. The women's WTP covers the
cost of more than one risk assessment visit. According to one source, the risk assessment
visits may cost up to approximately 25% more than a regular prenatal visit as billed to the
insurance organization. The physicians' offices must collect the extra risk factor data
from the women. 292 We compute the cost of a regular prenatal visit to compute the cost
of a risk assessment visit. According to the American College of Obstetrics and
Gynecology, one visit every four weeks is recommended until 28 weeks gestation.
293 294
One visit is recommended every two weeks from 28 through 36 weeks gestation; and one
weekly visit after that. On average, in the 2001 study, the pregnancy itself across both
control and intervention groups lasted about 36.8 weeks. Therefore, for the first 28 weeks
there should have been 7 prenatal visits. For weeks 28-36, there should have been 4
visits. In the last 0.8 week, we can assume another prenatal visit. Thus, the total number
of prenatal visits for high risk pregnancies is 7 + 4 + 1 or 12. These 12 visits translate
roughly into a cost per visit of 1385 / 12 or about $115 for the control group.295 A risk
assessment visit would cost--we conservatively use a full 25% increase in cost--1 15 *
1.25 or approximately $143. These are figures from 1992-1994. Using 1993 as the
average data collection point and converting via the Consumer Price Index, the result is
approximately $175 in 2001. Compared to $180, such a cost allows the women to pay for
one risk assessment visit and have a little money left over to pay for another such visit. It
is highly unlikely that women paid for "partial" risk assessments. Thus, the average $180
287 Ross, 835.
288 Morrison, 43.
289 Fangman, 749.
:290 Lear, 866.
291 Hutti, 290.
292 OB/GYN Nurse, Medical Department, MIT, telephone interview with author, March 31, 2005.
293 Siran Koroukian and Alfred A. Rimm, "The 'Adequacy of Prenatal Care Utilization' (APNCU) Index to
Study Low Birth Weight: Is the Index Biased?" Journal of Clinical Epidemiology, 55 (2002): 297.
294 See Virtual Hospital, "Obstetrics: Prenatal Care," University oflowa Family Practice Handbook, Fourth
Edition, <http://www.vh.org/adult/provider/familymedicine/FPHandbook/Chapterl4/02-14.html> (31
August 2005).
295 We use control group costs, since by concealing their PHI these women cannot be enrolled in
telemedicine.
WTP might suggest some women paid the $175 for one visit, while others paid for two or
more of such visits to create the average WTP.
We must understand payment timing. Which risk assessments are paid for will dictate the
cost implications to the insurer. If women paid for later risk assessments, PM would
recognize their high-risk status earlier and enroll them in disease management; their WTP
would have no effect on the insurer's operations. Based on our assumptions at the
beginning of this discussion, that women would recognize the significance of such
assessments, such women would want to pay for earlier risk assessment visits. They
would want to protect privacy from the beginning. It would not make sense to disclose
PHI and then subsequently try to protect PHI; privacy may not be protected. In the 2001
study, women would want to pay for the 12-week risk assessment, the first time they
might learn more about their high-risk status. The women who pay more for privacy, as
they create the average $180 WTP, may pay for the 24-week and any later risk
assessment visits.
If risk assessments are performed in non-provider contexts, the women may act in other
privacy "defensive" ways. For example, the California HealthCare Foundation Survey
indicates that 2% of people nationwide decided not to be tested for a medical condition
because they "were concerned that others might find out about the results." 296
Presumably the women would want to avoid seeing their providers or being subjected to
any tests at the beginning of their condition to protect their privacy, not in the middle or
in the end of their condition. As above, privacy would be protected from the outset. They
may avoid the first or first few risk assessment visits.
2.2.4.3 Impact of Delayed Disease Management
The cost implications of such behavior to the insurer are that the women will be delayed
in entering disease management. The intent of almost all high-risk population
management programs is early detection.297 298 This was the purpose of disease
management, as described before. In this case, since the first and in some cases the
second risk assessment is paid for out of pocket or perhaps not conducted, such records
should not be available to PM. With regard to out-of-pocket payments, data transmission
between provider and insurer become limited because the provider is not seeking
reimbursement. The women are paying the provider directly, lessening his need to submit
any associated data to the insurer. In the worst case, telemedicine may not be
administered at all. In Lear's 1998 study, two risk assessments were done by an HMO,
before and roughly during the time when home uterine monitoring would typically be
administered, at 24 weeks gestation. A high-risk pregnant woman would be enrolled in a
296 California Healthcare Foundation, "Medical Privacy and Confidentiality Survey," 15.
297 Jan Green, "Sizing Up the Sickest," Hospitals & Health Networks, 72 (1998): 28.298 Mary Anne Sloan, "Targeting Populations at Highest Risk: IT Delivers a 2:1 ROI for Midwest Health
Plan - What Works: Disease Management," Health Management Technology, September 2003,
<http://www.findarticles.com/p/articles/mi mODUD/is 9 24/ai 108148076> (20 April 2005).
case management intervention if either of the risk assessments indicated the woman was
high risk. The women in Lear's study were designated as high- or low-risk based on the
scores computed from the questions they and their physicians answered during the risk
assessments. Lear shows how high-risk women with incomplete questionnaires, or low-
risk women--those whose answered questions did not create a cumulative risk score
designating them as "high risk"--could not be enrolled in case management. The HMO
may not have understood the nature of their illness. Some of these women delivered
preterm. In another study, preterm women who were not risk assessed by their provider
delivered children who spent about four more days in the intensive care nursery as
compared to children of preterm women who were risk assessed. 299 Based on the 2001
study, four days in the intensive care nursery can readily translate into thousands of
dollars for the HMO.300 Similar delays may happen in the context described by the 2001
study.
We look at the potential costs implicated due to the disease management delay. In the
2001 study, costs spanned from prenatal care to post-birth including any intensive care
services used by the neonate. All the costs were categorized as prenatal care, antepartum
hospitalization, delivery, intensive care nursery, and the disease management-like
telemedicine services. 301 Costs starting at 24 weeks, the typical start of home uterine
activity monitoring, and ending with the intensive care nursery would be implicated if the
woman is not fully recognized to be high risk on time in our constructed telemedicine
model. The 5 prenatal visits after the antepartum hospitalization, happening at close to 29
weeks gestation when home uterine activity monitoring was typically administered in the
2001 study, as described before, should be apportioned to the implicated costs as they
were different for control and intervention groups. However, the costs of risk assessments
done by the providers do not need to be so apportioned as costs should be approximately
the same for control and intervention groups. 2 Keeping the same 7/12 fraction of the
prenatal costs across control and intervention groups, the control group had an average
delivery cost of about $20,000 while the intervention group had an average delivery cost
of about $6400. The difference, the implicated costs, is about $13,000 in our constructed
telemedicine model.
The impact to the insurer from women paying out of pocket or avoiding care appears to
be a delay of the women's entry into disease management by one week. A week's worth
of the implicated costs would be borne by the insurer. In the 2001 study, the total number
of days for the infant in intensive care was about 8.7 days.303 In total, the period wherein
delays may lead to greater costs is approximately 98 days. This is 24 weeks for the
initiation of home uterine activity monitoring in our designed telemedicine model
subtracted from the 36.8 weeks plus 8.7 days for the length of the pregnancy and number
of days spent by the infant in intensive care, respectively. During this time the child's
condition may worsen, as shown in the 2001 study. Dividing the implicated costs,
299 Fangman, 747.300 Morrison, 46.
301 Morrison, 46.
302 Implied OB/GYN Nurse, Medical Department, MIT.303 Morrison, 46.
$13,000, by 98 days, the incremental daily cost of delaying telemedicine is about $130.
Note, this makes a somewhat unrealistic assumption of uniform distribution of costs
across all the days. Actual daily costs can be lower or higher depending on the progress
of the pregnancy. Several days or up to a week's delay into telemedicine seems
appropriate. By that time the insurer should find if a woman is high risk.
There are other ways for the insurer to identify high-risk pregnant women. In the context
described in the 2001 study, PM can use the third risk assessment record to identify the
women. For those women who paid for only one or two visits via their WTP, data from
the third risk assessment, at 30 weeks gestation, should be available because those
women did not pay for that third visit. The insurer can also use methods not relying on
risk assessments. Given the high expense generated by women giving birth preterm,
insurance organizations should try to find such individuals early for intervention. 3
04 305
306 The women's physicians might refer the women to the insurer; the insurer can conduct
a medical record review to find if pregnant women are high-risk; or the insurer can
recognize a preterm labor hospitalization taking place for such women, as was done for
the 2001 study.307 308 309 310 In the latter case, the monitoring staff, upon recognizing a
hospitalization, can guess a pregnant woman may have preterm labor.31 1 Not all these
methods are optimal, as indicated before. For example, the insurer might be
organizationally separate from the providers, limiting its ability to review medical records
residing in provider offices. Nevertheless, if possible, all such methods could allow the
insurer to enroll the woman into a telemedicine program. The preterm labor diagnosis and
the third risk assessment which followed the preterm labor diagnosis chronologically in
the 2001 study took place at approximately 5-6 weeks after the 24 weeks gestation when
home uterine monitoring is typically initiated. We arbitrarily use a conservative 7 days
for the delay into disease management, given the importance of identifying the women
early, the failure of the insurer's processes to always detect high-risk women if risk
assessments are not administered, and the steps the insurer might take to identify the
women despite missing data. No study I found appears to assess the delay into
telemedicine due to privacy concerns. I estimate a delay of 7 days given the described
context, which will be examined in our sensitivity analysis; 130 * 7 or about $910 will be
the cost to the insurer due to a single woman's WTP or avoidance of risk assessment
visits.
304 Morrison, 43.
305 Melissa Muender, Mary Lou Moore, Guoqing John Chen, and Mary Ann Sevick, "Cost-benefit of a
Nursing Telephone Intervention to Reduce Preterm and Low-birthweight Births in an African American
Clinic Population," Preventive Medicine, 30 (2000): 271.
306 Ross, 835.
307 Fangman, 745.
308 Ofman, 1607.309 Hutti, 291.
30o Lear, 867.
3" Typically women are hospitalized after symptoms ofpreterm labor. (See J. Sanin-Blair, M. Palacio, J.
Delgado, F. Figueras, O. Coill, L. Cabero, V. Cararach, and E. Gratacos, "Impact of Ultrasound Cervical
Length Assessment on Duration of Hospital Stay in the Clinical Management of Threatened Preterm
Labor," Ultrasound in Obstetrics & Gynecology, 24 (2004): 756).
We compute the loss to the larger insurer using National Center for Health Statistics data.
In 2001 there were 14.1 live births per 1000 population.31 2 Of these, 11.9% were preterm
births.3 13 According to the 2001 study, on average about 40% of preterm births are due to
preterm labor. Therefore, we have a total of 748,000 * 14.1 / 1000, or about 10,500
children being born. Of these, 10,500 * 0.119 or about 1240 will be born preterm; 40% of
these or about 496 will be born preterm due to preterm labor. Thus, 496 * 0.0302 * 910
or about $13,600 will be the loss to the insurer due to lack of anonymity in the BQMA.314
As this is 1992-1994 data, we again use 1993 as the average data collection point for
computation. Converting via the Consumer Price Index, the 2001 result is about $16,600.
The smaller insurer will have a proportionally smaller loss.
2.2.5 Reduction in Data Error
We demonstrate another case of "increase in operating costs" for the insurer due to lack
of privacy protection. We quantify another application performance degradation to
measure the intangible loss of weaker privacy protection. We show a financial loss to the
insurer because there are errors in identifiers. Once again, the loss will not be large, but
again it will be buttressed later on. The high-risk pregnancy analysis above will be used.
In several studies on use of Social Security Numbers (SSN) within organizations, the
Government Accountability Office found that some insurance organizations use the SSN
as the primary identifier, which becomes the policy-holder's insurance number. 31 5 316 A
single identifier is apparently used for linking data. If an identifier is perceived error-free,
using such an identifier becomes the easiest way to link records-it can be indexed and
searched.317 318 Sometimes linkage identifiers are perceived to be credible and BQMA
staff does not examine errors further, as suggested earlier. The BQMA linkage identifier
will be referred to as the Medical Record Number (MRN). For the MRN error rate, we
rely on the error rate given by a Health Plan Employer Data and Information Set
312 Centers for Disease Control and Prevention. "National Vital Statistics Report: Births: Final Data for
2002," 4, <http://www.cdc.gov/nchs/data/nvsr/n 2/nvsr52 10.pdf> (26 April 2005).313 Centers for Disease Control and Prevention. "National Vital Statistics Report: Births: Final Data for
2002," 16.
314 Note, in this analysis we assume each mother will only have one as opposed to multiple children. This is
a reasonable assumption since in the US, national birth data show that only 3.3% of births are via "multiple
gestation" (i.e., a mother giving birth to twins, triplets, etc.). (See Centers for Disease Control and
Prevention. "National Vital Statistics Report: Births: Final Data for 2002," 98).
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August 2005).
316 Implied, General Accounting Office, "Social Security Numbers," January 2004, 12,
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(HEDIS) auditor.3 19 The National Committee for Quality Assurance, which administers
HEDIS, recommends such individuals for various HEDIS oversight functions. In an
interview with one HEDIS auditor, he mentioned that, of the many audits he's performed,
an internal MRN error rate of 1% seemed reasonable. Given our discussion of a possibly
higher error rate in Section 1.3.2, as well as the similarity of the BQMA, we use such an
error rate for our analysis.
A 1% MRN error rate will have an impact similar to but more complex than that of the
high-risk pregnancy case above. If a PM record representing the first or second risk
assessment is in error, there will be a delay in administering telemedicine. PM will not
find that record; however, it should find the record for the third risk assessment visit,
which should be available if that visit wasn't paid for out of pocket, as described above.
Alternatively, the insurer can rely on the other methods mentioned above, such as
recognizing the preterm labor hospitalization taking place, to find the high-risk pregnant
women. Given a 1% MRN error rate, the loss from a single risk assessment record in
error is 910 * 0.01 or about $9.10. This loss must be doubled, as both risk assessment
records arrive to the insurer at different earlier times, thus subject to different
independent earlier mistakes. For the larger insurer, the loss becomes 2 * 496 * 9.1 or
roughly $9000 using 1992-1994 data. Converting to 2001 for consistency, the loss
becomes about $11,000. If the third risk assessment record itself is in error, or if other
records acquired via non-risk assessment methods are in error, too, costs will be higher.
Assuming these records are maintained electronically, PM will have to wait for additional
electronic data to enroll the disease management candidates. The smaller insurer will
have a proportionally smaller loss.
2.2.6 Cost of Deidentification Technology
We now quantify the costs associated with providing BQMA privacy protections. In the
technical part of this thesis, we will attempt to deidentify the data used by the BQMA
while permitting the applications to function, as the method for privacy protection. We
will rely on HIPAA's deidentification standard known as Safe Harbor. We will provide
the costs associated with applying Safe Harbor to the copy data store in this section and
examine the actual technology to deidentify the data in the next chapter.
We use costs from several available studies to quantify the expenses of data
deidentification. The First Consulting Group created a cost model in 2000 for the
American Hospital Association when the Group was estimating the cost of future HIPAA
compliance for US hospitals. 320 One cost estimated by the First Consulting Group was
the implementation of HIPAA's "minimum necessary use" requirement, which requires
9 Charles Chapin, a HEDIS auditor connected to the National Committee for Quality Assurance,
telephone interview with author, February 22, 2005.320 HospitalConnect, "The Impact of the Proposed HIPAA Privacy Rule on the Hospital Industry,"
December 2000, <http://www.hospitalconnect.com/aha/key issues/hipaa/content/FCGDecember2000.pdf>
(31 August 2005).
removing access to data fields from individuals who do not need to know the data for
their daily work. An actuary who is computing premiums, for example, does not need to
know physician identifiers or patient names to compute the premiums as they should not
be used in the computations. We can use the values provided by the First Consulting
Group for the "minimum necessary use" change to quantify BQMA deidentification
costs. The nature of obfuscation under "minimum necessary use" should be similar to that
of Safe Harbor as sensitive variables are removed or modified to hide information about
the represented people, as will be shown in chapter three. For the sake of this thesis, we'll
take the representative costs for implementing HIPAA's "minimum necessary
requirement" for applications in a hospital IT system as the costs to change the BQMA
used by an insurance organization. In fact, we think this might be an overestimate since
hospital systems might be more complex. Nevertheless, some of the hospital IT systems
had similar functionality to that of the BQMA. The First Consulting Group identified
that, on average, each hospital had 17 major different IT subsystems which required
upgrades. 321 Two of the 17 subsystems were the hospital Utilization Review and Case
Management software platforms. A hospital's Utilization Review system, for example,
might be similar to an insurer's Utilization Review system, requiring similar changes to
the applications. 322 The hospital's Case Management application may again be similar to
the insurer's PM and Disease Management programs, requiring similar modifications to
the associated software applications.
323 324
We compute the costs to deidentify one BQMA. The First Consulting Group estimated an
initial cost of $15.79 per employee for staff training and $0.94 per employee for on-going
annual training related to the "minimum necessary use" requirement for each hospital
across the 6050 US hospitals the Group examined. The Group also estimated an initial
cost of $17,395 per hospital to plan for the compliance with the "minimum necessary
use" requirement across the 6050 US hospitals. The Group estimated an annual $9073 per
hospital to monitor for compliance with the "minimum necessary use" change as well.
The IT changes required for the "minimum necessary use" requirement across each of the
6050 US hospitals were estimated to range between $142,452 and $3,175,232. The Group
also estimated annual operating costs of between 0 and $7167 per hospital for
maintaining the software necessary for the "minimum necessary use" tenet. Thus, on
average, the initial IT modification costs for the "minimum necessary use" change
become about $1,658,840 per hospital, assuming a normal distribution of costs across the
6050 US hospitals. The annual IT operating expenses become about $3583 per hospital,
again assuming IT maintenance costs are normally distributed across the 6050 hospitals.
Converting to 2001 figures, the First Consulting Group costs above become about $16.23
per employee for the initial training; about $0.97 per employee for the annual re-training;
roughly $17,879 for initial compliance planning; about $9325 for annual compliance
321 HospitalConnect, "Report on the Impacts of the HIPAA Final Privacy Rule on Hospitals," March 2001,
<http://www.hospitalconnect.com/aha/key issues/hipaa/content/FCGMarch2001.doc> (31 August 2005).
322 Center to Advance Palliative Care (CAPC), "Utilization Review," CPA C Manual, 20 February 2002,
<http://64.85.16.230/educate/content/development/utilizationreview.html> (31 August 2005).323 Case Management Society of America (CMSA), "CMSA Definition and Philosophy,"
<http://www.cmsa.org/AboutUs/CMDefmition.aspx> (31 August 2005).
324 Case Management Society of America, "Strategic Vision,"
<http://www.cmsa.org/PDF/StrategicVision.pdf> (31 August 2005).
monitoring; about $1,705,070 for the initial IT modifications; and about $3682 for the
annual IT maintenance effort for the "minimum necessary use" change. From Section
2.2.2, we estimate it takes 4 individuals to operate one BQMA. Therefore, the initial
training cost becomes 16.23 * 4 or about $64.92 for the "minimum necessary use"
change. The annual re-training cost becomes 0.97 * 4 or about $3.88 for the modification.
We divide the other four costs by 17 to obtain a per-system cost. Thus, an insurer would
pay about $1050 for the initial planning; about $548 for the annual compliance
monitoring; about $100,000 initially for the IT modifications; and roughly $216 to
annually maintain the IT modifications. All these costs would be the approximate costs to
deidentify one BQMA.
Deidentifying four BQMA would imply quadrupling these amounts. However, total costs
may be less if all four BQMA rely on the same data, e.g., one copy data store is used to
run all four BQMA. If the same staff performs the deidentification, costs should be
reduced because the staff would not have to re-learn the deidentification approaches as it
tackles another BQMA. Faster learning by the relevant staff may quicken the needed IT
changes. We can arbitrarily double the IT-related costs of deidentifying a single BQMA
to quantify the IT-related costs of deidentifying the four applications. We have 100,000 *
2 or about $200,000 initially and about 216 * 2 or $432 annually as the initial IT
modification and subsequent maintenance costs for creating and operating the four
deidentified BQMA. We multiply the costs related to staff training and re-training and the
costs of compliance planning and compliance monitoring by four since these activities
may have to be done independently for each BQMA. The purpose of each of the BQMA
is relatively different, as described earlier, hence, probably requiring different training
and compliance activities regarding each of these applications. Thus, we have a cost of
(1050 + 64.92) * 4, or approximately $4450, for initial BQMA staff training and
compliance planning purposes. We also have a cost of (548 + 3.88) * 4, or about $2200,
for annual staff re-training and compliance monitoring purposes. The combined costs for
deidentifying the four BQMA become 200,000 + 4450, or about $204,000 initially, and
432 + 2200 or about $2630 annually. This is about 2 full-time equivalent (FTE)
employees working for one year plus a small percent of the work of one FTE employee
working annually thereafter.325
2.2.7 Net Benefits to the Health Insurer
We compute the net benefits to the insurer from installing our privacy-protecting
approach. We ignore the benefit when policy-holders switch health plans. Privacy
protection may not create a long-term gain as the smaller insurer--or larger insurer if the
smaller insurer installs privacy protections first--can also install safeguards to protect
privacy. Policy-holders might return to the smaller (or larger) insurer. We include the
$320 gain for the insurer as the insurer can annually benefit from preventing staff from
325 Based on Meghan Dierks, M.D, Instructor in Medicine, Harvard Medical School, personal discussion
with author on November 22, 2005; Hal Abelson, Professor, Electrical Engineering and Computer Science,
MIT, personal discussion with author on November 22, 2005.
abusing identifiable PHI. We ignore the roughly $4 million for which the larger insurer
may be liable due to the willingness-to-pay (WTP) for privacy protection, since that
money should be returned to the insurer as the insurer might recapture the WTP through
various recovery mechanisms as described before. We include both benefits related to
high-risk pregnancies-the roughly $16,600 related to improved disease management
outcomes and the roughly $11,000 related to minimizing MRN errors-as the insurer can
annually benefit from improved privacy protection within both operations. The annual
benefit to the larger insurer becomes 320 + 16,600 + 11,000 or about $27,900. After nine
years, the benefits should cover the costs of implementing our deidentification approach.
We use a discount rate of 3%.326 The net present value of a constant annual revenue
stream of $27,900 over 9 years is (27,900/0.03) * [1 - (1/(1 + 0.03)9)], or about
$217,000.327 The net present value of the combined installation and operation costs of the
deidentification approach after 9 years is (204,000/(1 + 0.03)) + (2630/0.03) * [1 - (1/(1
+ 0.03)8)] or about $216,000. We will explore later on how payback should happen
considerably sooner given that the insurer suffers other key opportunity costs as will be
discussed in subsequent sections. The smaller insurer should have a longer payback
period because its benefits are smaller. Of course, the insurance organization can absorb
the cost of deidentification much as in the $4 million WTP discussion from before. We
assume the insurer wants to recover costs for our analysis as a conservative worst-case
assumption.
2.2.8 Sensitivity Analysis
2.2.8.1 Health Plan Switching
Referring back to our original economic decision model, we now perform step 7, the
sensitivity analysis. The sensitivity analysis on the core components of the net benefits
computation above-combining the gains from reducing losses due to identifiable PHI
access, improving disease management, and reducing identifier errors, with the costs of
the deidentification-will be performed. In addition, a sensitivity analysis on the non-
core components of the net benefits computation-the gain from health plan switching
behavior and willingness-to-pay-related dynamics-will also be conducted. If some non-
core net benefit items are at least partially present in some US health insurance
marketplaces, the sensitivity analysis will point to the key parameters influencing those
values.
The key financial drivers affecting the core and non-core components are examined,
presented in the same order as these components were described in Sections 2.2.1
through 2.2.6.328 329 330 First, we examine competitive profitability. A key parameter
326 Hunink, 276.
327 See Hunink, 273.328 Hunink, 344.
affecting the financial benefit to the insurer due to health plan switching is the size of the
smaller insurance organization. In this analysis, assume the larger insurer installs privacy
protections first. A similar analysis can be carried out if the smaller insurer incorporates
such protections first. If the smaller insurer is relatively large then the number of new
policy-holders the larger insurer gains will also be relatively large because the number of
"switchers" is a percentage of total members. Assuming that acquiring more policy-
holders leads to profitability, as discussed before, the larger insurer should become more
profitable when it installs better privacy-protective practices. Consider the state of
California. Its "smaller" insurance organizations are among the largest in the US. Based
on the cost model we're creating, it's possible that California's largest health insurer
could see a very large profit from installing privacy-protective practices. California had
the largest number of individuals insured by the workplace, approximately 17,791,795
people in 2001.331 0.6 * 17,791,795 or about 10,600,000 Californians had a choice of at
least two health plans.332 The top group health insurer had a 31% market share while the
top 3 group health insurers had a combined 61% market share.333 Assume the second top
insurer had a (61-31)/2 or 15% market share for analysis, for simplicity, assuming the
second and third largest insurers had equal market shares in California. During annual re-
enrollment, the larger insurer would enroll 10,600,000 * 0.31 or roughly 3,280,000
policy-holders. The smaller insurer would enroll 10,600,000 * 0.15 or about 1,590,000
policy-holders. If the larger insurer installed privacy-protecting practices, 0.036 *
1,590,000 or about 57,200 policy-holders would switch to the larger insurer. The larger
insurer would gain 57,200 * 61.8 or about $3,530,000 annually while the smaller insurer
would lose this amount in 2003. Converting to 2001, the profit and loss would become
$3,300,000, respectively.
Compare this value to that of insurers in North Dakota. North Dakota had much smaller
"smaller" health insurance organizations in 2001. If the largest North Dakota insurer
installed privacy safeguards first, it would profit considerably less than California's
insurers. In 2001, approximately 344,379 individuals were insured through their
workplace in North Dakota.33 4 Of this figure, 60%, or about 206,000 individuals, could
choose from at least two health plans. The top insurer had a 91% market penetration
compared to the 96% penetration of the largest 3 health insurers. 335 Assume, based on
329 Samuel Wang, Blackford Middleton, Lisa A. Prosser, Christiana G. Bardon, Cynthia D. Spurr, Patricia
J. Carchidi, Anne F. Kittlera, Robert C. Goldszer, David G. Fairchild, Andrew J. Sussman, Gilad J.
Kuperman, and David W. Bates, "A Cost-benefit Analysis of Electronic Medical Records in Primary
Care," The American Journal ofMedicine, 114 (2003): 400-401.
330 Luisa Franzini, Elena Marks, Polly F. Cromwell, Jan Risser, Laurie McGill, Christine Markham,
Beatrice Selwyn, and Carrie Shapiro, "Projected Economic Costs Due to Health Consequences of
Teenagers' Loss of Confidentiality in Obtaining Reproductive Health Care Services in Texas," Archives of
Pediatrics & Adolescent Medicine, 158 (2004): 1143.
331 The Henry J. Kaiser Family Foundation, "Health Insurance Coverage in America, 2001 Data Update,"
33.
332 Note, in this discussion we again assume children are some of the insurer's members which will
participate in the plan switching, via their parents switching, as referenced before.
3 AcademyHealth, "Mapping State Health Insurance Markets, 2001: Structure and Change," 13.
334 The Henry J. Kaiser Family Foundation, "Health Insurance Coverage in America, 2001 Data Update,"
33.
335 AcademyHealth, "Mapping State Health Insurance Markets, 2001: Structure and Change," 13.
this 5% difference, the insurer with the second largest penetration had a (96-91)/2 or
2.5% market share for analysis. We assume, as above, the second and third largest
insurers had equal market shares in North Dakota, for simplicity. The larger insurer
would enroll 0.91 * 206,000 or about 187,000 policy-holders while the smaller insurer
would enroll 0.025 * 206,000 or about 5150 members in 2001. If the larger insurer would
incorporate privacy-protective practices first, it would gain an annual 0.036 * 5150 * 61.8
or about $11,400 profit in 2003. The profit would be about $10,900 in 2001. The smaller
insurer would lose such an amount annually.
2.2.8.2 Removing Identifiable Data Access
We perform a sensitivity analysis when analyzing the removal of identifiable PHI access.
The most important factor affecting insurer gain is the total number of employees per
organization. Gains are smaller with increasing number of employees as per-employee
losses are diluted. This is particularly shown in the CSI/FBI survey. When examining the
East Coast malpractice data set, several organizations with the smallest number of
employees per organization each had a loss of zero across each of the years of the data
set. This implies no gain to the insurer from adding privacy protections to prevent
employees from misusing identifiable PHI because the insurer is not losing money from
identifiable PHI access.
The 2001 CSI/FBI survey reports higher losses across its respondents. Using the smallest
number of employees per organizational-size category, the CSI/FBI survey suggests 16%
of respondents had 1 employee; 16% had 100; 8% had 500; 22% had 1000; 11% had
5001; and 27% had 10,000. 336 The average number of employees per respondent
becomes about 3500. The gain to the insurer from removing identifiable PHI access
becomes (2,210,000 / 3500) * 16 or about $10,000. Hence, the total gain to the insurer
from deidentifying the BQMA PHI when number of employees is small is about 10,000 +
0, or about $10,000.
Compare such values to the case when the number of employees is large. The East Coast
malpractice data set shows that for organizations with some of the largest number of
employees, across all the years of the data set the loss of each such organization was less
than a dollar per employee or less per year. The CSI/FBI survey suggests similar low
values. We use the highest number of employees per organization from the 2001 Fortune
500 list, 1,383,000, for a conservative analysis.3 3 Using the maximum number of
employees in the number-of-employees category, 16% of the CSI/FBI survey
respondents had 99 employees; 16% had 499; 8% had 999; 22% had 5000; 11% had
9999; and 27% had 1,383,000. These compute to an average number of about 370,000
employees per organization. The total loss to the larger insurer for the four BQMA from
the CSI/FBI data is (2,210,000 / 370,000) * 16 or at most $96. Thus, the benefit to the
336 Computer Security Institute, "2001 CSI/FBI Computer Crime and Security Survey," 3.337 "Fortune 500 Largest US Corporations," F-31.
insurer from deidentifying the BQMA PHI when number of employees is large is at most
16*1 + 96 or approximately $112.
2.2.8.3 Paying-out-of-pocket Dynamics
We conduct a sensitivity analysis on the paying out-of-pocket dynamics. The most
important parameter is the type of insurance organization involved. Traditional fee-for-
service plans require less PHI, while full managed care organizations require more PHI
for administration and oversight. The latter organizations generate a higher willingness-
to-pay as individuals are more concerned about potentially intense BQMA PHI use. We
vary the percent of individuals who don't submit claims based on their insurance type. In
traditional plans, the willingness-to-pay is close to zero due to fewer concerns over
BQMA PHI as the BQMA are not especially prevalent within such organizations. In the
most restrictive managed care organizations, 10.8% of policy-holders would pay out of
pocket 748,000*180*(0.108) or about $14,500,000 rather than submit claims to the larger
insurer due to concerns about persistent BQMA use. The smaller insurer will face a
significantly smaller total maximum willingness-to-pay as it has fewer policy-holders.
2.2.8.4 High-risk Pregnancy Assessment
A sensitivity analysis of the disease management program for high-risk pregnancies
shows that the main driver of the insurer's gain is the amount of delay before a woman
enrolls in telemedicine. The longer the delay, the greater the benefit to the insurer from
adding technologies and policies to protect privacy as the delay can be reversed. If the
delay is close to zero, the financial benefits of installing privacy-protecting practices to
the insurer could be close to zero. If the insurer uses some of the methods we described in
earlier discussions, such as if its staff waits for a hospitalization related to preterm labor
and enrolls the women in telemedicine, without their "cooperation," there may be no
delays. It may not make sense for the insurer to install privacy-protecting practices since
the delays can hardly be reduced further. On the other hand, telemedicine may not be
administered at all and the number of days delayed can be maximal. The financial benefit
to the insurer from installing additional privacy protections becomes 496 * 0.0302 * 130
* 98 or about $190,000 in 1992-1994 as installing such protections would enroll the
women without the delays. Converting to 2001, using 1993 as the average year of costs,
the benefit becomes about $232,000. The smaller insurer would have considerably
smaller benefits.
2.2.8.5 Medical Record Number Errors
A sensitivity analysis on errors in linkage identifiers suggests that the primary factor
responsible for the insurer's gain is whether more than one variable is used for linkage. If
more than one is used, the gain to the insurer can drop dramatically. Other linkage
variables can be used to identify the same individuals if some linkage variables are in
error. The gain to the insurer from installing privacy-enhancing technologies may be
close to zero because errors hardly exist in linking policy-holder records.
2.2.8.6 Variability in Deidentification Cost
A sensitivity analysis on the cost of BQMA deidentification shows that the complexity of
the BQMA is the main driver of the insurer's deidentification costs. The larger the
programming effort for the IT-related changes, clearly, the more expense. The BQMA
may be sufficiently sophisticated so that the IT-related deidentification changes do not
involve extensive change. For example, the changes I propose to deidentify the BQMA
include encrypting fields instead of revoking access to them, as we will see later on.
Many recent versions of commercial databases allow for column level encryption of
fields, which should reduce implementation expense.338 339 340 341 Performing the
encryption may be done without the potential cost of installing additional encryption
software. BQMA systems may also be less complex so that programming to create the
deidentification changes would be more straightforward than for more involved system
architectures. We can use the lowest IT-related costs suggested by the First Consulting
Group to find the lowest cost for BQMA deidentification. From Section 2.2.6, the lowest
IT-related cost to initially create the "minimum necessary use" modifications is $142,452
per hospital in 2000. No additional money is needed for annual maintenance costs for this
change. Converting to 2001, this cost becomes approximately $146,422. The IT-related
deidentification cost of the four BQMA becomes an initial sum of 2 * 146,422 / 17 or
roughly $17,200. This must be combined with the training and compliance monitoring
costs from before. Therefore, we have an initial cost of 17,200 + 4450 or about $21,600
to create the BQMA deidentification changes. There is also a cost of 0 + 2200 or $2200
to manage the deidentification changes annually.
338 Ecommerce Times, "Top Dog Oracle Losing Database Market Share," 11 March 2003,
<http://www.ecommercetimes.com/story/20968.html> (31 August 2005).
339 Database Journal, "SQL Server 2005 Security - Part 3 Encryption," 22 February 2005,
<http://www.databasejournal.com/features/mssl/article.php/348393 1> (31 August 2005).
340 Jared Still, "Data Obfuscation and Encryption,"
<http://www.cybcon.com/-jkstill/util/encryption/data obfuscation and encryption.html> (31 August
2005).
341 IBM, "Cost of Encryption for DB2," IBMDB2 Tools,
<http://publib.boulder.ibm.com/infocenter/dzichelp/index.isp?toic=/com.ibm.imstools.deu.doc.ug/cost.ht
m> (31 August 2005).
Conversely, costs might be larger if system changes are difficult or systems need to be
replaced to obtain the needed functionality. We use the highest First Consulting Group
estimate for IT-related costs, from Section 2.2.6, of $3,175,232 to install and $7167 to
maintain, per hospital, the 17 major different hospital IT systems in 2000. Converting to
2001, these costs become approximately $3,263,740 and $7366, respectively. Dividing
by 17 and multiplying by 2 we obtain about $380,000 and about $866 as the IT-related
costs to create and operate the changes for the four BQMA, respectively. Again, adding
the non-IT costs to these expenses, we have an initial creation cost of 380,000 + 4450, or
about $384,000, and an annual cost of 866 + 2200, or about $3060, to manage the BQMA
deidentification changes. The smaller insurer may have costs slightly lower than the
highest possible larger insurer costs as systems of the smaller insurer may be less
complex.
2.2.8.7 Sensitivity Analysis Conclusion
Under a few sensitivity scenarios, the insurer can cover the costs of BQMA
deidentification within a short amount of time, possibly within a few years. Benefits from
preventing BQMA staff from accessing the PHI range from $112 to $10,000. Benefits
from enrolling more high-risk pregnant women range from $0 to $232,000. Benefits from
addressing the errors in the medical record numbers to improve telemedicine
administration range from $0 to $11,000. The costs to deidentify the BQMA range from
$21,600 to $384,000 for the initial tasks to create the changes. The annual cost to manage
the changes may be at most $3060. Imagine that the larger insurer experiences the lowest
benefits. The insurer has other reliable methods to quickly identify high-risk pregnant
women without using risk assessments. It uses multiple reliable variables for BQMA
linkage. Women can be readily identified despite non-cooperation and data within the
copy data store can be accurately linked. The insurer would acquire very low financial
benefits from privacy protections as the context is hardly improved from such
protections. Now imagine that the larger insurer experiences the highest benefits. The
insurer has few other reliable methods to identify high-risk women aside from the risk
assessments. The insurer is primarily using only one linkage variable within the BQMA.
High-risk pregnant women cannot be readily located and data linkage is not optimal. The
overall annual benefit to the insurer becomes 10,000 + 232,000 + 11,000 or about
$253,000. The sum of the benefits that would accrue to the insurer would cover the costs
of BQMA deidentification in less than two years. Twice the annual insurer benefit is 2 *
253,000 or $506,000. The maximal BQMA installation and operating cost for the first
two years would be about 384,000 + 3060 or about $387,000-less than the $506,000.
Achieving profitability would take longer for the smaller insurer as it acquires less
benefits.
2.2.9 Additional Financial Benefits
The financial benefits of implementing additional BQMA privacy protections are
strengthened by still other gains, suggesting time for return on investment can be further
decreased. First, there are cost implications to the insurer from additional disease
management programs. We make the assumption that the insurer would adopt a PM
platform for all its disease management protocols to effectively identify chronically ill or
high-risk individuals. Missed cost savings could happen through an HIV disease
management program. One insurance-based disease management program showed the
cost savings of treating HIV positive patients. 342 343 The insurer would want to adopt a
similar program to lessen the costs of managing HIV positive policy-holders. HIV is
obviously a privacy-sensitive condition.344 Gains would be lessened if HIV patients pay
out of pocket, avoid care, or there are errors in linkage identifiers because the associated
PM software may not find the disease management candidates' data.
We quantify the percent of an insurer's policy-holders who have the confidentiality-
sensitive condition of high-risk pregnancy or HIV who would reduce the disease
management savings to the insurer, to understand the percent of individuals involved. We
will apply national prevalence statistics as well as statistics from the larger insurer
computed earlier which were based on national prevalences, to obtain the prevalence
within a typical insurer, of women who will deliver preterm due to preterm labor and of
people who are HIV-positive. In summary, across its entire population, the large insurer
should have 496 / 748,000 or about 0.066% of policy-holders who are females who
would deliver preterm due to preterm labor. In 2000, there were also approximately
900,000 individuals living with HIV in the US. 345 This represents roughly 0.3 1% of the
2000 US population. 346 Thus any insurer today, in 2005 or 2006, would have to manage
roughly 0.31% of all of its policy-holders who have HIV, assuming the same US HIV
prevalences. I acknowledge that there may be a disproportionate number of HIV-positive
patients who are not privately insured and that a for-profit insurer may not have so many
of such patients. Nevertheless very roughly, 3.02% of the above policy-holders, or very
roughly 0.0302 * (0.0031 + 0.00066) or 0.011% of policy-holders, may pay out of pocket
or avoid care creating poorer financial outcomes for an insurer because the insurer cannot
optimally administer disease management. The assumption is that there is no overlap
342 State of Florida, Agency for Health Care Administration, "The Florida Medicaid Disease Management
Experience," 26 January 2005,
<http://www.fdhc.state.fl.Lus/Medicaid/deputy secretary/recent presentations/medicaid disease manageme
nt house 012605.pdf> (31 August 2005).
343 Robert Catalla, F.S. Goldstein, and C. Farthing, "The Disease Management Initiative - A Novel
Approach in the Care of Patient with HIV/AIDS" (a poster presentation at the United States conference on
AIDS, September 2001).
344 American Civil Liberties Union, "ACLU Says CDC Guidelines on HIV Surveillance Could Lead to
Better Privacy Protections," News, 1999, <http://www.aclu.org/Privacy/Privacy.cfm?ID=879 1 &c=27> (Jul
17, 2005).
345 "Diagnoses of HIV/AIDS-32 States, 2000-2003," Morbidity and Mortality Weekly Report, 53 (2004):
1106-1110.
346 US Census Bureau, "National and State Population Estimates."
between women who will deliver preterm due to preterm labor and people who are HIV
positive, otherwise the computed percent above would be smaller.
Identification errors would lead to missed financial opportunities regarding the insurer
enrolling patients in the disease management programs for asthma, diabetes, lower back
pain, as well as those handling multiple chronic conditions simultaneously including the
just-mentioned conditions plus coronary artery disease and congestive heart failure.
The insurer may want to adopt such programs. Identifier errors would prevent PM from
linking data and identifying candidates in a timely manner. We again use national
prevalence statistics and assume that the prevalence of such chronic conditions among an
insurer's policy-holders is the same as national prevalence values. Using 2003 prevalence
data, 7.0% of a typical insurer's policy-holders would have asthma.348 Per 2005 data, any
insurer should also have approximately 7.0% of individuals with diabetes. 349 In 2002, an
estimated 4.8 million Americans had congestive heart failure. 350 This represented about
1.6% of the 2002 population. 351 In 2003, the prevalence of coronary artery disease (CAD)
was approximately 13.2 million in the US population. 352 Based on the 2003 US
population, the prevalence of CAD was approximately 4.5%. 353 Few consistent statistics
appear available for the prevalence of chronic back pain in the US population. We used a
1995 North Carolina study, indicating a chronic low back pain prevalence of 3.9% in the
North Carolina population, as an estimate of prevalence for the US population.354
Therefore, 1% of policy-holders with these conditions, or 0.01 * (0.07 + 0.07 + 0.016 +
0.045 + 0.039) or about 0.24% of an insurer's members with these conditions will be
affected due to errors in identifiers. Again, the assumption is that there is no overlap
between the people affected by the different conditions, otherwise the computed percent
would be smaller. Disease management candidate identification or risk stratification
problems regarding such conditions may reduce cost savings to the insurer.
Additional savings to the insurer arise because the insurer faces opportunity costs
regarding its employer clients who are also losing money due to suboptimal disease
347 American Association of Health Plans/Health Insurance Association of America, "The Cost Savings of
Disease Management Programs: Report on a Study of Health Plans."
348 Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, "Current Asthma Prevalence Percents by Age, United
States: National Health Interview Survey, 2003," 9 March 2005,
<http://www.cdc.gov/asthma/NHIS/2003 Table 4-1.pdf> (10 March 2006).
349 Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, "National Diabetes Fact Sheet," Publications and Products,
16 November 2005, <http://www.cdc.gov/diabetes/pubs/estimates05.htm#prev> (10 March 2006).
350 Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, "Congestive Heart Failure and Adrenergic Receptor
Polymorphisms," Genomics and Disease Prevention, 27 November 2002,
<http://www.cdc.gov/genomics/hugenet/ejoumal/heartfailure.htm#2> (10 March 2006).
351 US Census Bureau, "National and State Population Estimates."
352 See Thomas Thom, Nancy Haase, Wayne Rosamond, Virginia Howard, "Heart Disease and Stroke
Statistics - 2006 Update," Circulation, 113 (2006): e86, e100. Note, the prevalence stated in this article
actually refers to prevalence of coronary heart disease (CHD). However, typically, in public health
discussions, references to CAD usually refer to CHD. (Nancy Haase, Biostatistics Program Coordinator,
American Heart Association, telephone interview with author, March 28, 2006). Therefore, we can use
CHD prevalence in this article to obtain the CAD prevalence needed in the text.
353 US Census Bureau, "National and State Population Estimates."
354 TS Carey, Evans A, Hadler N, Kalsbeek W, McLaughlin C, Fryer J, "Care-seeking among individuals
with chronic low back pain," Spine, 20 (1995): 312-7.
management administration. Implementing additional BQMA privacy protections could
convert the opportunities costs into financial gains for the insurer. Chronic and high-risk
conditions increase the costs to employers, such as via employees' productivity declines,
as employers must manage their employees' worse health. 355 356 357 In the interest of
reducing such productivity and financial impacts to their organizations, employers may
pay the insurer to improve the care of their "high-risk" employees. The insurer might
solicit such payments. Using their leverage, some large employers and some employer
purchasing consortiums have recently created financial incentives to encourage health
plans to provide quality care to their employees. 358 Such incentives have included
providing financial bonuses to health plans that have met or exceeded target employee
health care metrics. The insurer can improve employees' care by enrolling more
individuals in disease management by implementing additional privacy protections.
Based on current precedent in the marketplace, the insurer might ask for the employer to
share some of its productivity returns with the insurer for the latter's efforts.
Furthermore, the insurer faces opportunity costs due to losses from poorer data quality in
the other BQMA and even non-BQMA software, which can also be converted to financial
gains for the insurer. Losses to the insurer can arise from poor data within the other three
BQMA. Poor data quality within the Utilization Review, Provider Profiling, and the
Health Plan Employer Data and Information Set applications may also undermine the
cost savings that such applications provide to the insurer. Assuming some of these
provide cost savings for the insurer, creating additional BQMA privacy protection would
provide the insurer financial benefits. By improving the other BQMA's data quality those
applications' operations improve. Non-BQMA applications would also operate better
because claims data would be available for processing throughout the organization.
Formerly missing claims data would now be submitted to the insurer by policy-holders.
This would improve the operations and thus cost-efficiency of the insurer's non-BQMA
applications relying upon that data.
2.3 Organizational Support
Providing additional BQMA privacy safeguards may also lead to better identification of
policy-holders for disease management which may then lead to the policy-holders' better
care, another motivation within our technology adoption model. Regarding the analysis
of premature pregnancies, providing extra BQMA privacy protection may reverse the
women's out-of-pocket payment behavior. This may eliminate their 7-day delay into
355 G. G. Liu, D. Ying, and R. Lyu, "Economic Costs of HIV Infection: An Employer's Perspective," The
European Journal ofHealth Economics, 3 (2002): 226.
356 Wayne Burton and Catherine M. Connerty, "Worksite-based Diabetes Disease Management Program,"
Disease Management, 5 (2002): 1-2.
357 Chris Penttila, "An Ounce of Prevention...," Entrepreneur Magazine, January 2003,
<http://www.findarticles.com/p/articles/mi m0DTI/is 1 31/ai n13470627> (31 August 2005).
358 AcademyHealth, "Ensuring Quality Health Plans: A Purchaser's Toolkit for Using Incentives," 14,
<http://www.academyhealth.org/nhcpi/healthplanstoolkit.pdf> (31 August 2005).
disease management due to better PM identification, which in turn can reverse the
suboptimal care provided to the women and their newborns. When analyzing the
characteristics of preterm children, researchers typically focus on a neonate's low birth
weight, often at 2500 grams and below; a baby's admission to the neonatal intensive care
unit (NICU); or if a baby was delivered before 37 weeks gestation. 359 360 361 Such
characteristics of the neonate are associated with the neonate's higher morbidity and
mortality, such as getting chronic lung disease, severe brain injury, retinopathy of
prematurity, and neonatal sepsis. 362 In later years, preterm infants are at increased risk of
motor and sensory impairment and behavioral problems. 363 364 In the 2001 study, women
not enrolled in telemedicine differed from those enrolled in telemedicine across these
three dimensions: 1) neonatal birth weight for the control group averaged 2554 grams,
and almost 60% of these neonates weighed below 2500 grams, while for the intervention
group birth weight averaged 3224 grams; 2) neonates whose mothers did not receive
telemedicine spent an average of 7.2 days at the NICU, while those whose mothers
received telemedicine spent an average of 0.3 days at the NICU; 3) the average
gestational age at delivery for the control group was 35.3 weeks, while for the
intervention group the average gestational age at delivery was 38.2 weeks. 365 A delay of
7 days in getting telemedicine implies that 496 * 0.0302 or about 14.9 children would
begin to experience the poor clinical and, later, sensory and behavioral outcomes within
the larger insurer. The errors in identifiers suggest that an additional 2 * 496 * 0.01 or
about 9.9 children would also experience these outcomes within the larger insurer.
The quality of care of policy-holders with other chronic conditions may decline due to
confidentiality and identifier errors. Incorporating additional BQMA privacy protections
would reverse the suboptimal administration of disease management regarding such
conditions. People's defensive behavior could reduce the quality of their care if they have
HIV and are not properly enrolled in disease management.366 Similar outcomes would
result with regard to depression, a confidential condition, which also has disease
management protocols.367 Errors in identifiers will also impact the care of individuals
with these conditions as well as of those with less confidentiality-sensitive conditions
which also have disease management protocols, including diabetes, asthma, congestive
heart failure, chronic obstructive pulmonary disease, coronary artery disease, being frail
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and elderly, cancer, low back pain, hypertension, and some others.36 8 369 370 371 372
Adding more BQMA privacy protection will reverse people's defensive behaviors and
reduce linkage errors, improving data quality, which may improve disease management-
enhanced health. The smaller insurer will feel a proportionally smaller health
improvement impact as it has fewer policy-holders.
2.4 Chapter Conclusion
A closer analysis of the regulatory, financial, and quality of care data suggests there are
benefits to insurance organization from implementing stronger BQMA privacy
protections. There is less chance new privacy laws will be passed, burdening the insurer
with new compliance requirements. The insurer may experience a positive cash flow
because policy-holders are behaving less "defensively" and the insurer has fixed the
errors in copy data store(s) identifiers. Disease management protocols may now reduce
the insurer's expenses. Better disease management administration will also improve
policy-holders' quality of care because policy-holders are better targeted by the disease
management protocols. All these results support the insurer's original environmental,
economic, and organizational aims, demonstrating the value of the BQMA privacy
protections to the insurer and encouraging the adoption of such protections. In the next
chapter we explore how to technically accomplish the stronger BQMA privacy
protections, providing the insurer the tools it can use.
368 See Welch, 356.
369 CorSolutrions, "Cancer Solutions," <http://www.corsolutions.com/programs/2.3.7 cancer.html> (27
October 2005).
370 Health Management Corporation, "Healthy Returns Program for Low Back Pain,"
<http://www.choosehmc.com/LowBackPain.html> (26 October 2005).
371 LifeMasters, "Products & Services," <http://www.lifemasters.com/corporate/prod/index.asp> (26
October 2005).
372 Accordant, "Rheumatoid Arthritis," <http://www.accordant.net/ra.html> (26 October 2005).
3 Providing Data Privacy
3.1 Applying the Safe Harbor Principle
This thesis will rely on data deidentification to provide application privacy protection. As
per the Ethical Force Program's recommendations regarding privacy practices, and
HIPAA itself, if data are deidentified consumer privacy concerns should not apply. Data
subjects could not be identified for harm. From a software engineering perspective it may
be possible to deidentify the BQMA yet permit the applications to operate. This thesis
will present a solution for creating additional BQMA privacy protections while
preserving sufficient data structure for BQMA and similar applications' operations. The
solution includes obtaining computable, linkable results, including some error handling in
linkage identifiers. We will work with PM but extend the results to the other BQMA.
Since we can't delete all claims data, we must deidentify them. We will work with the
UB92 claim record, used by PM. The UB92 has the following key fields:373 374 375 376
1) Provider Name/Address/Phone Number
2) Patient Control Number
3) Type of Bill
4) Federal Tax Number
5) Statement Covers Period "From" Date
6) Statement Covers Period "To" Date
7) Billing Covered Days
8) Billing Noncovered Days
9) Coinsurance Days
10) Lifetime Reserve Days
11) Patient Name
12) Patient Address
13) Patient Birth Date
14) Patient Sex
15) Patient Marital Status
16) Admission Date
373 Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services, UB92.
374 See description of UB92 terms in Centers for Medicare and Medicaid services, "Billing Procedures,"
Hospital Manual, 16 September 2004, <http://www.cms.hhs.gov/manuals/10 hospital/ho460.asp> (10
September 2005).
375 See UB92 description in State of California, Medi-cal, "UB-92 Completion: Inpatient Services,"
September 2003, <http://files.medi-cal.ca.gov/pubsdoco/publications/masters-
MTP/Part2/ubcompip i00.doc> (10 September 2005).
376 See UB92 information in Wisconsin Department of Health and Family Services, "UB-92 (CMS 1450)
Claim Form Instructions for Personal Care Services,"
<http://dhfs.wisconsin.gov/medicaid3/updates/2003/2003pdfs/2003-69att4.pdf> (10 September 2005).
17) Admission Hour
18) Admission Type
19) Admission Source
20) Discharge Hour
21) Patient Status
22) Medical Record Number
23) Condition Codes (up to 7 of them)
24) Occurrence Codes (up to 4 of them)
25) Occurrence Dates (up to 4 of them)
26) Occurrence Span "From" Date
27) Occurrence Span "Through" Date
28) Original Document Control Number
29) Value Codes "Code" (up to 3 of them)
30) Value Codes Amount (up to 3 of them)
31) Revenue Code
32) Revenue Description
33) HCPCS/Rates
34) Service Date
35) Service Units
36) Total Charges
37) Noncovered Charges
38) Payer
39) Claim Release Information
40) Provider Number
41) Prior Payments
42) Estimated Amount Due
43) Insured Name
44) Patient Relationship To Insured
45) Patient Identification Number
46) Group Name
47) Insurance Group Number
48) Treatment Authorization Codes
49) Employment Status Code
50) Employer Name
51) Employer Location
52) Principal Diagnosis Code
53) Other Diagnosis Codes (up to 8 of them)
54) Admission Diagnosis Code
55) Principal Procedure Code
56) Principal Procedure Date
57) Other Procedure Codes (up to 5 of them)
58) Other Procedure Dates (up to 5 of them)
59) Attending Physician Id
60) Other Physician Ids (up to 2 of them)
61) Remarks
62) Provider Representative's Signature
63) Provider Representative's Signature Date
This thesis will rely on HIPAA's deidentification standard as the method to provide data
deidentification. HIPAA offers two ways to deidentify data. One is for a professional
with statistical and scientific knowledge to determine that there is a very small risk that
an anticipated recipient of the data can identify the subjects associated with the data. 377
378 The other method is to use the Safe Harbor principle. Safe Harbor prescribes
removing a specific set of items from the data and ensuring that the data producer has no
"actual knowledge" that the remaining information can be used alone or in combination
with other data to identify the data subjects. 379 In this thesis we will work with the Safe
Harbor method. It's easier to follow as its instructions are explicit.
With respect to the "actual knowledge" part of Safe Harbor, several legal experts
explained how such a directive can be interpreted. The producer of the deidentified data
and his covered entity peers should apply reasonable effort to ensure that data are
deidentified based on the potential data recipient. 380 381 Given the potential sophistication
of the recipient and the capability of the covered entity, the covered entity should remove
further data to ensure that they cannot be reidentified. Larger covered entities may apply
more sophistication. Smaller covered entities, with less knowledge of reidentification
techniques, presumably have less deidentification sophistication. 382 More effort will have
to be made if the data should be put into the public domain, e.g., online. Users
knowledgeable in reidentification-such as that finding combinations of unique items in
the data can make some data subjects reidentifiable in certain geographies-will have
ready access to this domain and may more readily reidentify data subjects.383
Still HIPAA is a new law. Therefore, it's not clear exactly how "actual knowledge" will
be interpreted. It's possible that actual knowledge will be interpreted directly as either
having such knowledge or not.384 Safe Harbor may be emphasizing factual knowledge,
377 HHS (update), 53232.
378 US Department of Health and Human Services, Office for Civil Rights, "Standards for Privacy of
Individually Identifiable Health Information," August 2003,
<http://www.hhs.gov/ocr/combinedregtext.pdf> (20 May 2005).
379 HHS (update), 53232.
380 Benjamin Butler, attorney specializing in HIPAA, telephone interview with author, May 25, 2005.381 Peter Zahn, attorney specializing in HIPAA, telephone interview with author, May 24, 2005.382 In several conversations with attorneys for this thesis, the notion of "reasonableness" regarding the
deidentification effort was common. (Francesca Brotman-Orner, attorney specializing in HIPAA, telephone
interview with author, May 25, 2005; US Department of Health and Human Services, Office for Civil
Rights staff, telephone interview with author, February 27, 2004). We adopt such an approach when we
conduct an experiment deidentifying data which we obtain from an institution for testing PM
deidentification later on in this thesis. We examine the "reasonable" effort that institution may have to
undertake to deidentify the data.
383 For example, see Latanya Sweeney. Computational Disclosure Control: A Primer on Data Privacy
Protection (Cambridge, MA: Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 2001), 63-82.
384 Implied Chris Raphaely, attorney specializing in HIPAA, telephone interview with author, April 27,
2005.
intending to give the covered entity more certainty regarding deidentification. 385 Safe
Harbor prescribes the following set of items to be removed to deidentify the data set:386
1) "Obvious" [identifiers] like name and social security number;
2) all geographic subdivisions smaller than a state, including street address, city,
county, precinct, zip code, and their equivalent geocodes, except for the initial
three digits of a zip code if, according to the current publicly available data from
the Bureau of the Census: the geographic unit formed by combining all zip codes
with the same three initial digits contains more than 20,000 people; and [t]he
initial three digits of a zip code for all such geographic units containing 20,000 or
fewer people is changed to 000;
3) all elements of dates (except year) for dates directly related to an individual,
including birth date, admission date, discharge date, date of death; and all ages
over 89 and all elements of dates (including year) indicative of such age, except
that such ages and elements may be aggregated into a single category of age 90 or
older;
4) voice telephone numbers;
5) fax telephone numbers;
6) electronic mail addresses;
7) medical record numbers, health plan beneficiary numbers, or other health plan
account numbers;
8) certificate/license numbers;
9) vehicle identifiers and serial numbers, including license plate numbers;
10) device identifiers and serial numbers;
11) Internet Protocol address numbers and Universal Resource Locators;
12) biometric identifiers, including finger and voice prints;
13) full face photographic images and any comparable images; and
14) any other unique identifying number, characteristic, or code.
We make several assumptions when deidentifying the UB92. First, the UB92 PHI that
will need to be deidentified will refer to patient, Insured, and patient providers' data. The
PHI of all three is on the UB92 and must be removed to deidentify such people. As a
clarification, the Insured may be paying for the patient's care and may be different from
the patient.
We also try to retain some data structure permitting PM operations. A number of items
have to be removed per Safe Harbor. PM needs data to identify chronically ill
individuals, as before. To understand how to legally leave data in, I conducted interviews
with individuals working for PM vendor organizations and insurance companies. 387 I
385 HHS (part 2), 82542-3.
386 Taken from University of Miami, "De-identified Health Information (HIPAA)," Privacy/Data
Protection Project, <http://privacy.med.miami.edu/glossary/xd deidentified health info.htm> (13 October
2003).
387 Landacorp staff, telephone interview with author, October 1, 2003 and October 16, 2003; SAS technical
staff, telephone interview with author, October 2, 2003; Pacificare, Medical Informatics staff, telephone
interview with author, October 13, 2003; MEDAI staff, telephone interview with author, October 8, 2003;
Medical Scientists technical staff, telephone interview with author, August 22, 2003.
inquired what fields a PM application needs for operations so that a legally-proper
deidentified data set can still be created. Based on the interviews, PM only needs certain
fields for operations. PM apparently uses only more explicit demographic and medical
content. We will conduct an experiment with PM later in this thesis to understand how
Safe Harbor obfuscations might impact PM precision; how the application's ability to
identify high-risk individuals might change if the data it uses may be removed due to the
deidentification. We will leave in some legally-permissible data to permit basic PM
computations.
3.1.1 Deidentifying the UB92 Claim Record
Safe Harbor item 7 above suggests that member ids cannot be used. Several such ids exist
in the UB92, such as the Patient Control Number, Federal Tax Number, and Provider
Number. If a consistent identifier to link policy-holder records can be provided, such
explicit ids could be removed.
Safe Harbor items 1, 2, 4, and 14 above suggest that names, phone numbers, or other
"unique" type of codes cannot be left in the data. The following are some of such
codes: 388
* Patient Name
* Original Document Control Number
* Insured Name
* Treatment Authorization Codes
* Employer Name
We will remove the non-medical non-demographic codes.
Per Safe Harbor item 3, date of birth (DOB) cannot be available except for year of birth.
Further, the PHI of individuals 90 and over should be combined into a category such as
"90+". The UB92 has one DOB, Patient Birth Date, which can be modified as needed.389
390
388 Note, employer information must be removed per the US Department of Health and Human Services,
Office for Civil Rights as such information might make some individuals reidentifiable. (Implied, see US
Department of Health and Human Services, Office for Civil Rights, "Standards for Privacy of Individually
Identifiable Health Information").
389 For example, DxCG is a popular vendor of PM products used in insurance organizations as we will see
later in the text. The DOB appears preferred for DxCG PM platforms, but age, which can be readily
obtained through computations using the Safe Harbor-permitted year-of-birth, can also be used. (DxCG,
"Technical Requirements," <http://www.dxcg.com/uses/index.html> (22 May 2005)).
390 Also, an age, as opposed to a date-of-birth variable has been a predictor in various other PM-like
platforms, suggesting that age, instead of just DOB, can also be used. (See Symmetry, "A Comparative
Analysis of Claims-based Methods of Health Risk Assessment for Commercial Populations," 24 May 2002,
5-6, <http://www.symmetry-health.com/SOAStudy.pdf> (1 September 2005)).
Similarly, Safe Harbor item 3 above forbids other dates (except for year) and dates of
activity to be used. Several dates and dates of activities are available in the UB92, such as
Admission Date, Occurrence Span "From" Date, and Occurrence Span "Through" Date.
These obviously specify the dates and timeframes of the activities associated with data
subjects. The dates of activities, however, are typically only used to calculate the length
of the activities. All the dates should be given in an annual format in some part of the
copy data store, e.g., a new field.39 1 For dates that have a "From" and "To" part, the
length of the associated activity can be provided, for example, in another field. 39 2
Subsequently, the dates and dates of activities can be removed as needed information
should still be available.
Safe Harbor item 2 forbids the full zip code to be used. There may be three zip codes in
the data, within the Patient Address, Provider Name/Address/Phone Number, and
Employer Location fields. A deidentified zip code, as described in Safe Harbor item 2,
can be used for PM operations. We deidentify the zip code as needed.393
This completes Safe Harbor deidentification as the other items in the Safe Harbor list,
device identifiers, emails, or biometric identifiers are not in the UB92.
If the producer of the data, e.g., an analyst or his covered entity peers, has knowledge that
the resulting UB92-based data set can be used alone or in conjunction with other data to
identify the data subjects, the data set can be modified. Based on such "actual
knowledge," the characteristics of the people who can be so successfully reidentified can
be generalized.394 Their entire claims records can be deleted. The resulting data should be
more protective. We examine the "actual knowledge" aspect of deidentification in our
PM experiment later on.
A reidentification mechanism would have to be available. For example, in the PM
context, disease management staff would have to initiate contact with PM-uncovered
individuals to offer disease management services. Safe Harbor permits the assignment of
a "reidentification code" in the data for subsequent re-identification. We incorporate such
a code into our deidentification approach. Since we are already deidentifying the member
identifiers, to save costs, we can use the replacement of such member identifiers as our
reidentification codes. Instead of obfuscating other variables and providing the means to
reidentify them, the deidentified member identifiers can serve such purpose.
391 This is implementation specific and depends on the insurer's current configuration and data management
of the copy data store.
392 This is again implementation specific, depending on the current data management of the copy data store.
393 When the organization is doing deidentification it can check current Census data to find which current
3-digit zip codes need to become 000. Based on Census 2000 data, HIPAA provides the 17 zip codes which
must be changed to 000 because their associated geographic units contain no more than 20,000 people.
(HHS (update), 53234). The 3-digit zip codes are: 036, 059, 063, 102, 203, 556, 692, 790, 821, 823, 830,
831, 878, 879, 884, 890, and 893. We will assume these are the zip codes which need to be changed in
2005 and 2006 as well for illustration when we conduct our PM experiment later on.
394 For example, see Sweeney, Computational Disclosure Control: A Primer on Data Privacy Protection,
63-82.
Note, HIPAA's Safe Harbor principle states that the "reidentification code" cannot be
"derived" from or related to information about the data subject. 395 It would seem that
transforming linkage identifiers into secure reidentifiable identifiers, as will be suggested
and explored by this thesis, should not be allowed. Based on other information such a
conclusion might not necessarily be the case. If there is a secure way to transform PHI
into a reidentification code, this should be permitted. The spirit of HIPAA is to protect
data. If a strong mathematical function can be used to generate a reidentification code,
such a function should be permissible. Indeed, one can look at this question from a
statistical point of view. HIPAA allows a statistician to render data deidentified. If a
statistician feels the deidentified data have a low risk of being reidentified, they are
considered secure. Safe Harbor as a method should already presumably be low-risk
because it was designed so that information subject to its tenets could be used for any
purpose, including being placed in the public domain.39 6 If any transformation function
creating the reidentification code is shown to provide low risk it should be acceptable
with regard to the statistician's method. The transformation creates "low risk" data. We
will attempt such a secure transformation in this thesis. 397
Finally, as there are errors in the member identifiers, the reidentification code will have to
handle such errors. Resources might not be available to clean the errors earlier. 398
395 See discussion in HHS (update), 53232.396 Quintiles.com, "Understanding the Impact of HIPAA on Clinical Research," June 26-27, 2003.
<http://www.guintiles.com/NR/rdonlyres/e7n4reuv4qqzqtipdpzirnsyzbhmygzs4uijtkagmy5gie5dvu5gvyhk
mme5dwrbbcmoffkiiteeic/JBeachBarnett03.pdf> (31 August 2005).
397 HIPAA also states that the reidentification code cannot be "used" or "disclosed" for any purpose except
reidentification. (See discussion in HHS (update), 53233). The use of any such code for any data linkage, as
will also be examined in this thesis, should be prohibited, too. This may not necessarily be the case either.
For example, a considerable amount of epidemiological research relies on record linkage of health data.
(William Winkler, "The State of Record Linkage and Current Research Problems,"
<http://www.census.gov/srd/papers/pdfrr99-04.pdf> (12 March 2004)). Such linkage can be based on a
consistent code such as a reidentification code. (Fritz Scheuren and William Winkler, "Regression Analysis
of Data Files That Are Computer Matched - Part I," National Research Council. Record Linkage
Techniques - 1997: Proceedings of an International Workshop and Exposition (Washington, DC: National
Academy Press, 1999), 106). The latter may be a consistent code if it's created consistently for all equal
identifiers. Indeed, when used with deidentified data, linking records in and of itself may not necessarily
facilitate the reidentification of data subjects. For example, in the BQMA context, the intent of linking
records is to better manage the organization, better manage groups of policy-holders with chronic
conditions, etc., not to reidentify individuals per se for any direct harm. The intent of HIPAA's
confidentiality should be preserved as no reidentification or direct harm should take place. Also, as
mentioned before, HIPAA designers encouraged the use of deidentified data for purposes when this was
possible. The creation of a reidentification code which can be used for linking records helps in the creation
of deidentified data. Data can be linked and analyzed. Finally, this thesis actually proposes to create several
such secure reidentification codes. All will be based on linkage identifiers such as medical record numbers.
HIPAA only discusses the assignment of one code to a deidentified data set. However, the creation of two
or more codes, as long they meet HIPAA's requirements, should be acceptable. (Brian Annulis, attorney
s ecializing in HIPAA, telephone interview with author, May 3, 2005).
8 A solution to securely link records for applications that link data should handle errors in the linkage
identifiers. Ideally, errors would be cleaned before the application uses the data so that the application does
not deal with errors. For the BQMA, it might not be possible to remove the errors in the identifiers
beforehand. Presumably errors in the linkage identifiers happen upstream before data reach the main
linkage data set. There might be more than one data source that feeds the copy data store. (Health Plan
Employer Data and Information Set (HEDIS) auditor, telephone interview with author, May 19, 2004).
The table below illustrates the changes to a hypothetical UB92 after deidentification by
Safe Harbor. Any further data removal based on "actual knowledge" will be explored
later on in our PM experiment.
Therefore, any cleaning solutions may have to be placed at more than one upstream location, probably
increasing installation costs. It may not be easy placing such solutions upstream; the processes or people
responsible for placing data into the linkage data set may not have the proper authority or the storage
capacity required. (Implied, Dorothy Curtis, Research Scientist, Lab for Computer Science, MIT, personal
interview, January 20, 2004). Their focus may not include data linkage for applications like the BQMA.
They may not be able to access all the data all the time or have the storage required to store any redundant
data necessary for error resolution (potentially, stemming from the same data access restrictions, etc). The
need to handle errors rather than cleaning them upstream is even more relevant for data linkage
applications outside of an organization. Here the file to be linked is transmitted to another entity, for
example, an epidemiologist, for analysis. (See discussions in Shaun Grannis, J. Marc Overhage, and
Clement McDonald, "Real World Performance of Approximate String Comparators for Use in Patient
Matching," 2004, 43. <http://www.cs.mun.ca/-harold/Courses/Old/CS6772.F4/Diary/5604Grannis.pdf>
(22 May 2005); L. L. Roos and A. Wajda, "Record Linkage Strategies: Part I: Estimating Information and
Evaluating Approaches," Methods oflnformation in Medicine, 30 (1991): 117-118). It would be difficult if
not impossible for a receiving organization to clean any errors upstream. Presumably, the receiving entity
has little influence over the original data-producing organization as it does not manage it. Therefore it
might not be able to place any cleaning solutions upstream. The field of record linkage we discuss later in
the text exists because data-producing organizations may not clean errors, yet records must be linked. The
receiving entities must deal with errors. Our approach must deal with such errors, too.
UB92 Claims Data Before and After Deidentification
Before Deidentification After Deidentification
Provider Name/Address/Phone Number
Patient Control Number
Type of Bill
Federal Tax Number
Statement Covers Period "From" Date
Statement Covers Period "To" Date
Billing Covered Days
Billing Noncovered Days
Coinsurance Days
Lifetime Reserve Days
Patient Name
Patient Address
Patient Birth Date
Patient Sex
Patient Marital Status
Admission Date
Admission Hour
Admission Type
Admission Source
Discharge Hour
Patient Status
Medical Record Number
Condition Codes (up to 7 of them)
Occurrence Codes (up to 4 of them)
Occurrence Dates (up to 4 of them)
Occurrence Span "From" Date
Occurrence Span "Through" Date
Original Document Control Number
Value Codes "Code" (up to 3 of them)
Value Codes Amount (up to 3 of them)
Revenue Code
Revenue Description
HCPCS/Rates
Service Date
Service Units
Total Charges
Noncovered Charges
Delete. Except Zip Code (Should be 3 Digits or "000" When Pop. 5 20,000)
delete
Type of Bill
delete
Provide in Annual Format Elsewhere
Provide Length of "Statement Period" ("To" date - "From" date) Elsewhere
Billing Covered Days
Billing Noncovered Days
Coinsurance Days
Lifetime Reserve Days
delete
Delete. Except Zip Code (Should be 3 Digits or "000" When Pop. 5 20, 000)
Provide Age; Also Use 90+
Patient Sex
Patient Marital Status
Provide in Annual Format Elsewhere
Admission Hour
Admission Type
Admission Source
Discharge Hour
Patient Status
Encrypt Medical Record Number
Condition Codes (up to 7 of them)
Occurrence Codes (up to 4 of them)
Provide in Annual Format Elsewhere (up to 4 of them)
Provide in Annual Format Elsewhere
Provide Length of Stay ("Through" date - "From" date) Elsewhere
delete
Value Codes "Code" (up to 3 of them)
Value Codes Amount (up to 3 of them)
Revenue Code
Revenue Description
HCPCS/Rates
Provide in Annual Format Elsewhere
Service Units
Total Charges
Noncovered Charges
Payer
Claim Release Information
Provider Number
Prior Payments
Estimated Amount Due
Insured Name
Patient Relationship To Insured
Patient's Identification Number
Group Name
Insurance Group Number
Treatment Authorization Codes
Employment Status Code
Employer Name
Employer Location
Principal Diagnosis Code
Other Diagnosis Codes (up to 8 of them)
Admission Diagnosis Code
Principal Procedure Code
Principal Procedure Date
Other Procedure Codes (up to 5 of them)
Other Procedure Dates (up to 5 of them)
Attending Physician Id
Other Physician Ids (up to 2 of them)
Remarks
Provider Representative's Signature
Provider Representative's Signature Date
38)
39)
40)
41)
42)
43)
44)
45)
46)
47)
48)
49)
50)
51)
52)
53)
54)
55)
56)
57)
58)
59)
60)
61)
62)
63)
Payer
Claim Release Information
delete
Prior Payments
Estimated Amount Due
delete
Patient Relationship To Insured
delete
Group Name
Insurance Group Number
delete
Employment Status Code
delete
Delete. Except Zip Code (Should be 3 Digits or "000" When Pop. < 20,000)
Principal Diagnosis Code
Other Diagnosis Codes (up to 8 of them)
Admission Diagnosis Code
Principal Procedure Code
Provide in Annual Format Elsewhere
Other Procedure Codes (up to 5 of them)
Provide in Annual Format Elsewhere (up to 5 of them)
delete
delete
delete
delete
Provide in Annual Format Elsewhere
In summary, to satisfy Safe Harbor while making the data initially usable for PM entails
the following changes. We call them Enhancements 1 through 6 from now on:
1) Enhancement 1. Provide a consistent id unrelated to other member identifiers in
the data. This id should be reidentifiable to obtain an original member id and it
should handle errors in the original identifier. All other member identifiers should
be removed.
2) Enhancement 2. Remove all other unique values or codes in the data.
3) Enhancement 3. For the data subjects, provide year of birth instead of date of
birth, and a "90+" category when individuals are at least 90 years old.
4) Enhancement 4. Provide length of activity instead of dates of activity, and provide
the year component only for one of the two dates-of-activity dates as well as all
the single dates. Remove all the original date variables.
5) Enhancement 5. Generalize the zip code fields as prescribed by Safe Harbor item
2, as described earlier.
6) Enhancement 6. Apply reasonable effort to remove any other data so there is no
"actual knowledge" the data can be used alone or with other data to reidentify the
data subjects.
3.2 Quantifying the Value of Information
We demonstrate how to technically accomplish Enhancements 1 through 6. They should
be solved with data perturbation techniques. We create an encryption and modification
method to mask data while permitting PM functionality. We make several assumptions.
First, any linkage file involved may be large. According to the Centers for Disease
Control and Prevention, in 2003, approximately 85% of individuals with health insurance
saw a health professional within the past 12 months at least once. 399 Roughly 80% of
these individuals saw a health professional multiple times. In 2002, at least 70% of
individuals' total health care expenses were paid by private or public insurance
programs. 400 Thus, claims forms to insurance organizations should be generated by the
majority of people's visits to providers. An average size insurance organization may have
almost 154,000 policy-holders. 4 0 1 Assuming several claims get paid for by the insurer for
each policy-holder, on average, the copy data store in an average insurer may be filled
with a half million new claim records annually from the above computations. This is
399 Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, "Summary Health Statistics for US Adults: National Health
Interview Survey, 2003," July 2005, <http://www.cdc.gov/nchs/data/series/srlO/sr10_225.pdf> (31
August 31, 2005).
400 Medical Expenditures Panel Survey, "2002 Compendium of Tables - Household Medical
Expenditures," 23 December 2004,
<http://www.meps.ahrq.gov/mepsnet/tc/TC 15.asp?_SERVICE=MEPSSocketl&_PROGRAM=MEPSPGM
.TC.SAS&File=HCFY2002&Table=HCFY2002%5FPLEXP%5F%40&VAR I=AGE&VAR2=SEX&VAR
3=RACETHNX&VAR4=INSURCOV&VAR5=POVCAT02&VAR6=MSA&VAR7=REGION&VAR8=H
EALTH&VAROl=5+17+44+64&VARO2=1&VARO3=1&VARO4=1&VARO5= 1&VARO6=1&VARO7
=1&VARO8=1&_Debug> (31 August 2005).
401 America's Health Insurance Plans, <http://www.ahip.org/> (31 August 2005).
given the just-described submission of claims by policy-holders. In a large insurer, with
the number of policy-holders several times the 154,000 figure, the copy data store may be
filled with several million new policy-holder claims annually. Another assumption is that
the linkage identifiers involved may be diverse-unique within the linkage file. Since
most people annually use the health care system, the copy data store should have
numerous unique member ids present as claim records for many unique policy-holders
should be submitted. Finally, the linkage file may be dense from the point of view of the
linkage identifiers. For instance, in the PM context member ids may be alphanumeric. 402
On occasion, member ids are given out in sequential order within insurance
organizations. 403 One new policy-holder might get id 80155243 while the next new
policy-holder will get id 80155244. In this case, the copy data store should have a
number of "close" alphanumerical member ids for any given member id as many unique
member ids would exist in the copy data store. Identifiers in linkage files in other
applications might be diverse and dense on occasion as well.
3.2.1 Addressing Data Privacy
Data perturbation solutions can be broadly classified as encryption and hashing
techniques and non-encryption non-hashing solutions. Encryption can be defined as a
method that transforms original information, plaintext, into altered information,
ciphertext, which appears as nonsensical to an observer. 4 4 A hashing function transforms
a plaintext message into a hash, a concise representation of the original, usually longer
plaintext.4 05 406 Based on Menezes' taxonomy of cryptographic primitives, encryption and
hashing systems may be keyed or unkeyed. 4° 7 A "key" may designate the nature of the
transformation between plaintext and ciphertext, facilitate the encryption process, or
facilitate the hashing process.408 Non-encryption non-hashing data perturbation solutions
include swapping or suppression. 4 9 For example, suppressing a value obviously removes
the value.4 1
Providing Enhancements 2 through 6 should be done using non-cryptographic
techniques. Using cryptographic techniques for such enhancements may not be efficient.
Certainly some of the data to be removed, including that which should be removed based
402 DxCG, DxCG RiskSmart StandAlone User Guide Version 2.0.1, January 2005, 24.
403 Customer Service Staff, Harvard Pilgrim, telephone interview with author, June 9, 2004.
404 See Deborah Russell and G.T. Gangemi, Sr., "Chapter 3: Computer System Security and Access
Controls," Computer Security Basics, <http://www.oreilly.com/catalog/csb/chapter/ch03.html> (14 October
2003).
405 See Alfred Menezes, Paul C. van Oorschot and Scott A. Vanstone, "Chapter 1," Handbook ofApplied
Cryptography, 2001, 5, <http://www.cacr.math.uwaterloo.ca/hac/about/chap .pdf> (22 May 2005).
406 RSA Security, "What Is a Hash Function?" <http://www.rsasecurity.com/rsalabs/node.asp?id=2176>
(22 May 2005).
407 Menezes, "Chapter 1," 5.
408 Menezes, "Chapter 1," 11, 27.
409 See for example Sweeney, Computational Disclosure Control: A Primer on Data Privacy Protection,
63.
410 See Sweeney, Computational Disclosure Control: A Primer on Data Privacy Protection, 56.
on "actual knowledge," can be encrypted or hashed. However, adding a more
complicated cryptographic process to applications rather than transforming data directly
might be costlier. Software may have to be integrated into the application to perform the
transformations. Functionality for non-cryptographic techniques should probably already
exist within the software platform, as such functions should provide standard
modifications to data in almost any format. We recommend a non-cryptographic
approach for Enhancements 2 through 6. The deidentification effort involved should be
straightforward, performed as detailed in Section 3.1.1.
Conversely, providing Enhancement 1 should be done via an encryption mechanism. A
method is needed that obfuscates linkage identifiers, facilitates their linkability, yet
handles errors within the identifiers. Available approaches do not appear suitable. This
thesis proposes a new encryption-based approach to handle such requirements.
To provide Enhancement 1, however, we switch from the PM world to address the more
general world of record linkage. In resolving Enhancement 1 we need a general solution
as the just-stated requirements are general.
No current approach appears to handle sufficiently all requirement aspects from above.
For example, there exist approaches to hash linkage identifiers, securely evaluate any
generic function, and create matrices to hold comparison results of identifiers with errors.
They will be examined later on. These approaches may not address all aspects of
Enhancement 1. Some approaches may not handle all errors; other approaches might be
inefficient; others may not protect all aspects of privacy.
We create a new approach. In our approach we explain how to locate the identifiers that
can address the errors of linkage identifiers by obtaining additional data on which records
should be linked. We examine linkage fields' "information content," including asking
when fields should be analyzed at the character-level to reduce linkage errors.
Practitioners can decide whether to analyze a given field at the character-level or in its
entirety to overcome their software's linkage identifier errors. We devise a threat model
that can be used to judge the privacy protection offered by an approach. This is a generic
paradigm for evaluating application security within and outside of an original
organization. Since we are focused on the BQMA-internal applications-practitioners
can ask if an approach offers appropriate security if the data involved are produced by the
same or different organizations. If it is the same organization, more security would be
necessary since employees might have access to internal data deidentification processes
against which a security approach must protect. Finally, we provide a solution that meets
our threat model. We describe its operations and security, and demonstrate its strength
over other existing approaches.
3.2.2 Record Linkage of Data
The process for reducing identifier errors in applications linking records is described. In
the below, we first describe the purpose of record linkage and how likelihood ratios and
linkage thresholds form the basis of distinguishing true from false links. Next we use
such constructs in selecting fields within records that will provide optimum linkage.
Finally, character-level analysis of fields is explored to show under what conditions
exposing a field's characters for analysis might not be useful for linkage due to the
characteristics of the linkage data set. This analysis has implications for understanding
under what linkage data set characteristics analyzing a field's characters is useful.
3.2.2.1 Record Linkage Concepts
Record linkage is the process of combining two or more records to link information
relating to a single unit, such as an individual, a family, or an event.4 11 Numerous
applications utilize such a technique, often answering questions on relationships or
effectiveness of the associated programs, people, or entities. For example, linking police
records and court records is useful in answering questions such as which variables (e.g.,
type of assault, location of a break-in, etc.) affect severity of a prison sentence.412
Hospital discharge data can be linked to themselves to determine if the length of a
newborn's postnatal hospital stay is related to his future hospital readmissions. 413 The
hypothesis may be that the shorter the hospital stay the more probable the readmission.
When a unique identifier is unavailable for such linkage, however, because the identifier
is in a different format, it's not unique, or it has errors, including missing values, more
advanced techniques are required. 414 415 416 417
Our interest is to deidentify record linkage as per Enhancement 1. In this chapter, we
therefore ask the following two questions: What deidentification approaches preserve
record linkage? What are the best ways of securing data in the record linkage context?
411 Martha Fair, "Recent Developments at Statistics Canada in the Linking of Complex Health Files,"
<http://www.fcsm.gov/99papers/fair.pdf> (22 May 2005).
412 Scott Meyer, "Using Microsoft Access to Perform Exact Record Linkages," 1997, 280,
<http://www.fcsm.nov/working-papers/smeyer.pdf> (22 May 2005).
413 Shiliang Liu and Shi Wu Wen, "Development of Record Linkage of Hospital Discharge Data for the
Study of Neonatal Readmission," 2000, <http://www.phac-aspc.gc.ca/publicat/cdic-mcc/20-2/c e.html>
(22 May 2005).
414 See Winkler, "Preprocessing of Lists and String Comparison," 181.
415 See Scheuren, 106.
416 William Winkler, "Matching and Record Linkage," 1997, 378, <http://www.fcsm.gov/working-
papers/wwinkler.pdf> (21 May 2005).
417 Winkler, "Preprocessing of Lists and String Comparison," 183-5.
3.2.2.2 Record Linkage Operations
To conduct our analysis we first describe basic record linkage operations. The purpose of
record linkage is to determine which records represent matches and which represent non-
matches in a file. 418 419 Below, a match will represent the case when the two records
being compared represent the same unit, for example, the same person; a non-match will
represent the case when the two records represent two different units, e.g., two different
individuals. There are two steps involved: training and validation. Training configures the
record linkage system for subsequent use. The system then uses the training parameters to
run on actual, validated data. In this thesis, we focus mostly on the training step. We will
optimize record linkage training parameters to improve validation operations.
We will link a single file to itself, just as in the PM case. However, our analysis will
apply to applications that link two (or more) files, as is more common in record linkage.
The fundamental computation behind record linkage is that of likelihood ratios,
representing the odds that any two records represent the same unit. High ratio values
imply a match. Low ratio values imply a non-match, as we will see below. Each training
file record is linked with every other. In the resulting cross product, the system must
determine if record Ri and record Rj represent a match for all i, j= 1...N, where N is the
number of records in the file. "Patterns" are used to identify matches. That is, questions
about a comparison of the fields making up Ri with the corresponding fields in record Rj
are computed for every record pair. Almost any computation is possible. 420 The pattern
may be that two corresponding fields must agree exactly on their contents; the pattern
may be that several corresponding fields should specifically disagree on their last 3
characters; or the pattern may be that two corresponding fields should be equal to
"Jones."
Given observed patterns 1 through k, a likelihood ratio (LR) is formed during training.
The computed LR is
LR = P(patternl,.. .,pattemk I Ri and Rj match) /
P(patternl,...,pattemk I Ri and Rj don't match) (1)
The intent of training is to find patterns such that the LR created would properly
designate the match status of Ri and Rj when the system actually observes the pattern
during training. The system will distinguish matching from non-matching records by
separating high and low LRs. Useful patterns would create LRs significantly different
from 1. Otherwise, it would be difficult to distinguish whether the two records match
upon observing the pattern. Equality, inequality, or partial equality of fields are
commonly used patterns because they will generate LRs significantly higher and lower
418 For example, see Martha Fair, "Recent Developments at Statistics Canada in the Linking of Complex
Health Files."4 19 Winkler, "The State of Record Linkage and Current Research Problems."
420 See Ivan Fellegi and A.B. Sunter, "A Theory for Record Linkage," Journal of the American Statistical
Association, 64 (1969): 1185.
than 1, respectively, allowing for the separation of matches versus non-matches, as we
will see below.
Since the possible number of patterns involving all record fields is vast, one common
assumption made in record linkage is that of conditional independence. The comparisons
represented by patterns are assumed to be mutually independent conditioned on either
records matching or not matching. For example, imagine two patterns: equality of the
date of birth (DOB) field and equality of the street name field. Whether two records agree
on DOB is assumed to be independent of whether they agree on the street name of the
address if we know that the records match or don't match. Practically speaking, in real
life, we don't anticipate the DOB to be "correlated" to street name. The ideas we describe
in this thesis, however, will hold even if this assumption is not true, and certain fields are
correlated. Equation (1) can be rewritten as:
LR = P(patternl I Ri and Rj match) * ... * P(patternk I Ri and Rj match) /
P(patternl I Ri and Rj don't match) * ... * P(patternk I Ri and Rj don't match) =
[P(patternl Ri and Rj match) / P(patternl I Ri and Rj don't match] *... *
[P(patternk Ri and Rj match) / P(patternk I Ri and Rj don't match] (2)
For ease of analysis, it is customary to work with the log of the LR computed above.4 21
We have
log (LR) = log (P(patternm I Ri and Rj match) / P(patternl Ri and Rj don't match)) + ... +
log (P(patternk I Ri and Rj match) / P(patternk I Ri and Rj don't match)) (3)
Each of such k terms is considered a weight. We refer to the above computed log (LR) as
Wtotal weight from now on as it sums the k weight terms.
There are several ways to select the patterns and compute each of the k weight terms for
record linkage. Examining the training file directly, using weights from prior linkages,
and theoretically determining what should be the weights in a typical distribution of units
are some of the techniques available.422 423 One approach is to analyze the data directly.
When analyzing a training file, for example, the match status of all or a representative
sample of records in the cross product would be examined. For this sample, the true
match status regarding any two records should be obtained. Patterns and weights can be
set: patterns should be found to force weights for matching records when patterns agree
to be higher. Weights for non-matching records in the sample should be lower, and
patterns should be found so that non-matching units should disagree. Matching will
improve. If high weights indicate matches and low weights non-matches, the above
construction will allow for better identification of matches versus non-matches.
421 Tony Blakely and Clare Salmond, "Probabilistic Record Linkage and a Method to Calculate the Positive
Predictive Value," International Journal ofEpidemiology, 31 (2002): 1247.
422 For example, see Martha Fair and Patricia Whitridge, "Tutorial on Record Linkage Slides Presentation,"
1997, 463, <http://www.fcsm.gov/working-papers/mfair-tutorial.pdf> (23 May 2005).
423 Blakely, 1247.
That is, during matching Wtotal weight, comprised of all the weights, is compared to a
threshold. If Wtotal weight equals or exceeds the threshold, the system will consider the two
records a match. If Wtotal weight falls below the threshold, the pair will be deemed a non-
match. In more sophisticated record linkage approaches two thresholds may be used.424
425 When Wtotal weight Ž Upper Threshold the record pair is deemed a match. When Wtotal
weight < Lower Threshold the record pair is considered a non-match. For simplicity of
exposition, we will not be using the dual-threshold model. Our results are generalizable
to a dual-threshold model, however.
The threshold should be set to maximize the usefulness of the linkage. Four outcomes are
possible when determining match status of two file records: true positive, false positive,
true negative, and false negative. The false negatives and false positives arise due to
errors or the natural distribution of field values. For example, two different people can
have the same date of birth (DOB). If DOB is a comparison field and other comparison
fields for these two individuals do not produce appropriate weights low enough, the
equality of the DOB may create a false positive if the DOB weight is high enough to
make the Wtotal weight higher than the threshold. The two different people will be falsely
labeled a match. A utility could be assigned to each of the four outcomes above and a
threshold be computed which maximizes total system utility.426 Practically, the threshold
is often set by examining the cross product in the training file and assessing the type of
errors that can be tolerated by the application. If the intent is to avoid false negatives, the
threshold should be set to a low Wtotal weight. Matching records should have weights above
that cutoff as patterns were chosen to create higher weights.42 7 If the intent is to have no
false positives, the threshold should be set high. Weights for non-matching records
should be lower than that threshold, as patterns were chosen to create lower weights for
non-matching records. In our single-threshold system we will arbitrarily define the
threshold as halfway between the maximum and minimum weights for compared fields.
Our approach will generate some false positives and some false negatives. The total
weights of some matching units will fall below the threshold, and the weights of some
non-matching units will appear as matches. We use a simpler threshold for illustration.
Our analysis can be undertaken using other choices of thresholds.
Further, it may be possible to attribute greater "importance" to different weights and
create linkage field coefficients which would more optimally interact with a given
threshold. Field weights could be multiplied by field coefficients signifying "importance"
to indicate the usefulness of a particular field. However, the patterns themselves may be
constructed to create appropriate field weights to optimize field relationships to
424 Winkler, "Matching and Record Linkage," 382-3.
425 Shaun Grannis, J.M. Overhage, S. Hui, and C.J. McDonald, "Analysis of a Probabilistic Record Linkage
Technique Without Human Review" (American Medical Informatics Association 2003 Symposium
Proceedings), 259.
426 For setting utilities in record linkage applications see similar ideas in C. Quantin, C. Binquet, F.A.
Allaert, B. Comet, R. Pattisina, G. Leteuff, C. Ferdynus, and J.B. Gouyon, "Decision Analysis for the
Assessment of a Record Linkage Procedure," Methods of nformation in Medicine, 44 (2005): 77.
427 For instance, see David White, "A Review of the Statistics of Record Linkage for Genealogical
Research," 1997, 368-71, <http://www.fcsm.gov/working-papers/dwhite.pdf> (23 May 2005).
thresholds. Since weights are constructed based on patterns, the pattern itself can be
chosen to create the needed weight "importance." Importance can be specified by
creating multiple similar patterns, patterns based on individual characters analogous to
patterns encompassing full fields, and similar constructions, creating multiple weights for
a field. The diversity of weights, instead of using fixed coefficients, could offer more
flexibility in constructing field weights to optimize matching.
Once the system is trained it can be run on validated data. The weights and threshold
computed above are used for matching. The same process is followed as above with
respect to computing Wtotal weight and comparing it to a threshold to determine match status
of a validation record pair in a validation file.
3.2.2.3 Field Information Content
3.2.2.3.1 Selecting Fields for Linkage
We work with the basic patterns of full and partial field equality and inequality to
develop our theory for minimizing the impact of identifier errors. Assuming an error rate
for linkage identifiers which is not significant, as per the discussions in Sections 1.3.2
and 2.2.5, a single weight computed as
log (P(patternq I Ri and Rj match) / P(patternq I Ri and Rj don't match))
will be significantly higher than I when Ri and Rj match and patternq is the equality
pattern. The same units should typically have equal identifiers, creating a high numerator
above. Similarly, the above weight will be significantly lower than 1 when Ri and Rj
don't match and patternq is the inequality pattern. Typically when units are different their
identifiers will not equal, creating a much higher denominator above. High and low
weights can now be separated.
Some record linkage practitioners recommend using more fields to reduce errors from
suboptimal identifiers. 428 Others recommend employing string comparators-which
examine the characters of compared variables and assign a similarity "score" based on
equality of certain characters-to reduce errors.429 430 31 More information can be used
to add certainty in overcoming linkage problems. How do we know which fields in
records have the best "information?" How do we know which to analyze at the character
level? Current literature discusses reasons why certain variables appear more useful than
428 For instance, see Winkler, "Matching and Record Linkage," 393.
429 Winkler, "Preprocessing of Lists and String Comparison," 185.
430 See Fred Damerau, "A Technique for Computer Detection and Correction of Spelling Errors,"
Communications of the ACM, 7 (1964): 172.
431 Grannis, "Real World Performance of Approximate String Comparators for Use in Patient Matching,"
46.
others.4 32 433 434 Some literature talks about the "information content" of a variable and
asks how beneficial it might be for linkage. 435 436 However, current literature doesn't
explain the tradeoffs between the errors of a field and linkage outcomes. The authors may
resolve errors in particular systems without describing more generally how to improve
error handling in a variety of contexts. It may be less clear how to overcome a field's
errors in other linkage projects, which may or may not have similar traits to projects
already examined.
This thesis explores such questions. It examines how a field's errors might impact
linkage. We explore the usefulness of character-level analysis, describing the benefit of
the new information. This thesis will not create a complete analytical framework. Future
research can create a more generic approach.
We first ask how to select fields to add linkage redundancy to address linkage identifier
errors. Imagine records Ri and Rj represent the same unit. However, the comparison fields
involved have sufficient error such that their computed Wtotal weight is below the threshold.
The system would incorrectly label Ri and Rj a non-match. If we can find another field
such that its weight pushes Wtotal weight above the threshold, the records will properly be
designated as a match. Similarly, to fix a false positive, we must find another field whose
disagreement weight pulls Wtotal weight below the threshold to rectify this error.
3.2.2.3.2 Using a Single Linkage Field
We will work with the following example to demonstrate our analysis. Imagine that an
existing system uses only a field arbitrarily named K1i. Assume the number of character
positions in K1 is nl, and each character position has a range of pl values. For example,
pl would be 10 if each K, character is a digit ranging 0-9. K1 has an error rate e, in [0,1].
With probability e, Ki is subject to a typo, insertion, missing value or similar errors that
can ha en to a field. We assume the K1 namespace, p1n l , is large and the error rate is
small. Consider field K2, another field available in the records. The number of
character positions in K2 is n2 and each K2 character has a range of p2 values. Assume the
432 Catherine Quantin, C. Binquet, K. Bourquard, R. Pattisina, B. Gouyon-Cornet, C. Ferdynus, J.B.
Gouyon, and F.A. Allaert, "A Peculiar Aspect of Patients' Safety: The Discriminating Power of Identifiers
for Record Linkage," Studies in Health Technology and Informatics, 103 (2004): 400-406.
433 Quantin, "Decision Analysis for the Assessment of a Record Linkage Procedure," 72-9.
434 Shaun Grannis, J.M. Overhage, and C.J. McDonald. "Analysis of Identifier Performance Using a
Deterministic Linkage Algorithm" (Proceedings of the AMIA 202 Annual Symposium), 305-9.
435 L. J. Cook, L.M. Olson, and J.M. Dean. "Probabilistic Records Linkage: Relationships Between File
Sizes, Identifiers, and Match Weights," Methods ofInformation in Medicine, 40 (2001): 196-203.
436 Roos, 117-23.
437 Obviously not all namespaces will be large. Our analysis will work with smaller namespaces, but we use
a larger namespace for illustration. Our analysis will also work with larger errors, but again we use a small
error rate for presentation. Nevertheless, a larger namespace and smaller error rate are realistic for a number
of linkage applications. For example, the Patient Account Number may be a large field, with an arbitrary
length of 10 positions, for example, within a health organization. If it is the primary identifier for linking
patient data it may have a low error rate given its importance and the quality monitoring to which it
probably is subject.
K2 namespace, p2n2, is also large. K2 has error rate f. The same types of mistakes can
happen to K2 as for K1. Likewise, assume a small K2 error rate. We assume a uniform
distribution of all values in the namespaces for K, and K2 for simpler presentation
although our approach will work with more complex namespace distributions. We'd like
to understand what characteristics K2 must meet to fix the errors created by a system only
using K 1. Section 1.3.2 described how errors in the medical record number can lead to
poor linkages. We will minimize them in this presentation by using redundant data. The
Levenshtein string comparator will be used in our analysis. The Levenshtein string
comparator measures the distance between two strings by determining the smallest
number of insertions, deletions, and substitutions needed to change one string into
another. 438
Imagine that the current system compares equality and inequality of full K1 values
without any character-level analysis of K1. We compute the weights for the system to
understand system operations. The weights will be determined theoretically. By
computing the likelihood ratios, we see that for this system the agreement weight,
representing the equality pattern, and disagreement weight, representing the inequality
pattern are:
[Ki]Wagree = log (P (Ri[K1] = Rj[Ki] I Ri and Rj match) /
P (Ri[KI] = Rj[KI] I Ri and Rj don't match) ) (4)
[K1]Wdisagree = log (P (Ri[K1] i Rj[KI] I Ri and Rj match) /
P (Ri[KI] # Rj[KI] I Ri and Rj don't match)) (5)
Since the overall error rate for K, is e, we have:
P (Ri[KI] t Rj[KI] I Ri and Rj match) = e*(1-e) + e*(1-e) + e2 - (e2)* (*/pl)nl
The first term on the right represents Ri[KI] being in error when Rj[Ki] is not in error.
The second term represents the opposite event. The third term represents the event when
the Ki fields of both records are in error. The last term computes the chance that both
fields are in error and, uncommonly, the errors produce identical Ki values. The
possibility of two K1 fields randomly equaling is one chance within the size of the
namespace, represented by (1/pl)n I . The full fourth term must be subtracted from the third
term, e2, since this event quantifies the K1 values of both fields erroneously equaling
rather than not as the conditional probability above requires. We can drop all the terms
which contain e2 terms as e is assumed small. We have
P (Ri[Ki] t Rj[KI] I Ri and Rj match) = e - e2 + e - e2 + e2 - (e2) * (/pl) n l
P (Ri[KI] # Rj[KI] I Ri and Rj match) = 2*e (6)
Consequently,
P (Ri[KI] = Rj[KI] I Ri and Rj match) = 1 - 2*e (7)
On the other hand, we have,
438 Grannis, "Real World Performance of Approximate String Comparators for Use in Patient Matching,"
44.
P (Ri[KI] = Rj[KI] I Ri and Rj don't match)=
[2 * e * (1-e) * (1/p1) n l] + ((1-e) 2) * (l/pl)n l + (e2) * (l/p1) nl
The rightmost (1/pl) n l term represents the possibility of the K1 fields of two non-
matching records equaling when both K1 fields are in error. This is the size of the K1
namespace: one value in each character position in the field randomly being chosen
across all characters positions independently. The associated e2 term indicates a mistake
took place in both fields for both of them to equal erroneously. The middle (l/pl)n l term
represents the possibility of K1 fields of two non-matching records equaling due to the
natural distribution of field values, which is again the size of the K1 namespace: one
value in each field character position randomly being chosen across all positions
independently. Such an occurrence is multiplied by the chance both K1 terms will not be
in error, (1-e) 2. The leftmost (l/pl)n l term represents the possibility of K1 of two non-
matching records equaling when one K1 can become another only via the error e, which is
again the size of the namespace. The e and (1-e) terms signify a mistake occurred in one
but not the other field. The factor 2 appears since this can happen for the combination Ri
and Rj or the opposite combination event, Rj and Ri. Therefore,
P (Ri[K 1] = Rj[K 1] I Ri and Rj don't match) = ((l/pl)nl)*(2*e*(1-e) + (l-e)2 + e 2)
((l/p l)n') * ((l-e) + e)2
((1/pl) n l) * (1)2
(1/p13) n l  (8)
Consequently,
P (Ri[KI] # Rj[Ki] I Ri and Rj don't match)= 1 - (1/pl) n l  1 (9)
That is, the second term is negligible when the namespace plnl is assumed large. Thus,
[Ki]Wagree log( (1 - 2*e) / (1/pl)nl) = log ((plin)*(l - 2*e)) (10)
[K1]Wdisagree log ((2*e) / 1) = log (2*e) (11)
We should note that (10) is typically a large positive value in actual record linkage
systems since it is a log of a term including a large namespace; (11) is usually a negative,
but sometimes a small positive value since it is a log of a term including a small error e.
Both are typically notably different from 1 to improve matching.
3.2.2.3.3 Improving Linkage with a Second Field
What criteria must K2 meet to reduce linkage errors given a system only using a
suboptimal KI? K2 must have a larger namespace or smaller error rate which will create
larger weights to reverse K1-generated false negatives and false positives. Imagine K 1 is
creating a false negative. K2 must push the total weight above a new threshold. It must fix
the mistake when Ri[K 2] = Rj[K 2] but Ri[KI] t Rj[KI] when Ri and Rj match. When only
K1 was used, such an error would lead to a false negative. Upon encountering Ri[KI] and
Rj[KI] in a Ki-only system, an error in either K, field would set Wtotal weight to [KI]Wdisagree
and the records would be incorrectly labeled.
The threshold for a KI-only system is
T1 = ([KI]Wagree + [KI]Wdisagree) / 2
In a K1-only system we have,
Wtotal weight = [Ki]Wdisagree < T1 = ([Kl]Wagree + [Ki]Wdisagree) / 2
The left term would be a low or negative number which would be smaller than the
positive value on the right, a positive number plus half of the low or negative term on the
left.
For a K2 system, new weights and threshold must be created since the new field, K2, is
introduced. K2 parameters are similar to that of a KI-system:
[K2]Wagree - log ((p~n2)*(1 - 2*f)) (12)
[K2]Wdisagree - log (2*f) (13)
The new threshold is
T2 = ([K1]Wagree + [K2]Wagree + [Kl]Wdisagree + [K2]Wdisagree) / 2
To fix Ki false negatives, we must have
Wtotal weight = [Ki]Wdisagree + [K2]Wagree : T2 (14)
Thus, K2 characteristics must meet (14) to fix K -created false negatives.
Imagine KI is creating false positives. K2 characteristics must meet additional criteria
beyond (14). Upon encountering Ri[Kl] = Rj[KI], when the records are a non-match, the
Wtotal weight would be incorrectly set to [Ki]Wagee and the records would be incorrectly
labeled a match.
Wtotal weight = [Kl]Wagree _ T1 = ([Ki]Wagree + [KI]Wdisagree) / 2
The left term would be a positive number, which would be higher than the smaller
positive value on the right. In this case, K2 must create a sufficiently low weight to push
the total weight below the threshold. In this case, we must have
Wtotal weight = [Ki ]Wagree + [K2]Wdisagree < T2 (15)
Combining (14) and (15) we have,
[KI]Wagree + [K2]Wdisagree < T2 < [K1]Wdisagree + [K2]Wagree
+[KI]Wagree + [K2]Wdisagree < [KI]Wdisagree + [K2]Wagree (16)
Reinstating the original parameters, combining, and exponentiating both sides, we have
log ((pll )*(1 - 2*e)) + log (2*f) < log (2*e) + log ((p2n2)*(l - 2*f))
4 (pln')*(1 - 2*e)*(2*f) < (2*e)*(p2n2)*(1 - 2*f) (17)
Given an e, pI, and nl associated with K, we can compute if a given available K2 can
correct for K, errors. It has to meet equation (17). We can analyze K2's parameters when
training the system. The best K2 among available fields can be chosen to fix the
platform's linkage errors due to only Ki. Observe that the K2 error rate, f, can be even
higher than the error rate for Ki, e, as long as its namespace compensates for it and
allows K2 to fix KI's errors.
We can ensure that K2 is introducing fewer linkage errors than K 1. K2 is fixing Ki errors,
but ideally it can fix more errors than it introduces in which case overall system linkage
would improve. Assume a K2 field meets (17). We check if
[ ( P (Ri[K 2] = Rj[K 2] I Ri and Rj don't match) *
P (Ri[KI] # Rj[K ] I Ri and Rj don't match) ) +
( P (Ri[K 2] # Rj[K2] I Ri and Rj match) *
P (Ri[K 1] = Rj[K 1] I Ri and Rj match) ) +
( P (Ri[K 2] t Rj[K 2] I Ri and Rj match) *
P (Ri[KI] # Rj[K 1] I Ri and Rj match) ) +
( P (Ri[K 2] = Rj [K2] I Ri and Rj don't match) *
P (Ri[Ki] = Rj[KI] I Ri and Rj don't match) ) ] <
P (Ri[Ki] : Rj[KI] I Ri and Rj match) +
P (Ri[K 1] = Rj[Ki] Ri and Rj don't match)
(To clarify, in this inequality we are computing:
[(prob(K2 false positive) *
prob(Kl true negative)) +
(prob(K2 false negative) *
prob(K1 true positive)) +
(prob(K2 false negative) *
prob(Klfalse negative)) +
(prob(K2 false positive) *
prob(KI false positive))] <
prob(Klfalse negative) +
prob(KI false positive) )
The left part of the inequality represents the full linkage errors produced by a Ki and K2
system, while the right part represents the complete errors in a K1-only system. We hope
for the left side to be smaller than the right to create fewer errors. We simplify the above
inequality:
[ P (Ri[K 2] = Rj[K 2] I Ri and Rj don't match) *
(P (Ri[KI] # Rj[KI] I Ri and Rj don't match) +
P (Ri[K 1] = Rj[KI] I Ri and Rj don't match) ) +
P (Ri[K 2] = Rj[K2] Ri and Rj match) *
(P (Ri[KI] = Rj[KI] I Ri and Rj match) +
P (Ri[KI] • Rj[KI] Ri and Rj match)) ] <
P (Ri[K 1] # Rj[KI] Ri and Rj match) +
P (Ri[K 1] = Rj[KI] Ri and Rj don't match)
+ [P(Ri[K 2] = Rj[K 2] I Ri and Rj don't match)*(1) +
P(Ri[K2] : Rj[K 2] Ri and Rj match)*(l) ] <
P (Ri[KI] : Rj[KI] I Ri and Rj match) +
P (Ri[K 1] = Rj[Ki] | Ri and Rj don't match)
+ [ P (Ri[K 2] = Rj[K 2] I Ri and Rj don't match) +
P (Ri[K 2] : Rj[K2] I Ri and Rj match) ] <
P (Ri[KI] # Rj[KI] I Ri and Rj match) +
[prob(K2 false positive) *
(prob(K1 true negative) +
prob(K1false positive)) +
prob(K2 false negative) *
(prob(K, true positive) +
prob(K false negative)) <
prob(Klfalse negative) +
prob(Kl false positive)
[prob(K2 false positive) *(1) +
prob(K2 false negative)*(1)] <
prob(K false negative) +
prob(KI false positive)
[prob(K2 false positive) +
prob(K2 false negative)] <
prob(KI false negative) +
P (Ri[K1] = Rj[KI] I Ri and Rj don't match)
We insert the approximations from (6) and (8) for Ki above, and analogous ones for K2,
into (18):
(l/p2)n2 + 2*f < 2*e + (1/p)' nl  (19)
The total linkage error rate in a Ki-only system is the sum on the right. The 2*e term is
the error rate when K1 is not equal during a match while the (1/pl)n term is the error rate
when K, is equal during a non-match. The sum on the left is the equivalent error rate for
a K2- and Ki-system, using analogous computations as for K1. K2 characteristics are
apparently the only ones responsible for linkage errors. The values for errors are
analogous to those computed for a KI-only system. The K2 field among all candidate K2
fields with the smallest product on the left in the above inequality should be chosen to
maximally overcome identifier errors in the system.
3.2.2.3.4 Assessing a Field's Characters for Improved Linkage
We examine the information value of another common pattern used in record linkage: the
analysis of a field's characters. Can linkage problems due to identifier errors be reduced
if a field's characters are examined? If the number of character positions in error in a
field is not large, the field's characters may be analyzed. More refined weights will be
returned which can fix some linkage errors. However, if a field is diverse and dense,
more false positives may be created due to "close" fields. A greater number of higher
weights may be created which would be larger than the threshold than the errors fixed by
the character level analysis, overcoming the benefits of such analysis. We will work with
string comparators as the mechanism for character-level assessment. We will also
continue to work with the agreement and disagreement weights due to the frequent usage
of equality and inequality patterns in practice. A weight can be created by a string
comparator just like the agreement and disagreement weights. 439 Since a string
comparator ultimately indicates degree of agreement between fields, the weight attributed
should fall between Wdisagree and Wagree to reflect the comparator's score, reflecting the
degree of field equality. One author converted the comparator score into [0,1] for simpler
data manipulation and analysis, which we also do for similar reasons. 440 The value of
zero should indicate virtually no similarity between fields while a 1 can indicate an exact
match between fields. A score close to 0 should be transformed into a weight close to
Wdisagree, reflecting almost full field inequality. A converted score close to 1 should be
transformed into a weight close to Wagree, reflecting almost full field equality. A simple
model to create the needed comparator weight is to assume that the rise from the
disagreement to agreement weights is linear. The [0,1] score can simply be multiplied by
the difference between the disagreement and agreement weights and added to Wdisagree-
439 Taken from William Yancey, "An Adaptive String Comparator for Record Linkage," 19 February 2004,
1-24, <http://www.census.gov/srd/papers/pdf/rrs2004-02.pdf> (24 May 2005).
440 For instance, see Grannis, "Real World Performance of Approximate String Comparators for Use in
Patient Matching," 44.
prob(Kl falsepositive) (18)
A more advanced weight construction would involve examining the training file,
investigating particular [0,1] scores. Linear regression can be used to create a function
mapping the converted scores into appropriate weights representing the comparator score.
The analyst can find how often a converted comparator score in [0,1], when examining
field K among file records, equaled some particular score z in [0,1] when the records
matched as opposed to how often such scores equaled score z when the records didn't
match. The values would be quantified for all training file scores z. We elaborate on the
analysis. Imagine that a string comparator compare(sl, s2) returns a degree of equality
score between strings sl and s2. If compare(sl, s2) can be converted into 0 5 z < 1, the
weight for comparing arbitrary field K in records Ri and Rj in our context becomes:
Wcomparator = log (P ( convert (compare(Ri[K], Rj[K]) ) = z I
Ri and Rj match) /
P ( convert (compare(Ri[K], Rj[K]) ) = z
Ri and Rj don't match) )
Wcomparator should compute to a high positive value when there are more matches for a
given score z in [0,1] than non-matches. Likewise, Wcomparator should compute to a low or
negative value when there are more non-matches for a given score z than matches. Linear
regression can be used to fit a line between Wdisagree and Wagree representing the points (zi,
Wcomparator [Zi]) for all scores zi found and examined in the training file. The resulting
function Wcomparator would compute the weights for all scores z when examining the
validation file. The system would obtain a regular comparator score when examining
Ri[K] and Rj[K] in a validation file, convert it to [0,1], and convert this value into the
needed weight using the Wcomparator function. All other described record linkage processes,
computing Wtotal weight, comparing it to a threshold, etc., are the same. We will use the
former linear-based weight-creation approach above for simpler presentation. However,
our analysis will work with more advanced weight constructions.
We show how incorporating the Levenshtein string comparator into one field at first
appears useful to reduce linkage identifier errors. Our results will be demonstrated
numerically. We will work with a system using K1 and K2 as before. The parameters for
our hypothetical system are as follows:
p2 = p = 10
f= e = 0.01
nl =8
n2 = 12
The characteristics of K1 and K2 are similar. As is evident, the length of K2, n2, is 4
positions longer than that of K1, nl.
Incorporating a comparator can correct the false negatives created by the same field. With
the above choice of parameters, K2 can correct K1 errors. K2 meets equation (17).
(pinl)*(l - 2*e)*(2*f) < (2*e)*(p 2n2)*(1 - 2*f)
+ (108)*(1 - 2*(0.01))*(2*(0.01)) < (2*(0.01))*(1012)*(1 - 2*(0.01))
+ 1.96*10E+6 < 1.96*10E+10
Further, K2 should be introducing fewer overall system linkage errors as it meets equation(19).
(l/p2) n2 + 2*f < 2*e + (1/pl) nl
+ (1/10)12 + 2*(0.01) < 2*(0.01) + (1/10)8
4 0.02 + 1.0*10E-12 < 0.02 + 1.0*10E-8
Since both inequalities hold K2 is a useful field for the system.
Imagine that the errors produced by f create a single typo in K2. That is, the K2 error is a
single spelling mistake in one character. The comparator is useful in K2 to fix K2 false
negatives. Suppose that Ri and Rj match. If LEV represents the Levenshtein string
comparator function call, we have
LEV (Ri[K 2], Rj[K2']) = 1
K2' is a K2 field which has been erroneously transformed. The distance between K2' and
K2 is one character position, which has been changed due to the spelling mistake. We
first examine the case when both K2 and K, are in error. In this case, we hope the
comparator can reverse the false negatives if the K2 error is small. The weight produced
should be high to reverse the K2- and KI-generated false negatives. The weight assigned
to K2 should push the total weight above the threshold. We have,
T2 = ([KI]Wagree + [K2]Wagree + [KI]Wdisagree + [K2]Wdisagree) / 2
The Levenshtein string comparator score can be transformed into a modified [0,1 ] score
following Grannis:441
Zscore = 1 - [LEV(sl, s2) / maxlen(s1, s2)]
We have,
Zscore = 1 - [LEV(Ri[K 2],Rj[K 2']) / maxlen (Ri[K 2],Rj[K 2'])]
= 1-(1 /n2)
- 1 -(1 / 12)
= 0.92
The comparator weight is created from the linear difference between the agreement and
disagreement weights:
[K2]Wcomparator = [K2]Wdisagree + ([K2]Wagree - [K2]Wdisagree) * Zscore
The total weight is
Wtotal weight = [K2]Wcomparator + [K,]Wdisagree
We check if Wtotal weight Ž T2.
[K2]Wcomparator + [K1]Wdisagree Ž T2 =
([Ki]Wagree + [K2]Wagree + [Kl]Wdisagree + [K2]Wdisagree) / 2
441 Grannis, "Real World Performance of Approximate String Comparators for Use in Patient Matching,"
44.
4 [K2]Wdisagree + ([K2]Wagree - [K2]Wdisagrce) * Zscore + [Ki]Wdisagrec >
([KI]Wagree + [K2]Wagree + [KI]Wdisagree + [K2]Wdisagree) / 2
4 log (2*(0.01)) +
(log((10 12)*(1 - 2*(0.01))) - log (2*(0.01))) * (0.92) + log (2*(0.01)) >
(log((108)*(l - 2*(0.01))) + log((1012)*(1 - 2*0.01)) +
log (2*(0.01)) + log (2*(0.01))) / 2
+ (-5.64) + (39.83 - (-5.64)) * (0.92) + (-5.64) > (26.55 + 39.83 + (-5.64) + (-5.64)) / 2
+ 30.55 > 27.55
Since the total weight rises above the threshold, K2 can correct its own false negatives
when KI is in error.
K2 will also correct its own false negatives when Ki is error-free. [Ki]Wagree will be
added to [K2]Wcomparator which will make the sum above on the left even larger than
30.55, and thus larger than the threshold, 27.55, generating the match. The Levenshtein
string comparator appears useful.
However, the comparator will also be assigning the same sum 30.55 to many other
"close" non-matching fields in dense space. When K2 is dense and diverse, as was one of
our earlier assumptions, for a given field there should be a number of fields which may
differ by one character. There may be many non-matching identifiers which would differ
in any one of K2 n2 positions. The weight for such identifiers will be the same, 30.55, in
the case when the K, fields and K2 fields are not equal. K2's small error rate f will
probably generate considerably fewer false negatives as it is probably smaller than the
number of "close" fields in K2' namespace. In this example, performing character-level
analysis for K2 will not be useful and should not be incorporated as the assigned total
weight will be larger than the threshold. More system linkage errors will be introduced
than fixed.
The same analysis above can be carried out to determine which error rate, length of field,
and number of characters per position is needed for character-level analysis to be useful
for a field. Future research can create the needed approach.
3.3 Threat Framework
We ask how to handle the above record linkage paradigm securely. We return to the other
part of Enhancement 1 and ask how to deidentify the above operations. This thesis
proposes to securely link records, including allowing for character-level analysis. To do
so we create a security framework. A variety of security approaches exist from which we
must select the best foundation. We synthesized a literature analysis with interviews with
experts to derive the following security and functionality framework. Approaches
meeting the security and functionality framework may be used for securing the above
linkage operations; those not meeting it may be rejected.
* Efficiency is obviously preferred. If two technical approaches offer the same level
of functionality and security, the one which uses less storage, less time, etc., is
obviously preferred.
* Hiding smaller "secrets" is preferred. Hiding a very small amount of data, for
instance, one bit, can be considered insecure since the data can be guessed despite
the strongest of security. Nevertheless, given a certain nominal amount of data
which are difficult to guess, protecting less of such data is easier than protecting
more of them as less opportunity exists for misuse. For example, some authors
critique access controls as compared to encryption from this perspective within a
database context. 44 2 443 Data are ultimately unencrypted when access controls in a
database are used, creating more difficulty in controlling plaintext management
and disclosure. An encryption approach restricts plaintext availability more as the
secret is placed in a small encryption key which alone should be protected.
* If an approach involves encryption, the encryption algorithm itself-the
mathematical formula(s) and any public parameters-should be public
knowledge. 444
* Any encryption-based approach must be secure. As we will investigate encryption
and hashing in this thesis, we will create a threat model for investigating the
associated cryptographic schemes in an intra- and inter-organizational context.
The BQMA are internal applications; however, record linkage can happen outside
of an organization, too, if the organization sends its data elsewhere for analysis.
The approach must be secure in both contexts. The threat model will be described
in more detail in Section 3.3.1 below.
* It should not be feasible to conduct brute force attacks (BFAs) on the approach
either. In this thesis, BFAs will be defined as systematic traversals of all
possibilities until "success" is obtained.445 We will define the nature of BFAs in
Section 3.3.2.
3.3.1 Cryptographic Threat Model
We first describe the cryptographic threat model against which our approach should be
secure because we will explore a cryptographic solution in this thesis. Over the years,
442 Min-Shiang Hwang and Wei-Pang Yang, "A Two-phase Encryption Scheme for Enhancing Database
Security," Journal of Systems Software, 31 (1995): 257-265.
443 George I. Davida and David Wells, "A Database Encryption System with Subkeys," ACM Transactions
on Database Systems, 6 (1981): 312-328.
44 Indeed, in the cryptographic world it is a typical assumption that any algorithm to be examined is public.
Fewer faults might be uncovered in proprietary approaches due to less scrutiny by experts. (See Bruce
Schneier, "Security Pitfalls in Cryptographic Design," Information Management & Computer Security, 6
(1998): 133-137; also, see RSA Security, "What is Cryptanalysis?" RSA Laboratories'Frequently Asked
Questions about Today's Cryptography, <http://www.rsasecurity.com/rsalabs/node.asp?id=2200> (14
March 2004)).
445 Extracted from Terry Ritter, "Brute Force Attack," Ritter's Crypto Glossary and Dictionary of
Technical Cryptography, 12 March 2004,
<http://www.ciphersbyritter.com/GLOSSARY.HTM#BruteForceAttack> (15 March 2004).
cryptographers have designed threat models to capture ways in which an adversary can
interact with an encryption or hashing system to capture sensitive data. Consider one
common high-level general classification of attacks on encryption or hashing schemes, in
order, approximately, of least to most severe as presented by Menezes. 446 44 448 In the
attacks below the purpose of the adversary is to deduce any involved encryption or
hashing algorithm's key, or surmise the current, past, or future plaintexts associated with
the system. If an adversary is successful, we call such success system compromise.
1) A ciphertext-only attack is an attack in which the adversary tries to compromise
the system by observing only available ciphertexts. He may try to learn the
distribution of ciphertexts or the nature of the encryption or hashing encodings in
hopes of learning more about the original plaintexts.
2) A known-plaintext attack is one in which the adversary has a quantity of plaintext
and corresponding ciphertext. He may uncover more sensitive data or attempt
other compromises knowing such mappings.
3) In a chosen-plaintext attack, the adversary chooses some amount of plaintext and
is given the corresponding ciphertext. He is forcing the system to encrypt or hash
data, hoping to discover the nature of the encryption or hashing process, which
may be sensitive to such mapping.
4) An adaptive chosen-plaintext attack is a chosen-plaintext attack wherein the
adversary may choose the plaintext to be given based on the ciphertexts received
from prior requests. He examines chosen plaintext and ciphertext structures
dynamically, "testing" the system with probing requests.
5) A chosen-ciphertext attack is one in which the adversary selects the ciphertexts
and is given the corresponding plaintexts. He begins with the ciphertexts,
generates the plaintexts, and again tries to surmise the encryption or hashing
transformations. Practically, such an attack may happen if the adversary gains
access to the decryption equipment; however, the assumption is he will not access
the decryption key.449
446 Menezes, "Chapter 1," 41.
447 See Menezes, "Chapter 1," 42.
448 Alfred Menezes, Paul C. van Oorschot, and Scott A. Vanstone, "Chapter 9," Handbook ofApplied
Cryptography, 2001, 326, <http://www.cacr.math.uwaterloo.ca/hac/about/chap9.pdf> (24 May 2005).
449 If the adversary can get access to the key, the system is compromised and the application owner has to
"recover." For example, he may need to warn data owners that their data has been compromised, etc. Some
cryptographic designs try to protect the key. (For example, see Freesoft.org, "Connected: An Internet
Encyclopedia: Key Management," <http://www.freesoft.org/CIE/Topics/138.htm> (24 May 2005)). For
example, they can use passwords to protect the key or split the key to make the construction of the key
more difficult. If such approaches work in our record linkage paradigm they can be chosen for improved
key security. However, if such approaches cannot be used in our context due to, for example, architectural
incompatibility, we assume that approaches that protect the key less will be chosen. Standardized robust
encryption schemes protect the key, such as recommending the key not be given to colleagues or that the
:key be stored in a secure location. Data subject to such schemes will be protected, albeit less securely than
if extra key protection could be involved. Also, with respect to hash functions, decryption can't be done per
se. The purpose of hashing is to confirm data integrity, not to recover original data. (See discussion in
Menezes, "Chapter 9," 321-322). The decryption attacks described in the text would not be possible; only
plaintext-based attacks could be mounted. Enhancement I requires a "decryption" for data subject
reidentification to be available. We will examine one approach which tries to deidentify record linkage
applications later in this thesis to understand how hashing may "decrypt."
6) An adaptive chosen-ciphertext attack is a chosen-ciphertext attack wherein the
choice of ciphertexts may depend on the plaintexts received from prior requests.
Such an attack starts with "testing" ciphertexts and obtaining, hopefully, useful
plaintexts to understand the encryption or hashing transformations.
Each of these attacks can be formalized in theoretical terms. 450 For example, to test the
security of an encryption or hashing scheme E, an "oracle," i.e., a program, is given
access to and can operate E, represented as another program. The adversary, a third
program, attempts to compromise E by interacting with the oracle. The security of E can
be expressed as the adversary's "advantage," the time and space complexity of the oracle
and the adversary involved, in being able to divulge the key, discover some plaintexts,
etc. as described in the compromise definition above.
We will not be using the theoretical versions of such attacks but the practical realization
of such attacks within and outside of institutions. More pragmatic threat models for actual
software operations will be constructed. With respect to the intra-organizational context,
i.e. internal attacks, for example, we will be guided by the "insider threat" discussion
from Section 1.3.2. In that discussion, some employees will have access to some of the
equipment, personnel, or even some of the data used in the encryption or hashing
processes some of the time. They may encrypt or decrypt or hash data to obtain needed
information, trying to misuse a cryptographic system. In a real-world known-plaintext
attack, for instance, an employee might know how original sensitive data becomes
particular encrypted output. The employee might be a business manager who generated
such data. He subsequently gives it to an IT staff specialist for secure storage. Perhaps the
data will be examined later on. He sees the ciphertexts that are created and stored in a
data warehouse because the IT expert protects them with encryption, storing them in such
a warehouse. Since the original employee is a business manager he might have access
privileges to the data warehouse for operational reasons. To the degree the encryption
used by the IT staff specialist is the same as that used by the record linkage application
we're exploring (perhaps the encryption process is standardized within the organization),
the business manager has just conducted a realistic "known-plaintext attack." He knows
the relationships between some plaintexts and corresponding ciphertexts because he sees
the latter in the data warehouse. Other similar attacks within and outside of institutions
may happen, too.
We call our threat framework attacks against encryption (AAE). This framework will
encompass the six attacks described above, practically realized. The adversary will be an
employee running the record linkage software, attempting system compromise. The
plaintexts will be the application fields, such as a policy-holder's last name or Social
Security Number which could be available in a linkage data set. The ciphertexts will be
these encrypted or hashed fields available to the record linkage software and to the
employee running it.
450 This is taken from Shafi Goldwasser and Mihir Bellare, Lecture Notes on Cryptography (Cambridge,
MA: Massachusetts Institute of Technology, August 2001), 62, 91-93.
We need to clarify our notion of compromise. In addition to learning past, current, or
future plaintexts, or even the key involved with an encryption or hashing system, the
discovery of small parts of a plaintext will also be considered a compromise under the
AAE. The full plaintext might be guessed if such partial knowledge becomes known. As
an example of practical guessing, imagine the linkage data set is like the copy data store,
a claims data set, deidentified via Safe Harbor. An organizational employee is trying to
guess the personal information of policy-holders using their last names. If a policy-holder
associated with a claims record has a rare last name, knowing its first few characters can
considerably help in guessing that person's fully identifying information. A phone book
can be used covering the zip code of the policy-holder, which will be available in the
claims record but will now be three digits long after Safe Harbor deidentification. Several
last names might be listed in the phone book matching the first few characters of the
policy-holder's last name. Inputting the several last names and the patient's state,
represented by the three-digit zip code, into a free online name lookup service such as
www.MelissaDATA.com will yield the first name, last name, and current age of all
individuals with that last name within available public and other records in that state
available to the lookup service. 4 51 Age can be computed from the claims data by
subtracting the year of birth field, available from the Safe Harbor-deidentified date-of-
birth, from the current year. Matching the age with the age provided by the lookup
service can narrow the search to the possibly correct person. I was able to successfully
obtain, within 30 minutes, names, home addresses, and phone numbers for a few people
with rare last names in this manner knowing only the first few last name characters based
on various lookup strategies using www.MelissaDATA.com and similar free online
lookup services.452 453
451 www.MelissaDATA.com, "People Finder Lookup," <http://www.melissadata.com/cgi-
bin/peoplefinder.asp> (20 October 2005).452 Lookups performed on October 20, 2005.
453 As another example of being able to guess personal information, consider the Social Security Number
(SSN). In the PM context, the medical record number on a claims record may be an SSN. The Federal Tax
Number can be an SSN on a UB92, for instance. (Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services, UB92;
Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services, HCFA 1500). However, numbers making up the SSN are not
randomly assigned. The first three SSN digits comprise the "area" of the SSN. This value is determined by
the zip code of the mailing address of the individual who submitted the application for the SSN. (Social
Security Administration, "Is There Any Significance to the Numbers Assigned in the Social Security
Number?" 2003, <http://ssa-custhelp.ssa.gov/cgi-
bin/ssa.cfg/php/enduser/std adp.php?p sid=mtTFC74h&p Iva=&o faqid=87&p created=955483216&p s
p=cF9zcmNoPSZwX2dvaWRzb3JOPSZwX3Jvdl9ibnO9NjlImcF9jYXRfbHZsMTOxNiZwX3BhZ2U9MQ
**&p li> (14 March 2004)). The Social Security Administration (SSA) website indicates that digit 5 is the
most popular first digit in the "area" field. (Social Security Administration, "Social Security Number
Allocations," <http://www.socialsecurity.gov/foia/stateweb.html> (14 March 2004)). Imagine that a
deterministic encryption function is used to encrypt such values. Deterministic encryption transforms the
same plaintexts into the same ciphertexts every time, as will be described later on in the text. If the first
character position of the plaintext is enciphered on its own, the resulting ciphertext of the first position
character will have the same frequency distribution as digit 5 across all enciphered SSNs. Deterministic
encryption does not change the frequency of the underlying data. The created ciphertext code will have the
same frequency, allowing for the recognition of an original plaintext character based on the frequency
distribution of the corresponding ciphertext code. The SSA describes other smaller "structures" that may
exist within the SSN, which could permit other types of attacks based on smaller partial plaintext
knowledge, which, in turn, may allow for better full-field SSN guesses.
3.3.2 Brute Force Attacks
Next we describe the brute force attacks (BFAs) against which an approach must also
protect. Just as in the AAE above, success via a BFA will involve the discovery of
sensitive data. If cryptography is involved, the discovery of full or partial original
plaintexts or the encryption or hashing key in key-based schemes would be a
compromise.4 54 455 We divide the BFAs into a plaintext-bruteforce attack and key-brute
force attack, against both of which an approach must guard. To say the BFAs should be
"infeasible," as described before, will mean the storage or time requirements for attacking
the scheme would make the BFAs unrealistic given today's available computational
resources. The design of good encryption or hashing schemes is to make the BFAs some
of the few possible attacks on a scheme yet make the attacks virtually impossible to carry
out.
We describe the plaintext-brute force attack and key-brute force attack. In a plaintext-
brute force attack, the adversary investigates every possible plaintext in an attempt to
compromise the scheme. He traverses all possible plaintexts in the domain and matches
the results to those which have been encrypted or hashed and to which he has access
through normal system interactions. For example, in a PM context, assume medical
record numbers (MRN) are to be encrypted. Suppose MRN values are arbitrarily in the
range of 0000000000 - 9999999999. We define a plaintext-bruteforce attack as the
success an employee has by systematically encrypting 0000000000 - 9999999999 to see
if some enciphered member id equals one of the enciphered member ids in the copy data
store to which he has access. If this can be done for all or some of the full original MRNs,
or all or some of partial MRNs (i.e., particular character positions), the scheme is
insecure. We define the key-brute force attack in a similar fashion. The adversary
systematically generates all possible keys and encrypts or hashes the known plaintext
field values to see if the ciphertexts in the copy data store to which he has access result.
The adversary, based on the AAE, should already have some such plaintext and
ciphertext pairs, such as from a known-plaintext attack in an intra-organizational context.
He can use such data to systematically traverse through all possible keys of a key-based
scheme to find the right key.
Whether the adversary can mount such an attack actually depends on the design of the
scheme. In some constructions, it would be impossible to find the right key. An employee
should only have a limited set of possible plaintexts and corresponding ciphertexts per
the AAE. 456 However, a construction may allow for many keys to map the available
plaintexts into their corresponding ciphertexts, undermining the recognition of the right
454 For example, Menezes, "Chapter 1," 42.
455 Menezes, "Chapter 9," 336.
456 Otherwise there would be broader security concerns within the organization. Large amounts of sensitive
data are available to unauthorized individuals.
key.45 7 Some encryption approaches create a key space that includes all possible
transformations from the domain of the key space into its range. For example, a simple
substitution cipher could have the same domain and range. The domain and range can all
be a list of items, each of which is valued, say arbitrarily, 0 to N. The cipher works by
permuting a given domain value into a different value in the range. 458 In such a
construction the key space is at least N! in size. Each domain value maps into any range
value except those that were already mapped. A key-brute force attack could not identify
the correct key. The at least N! set of permutations representing the keys by their very
nature would create many possible "keys" that could map the small set of known
plaintexts into the corresponding ciphertexts. The proper key cannot be identified since
many keys would transform available plaintexts into corresponding ciphertexts for that
plaintext-ciphertext space since their transformations over that space may be identical.
However, a key-brute force attack can be mounted on approaches which dramatically
limit the key space. For example, AES, a block cipher, can be the basis of deterministic
encryption schemes. 459 AES has a much smaller key space than the substitution cipher
described above. AES breaks all input into 128-bit plaintext blocks before encrypting.
The typical ciphertext blocks produced are each 128 bits in size.46 0 The key space used
for AES is 212 or at most 225 bits in size, it is not 2128! in size. 46 1 If the wrong key is
457 Note, hash functions typically convert a larger domain into a smaller range. Therefore, for keyed hash
functions, more than one key might be found which maps a given element of a domain into the same
element in the range. For example, if only one plaintext-ciphertext pair is known via a known-plaintext
attack, many keys can be found. (See Menezes, "Chapter 9," 336). They would map the single plaintext
into the single available ciphertext. The way to find the right key in a key-brute force attack on a keyed
hashing scheme is to have enough plaintext-ciphertext pairs via a known-plaintext attack or similar attacks
to disqualify all keys but one. Given the nature of the insider threat, we'll assume there are enough such
pairs available. If a hashing approach implements a key structure requiring innumerable known-plaintext
pairs to disqualify keys, the hashing algorithm will be considered safe from a key-brute force attack.
Although some plaintext-ciphertext pairs will be known to an employee via the AAE, the number of pairs
available should not be as large as needed for attack success.
458 See Menezes, "Chapter 1," 15-17.
459 See Goldwasser, Lecture Notes on Cryptography, 51-53, 84.
460 National Institute of Standards and Technology, "Announcing the Advanced Encryption Standard," 26
November 2001, 7, <http://csrc.nist.gov/publications/fips/fips 97/fips-197.pdf> (18 October 2005).
461 Indeed, such constructions are often based on pseudo-random functions (in case of AES, it is based on
the similar pseudo-random permutation), which are a family of functions such that a randomly-chosen
function is "computationally indistinguishable" from a truly random function. (Goldwasser, Lecture Notes
on Cryptography, 67, 61). Such constructions must restrict their key space to make the algorithm behave
like a pseudo-random function. Computational indistinguishability implies that a given plaintext should
typically map into a given ciphertext only under one or a small set of keys. Such functions should typically
send the same plaintexts into random ciphertexts under different keys, i.e., "random" behavior. A randomly
selected key for the algorithm is part of the randomness making the deterministic algorithm like a pseudo-
random function. (See Yehuda Lindell, "Pseudorandomness and Private-key Encryption Schemes,"
Introduction to Cryptography, <www.cs.biu.ac.il/-lindell/89-656/lecture03-89-656.ps> (31 August 2005);
Wikipedia, "Key (Cryptography)," 14 July 2005, <http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Key (cryptography)> (31
August 2005)). If the key space is not reduced and the wrong key is used, the function may continually map
known plaintexts into available ciphertexts. Many keys may be available for such mappings. As there are
numerous keys, some would only transform the domain space excluding the plaintexts available via the
AAE. For the plaintexts discovered via the AAE, the keys would create the same plaintext-to-ciphertext
transformations, as in that space they can create identical mappings, as described in the text. This would
used in such constructions, this should be recognized in a key-brute force attack.462 The
key would map known plaintexts into non-corresponding ciphertexts. If the right key
were found it would map known plaintexts into corresponding ciphertexts. All unique
original plaintexts could be obtained since by definition, decryption associated with any
encryption scheme must transform ciphertexts into the original plaintexts. If an approach
is implemented in this manner permitting such an attack it is obviously insecure.
3.4 Securing Record Linkage
Given the above security andfunctionality framework, we build a secure approach that
meets it. We devise a key-based encryption approach to securely address errors in linkage
identifiers, as per Enhancement 1. We create a general solution that can incorporate many
fields and allow for character-level analysis of a field. First, we describe how to secure a
full field. To secure a full field deterministically encrypt it. Equality of ciphertexts can be
directly compared since the same ciphertexts should be created for the same plaintexts
under deterministic encryption which creates the same ciphertexts from identical
plaintexts.463 With regard to character-level analysis, we will use the following example
for illustration. Assume that originally the system is using just one field for linkage and
needs to analyze its characters. For example, perhaps if all positions in the identifier
equal but a particular position does not, this signifies the individual is a dependent of the
policy-holder. The intent is to link all family-related information. Another field in the
records will be used forpadding as will be described below. We construct a scheme
involving both fields, permitting character-level analysis of the first field. First, choose a
deterministic key-based encryption algorithm which can withstand attacks against
encryption (AAE). This same approach should also withstand a key-brute force attack.
Call this the foundation algorithm. AES, which can be the basis of deterministic schemes,
can be a block cipher meeting these criteria, although subject to the following important
caveat. 464 Since we will need to equate ciphertexts, as will be shown, if we use block
undermine the function's pseudo-randomness because the function is transforming the same plaintexts into
the same, not different, ciphertexts, undermining "random" behavior.
462 Just as in the hash function discussion referenced earlier, in a key-brute force attack a small number of
plaintext-ciphertext pairs, but enough need to be available from the known-plaintext or more advanced
AAE attacks to discard essentially all but the right key. (Alfred Menezes, "Chapter 7," Handbook of
Applied Cryptography, 2001, 233, <http://www.cacr.math.uwaterloo.ca/hac/about/chap7.pdf> (24 May
2005); Alfred Menezes, "Chapter 8," Handbook ofApplied Cryptography, 2001, 286,
<http://www.cacr.math.uwaterloo.ca/hac/about/chap8.pdf> (24 May 2005)).
463 Wikipedia, "Deterministic Encryption," 20 July 2005,
<http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Deterministic encryption> (15 September 2005).
464 See Goldwasser, Lecture Notes on Cryptography, 51-53, 84. AES is secure against the AAE when it is
run in the Counter or the Cipher Block Chaining (CBC) operating modes which create randomized
ciphertexts for every plaintext, breaking any possible relationship between any two encrypted plaintexts.
(See Mike Touloumtzis, "Re: (AES) Loopback Crypto Questions," 11 July 2001,
<http://mail.nl.linux.org/linux-crypto/2001-07/msg00150.html> (31 August 2005); Steve Weis, PhD
student, Lab for Computer Science, MIT, personal interview, September 9, 2004; Goldwasser, Lecture
Notes on Cryptography, 84-6, 100-110). AES also protects against a key-brute force attack. One analysis
ciphers, which can be run in several modes we will run them in Electronic Code Book
(ECB) mode.465 Under such usage, the scheme transforms the same plaintexts into the
same ciphertexts, allowing for easy equality comparisons. Under ECB, no encryption
scheme including one based on AES can be considered completely secure against the
AAE due to the scheme's deterministic operation. The same plaintexts would create the
same ciphertexts, allowing an adversary to learn more "information" about equal
plaintexts, that is, in this case, they equal. We will explore the degree of insecurity
associated with our use of ECB mode and deterministic encryption more generally later
in Section 3.4.1.1.
Assume we are working with fields K, and K 2 where K1 needs to be character-analyzed.
To securely enable character-level analysis encrypt K1 in all records R before they reach
the validation file. K1 will be transformed into a new privacy-preserving data structure
which will be stored in the original Ki location.4 66 Break K1 into its individual characters.
If R is a record about to enter the validation file, parse its K1 into R[K 1][1],
R[KI][2],... ,R[Ki][nl 1], where nl is the number of character positions in K1. Concatenate
to each R[K1][q] all of K2, for q=l...nl. Encrypt each of these plaintexts with the
foundation algorithm. Link these ciphertexts in a list. Encrypt K1 with the foundation
algorithm. We assemble our privacy-protecting data structure. The data structure will
contain the encryption of the full K 1 identifier and the pointer to the linked list of the
identifier's characters padded with K2. We store the fully encrypted K 1 and the head
pointer of the linked list in the data structure. Encrypt the full K2 plaintext and store the
ciphertext in the new K2 privacy-protecting data structure just as for K1. Below is an
illustration of the new privacy-protecting data structures for arbitrary record R using
foundation algorithm E:
Before Privacy Enhancement
Rec. K, K2
R 578 HL4
After Privacy Enhancement
Rec. K1  K2
R id: E(578) id: E(HL4)
hd: E(51HL4)->E(71HL4)->E(81HL4)
Each data structure has component "id" corresponding to the fully encrypted identifier,
and the character-level analyzed field(s) has a linked list head ("hd") as above.
shows that mounting a key-brute force attack on AES using its 128-bit key configuration and possibly
testing 255 keys per second would take 149 trillion years for the attack to succeed! (Jim Reavis, Feature:
Goodbye DES, Hello AES," Networkworld, July 30, 2001,
<http://www.networkworld.com/research/2001/0730feat2.html> (24 May 2005)). Note, when we refer to
AES in this thesis a 128-bit key will be assumed, one of the possible AES key sizes.
465 Goldwasser, Lecture Notes on Cryptography, 84.
466 This is obviously implementation-specific and depends on how the system currently stores and manages
data. For example, in a database scheme, new database columns may be used to hold the new data
structure(s).
We explain how a record linkage application can work with the new field formats. All
records in the validation file have been encrypted as above. Imagine that, in one
particular matching (Ri,Rj) pair in the validation file, all positions between Ri[K 1] and
Rj[Ki] are the same except for one, signifying the special dependent status defined above.
Also, Ri[K 2] = Rj[K 2]. Seeing the privacy-preserving data structures for KI and K2 in the
Ri and Rj validation pair in the validation file, the application begins with K1. The
software compares the identifiers. Since Ri[KI.id] # Rj[KI.id] the two plaintext fields
must differ. The application can see that Ri[K 2.id] = Rj[K 2.id]. Therefore, it can proceed
with trying to determine if the two fields except for one position match, or if this is a
false positive with regard to K2. The only way the encrypted Ki's would not equal while
the encrypted K2's would equal would be for the original Ri and Rj records to not match,
and for a mistake to make the original K2 plaintexts of both records equal; or for the Ri
and Rj records to match and we would need to surmise if one character position in the
original Ki plaintexts differ, which would signify another family member, as before. Of
course, if Ri[K 2] or Rj[K 2] is also in error, that is, there is a mistake in one or both K2
fields, no further processing can take place. The pads are in error as the K2 fields are
erroneous. Comparisons of the enciphered KI characters will fail. The application
accesses the linked lists connected with Ri[KI] and Rj[Ki]. It confirms that each
individual character matches except one and properly designates the two records as
linking. The below illustrates such a comparison for records Ri and Rj using the example
above where Ki=578 and K2=HL4. Although the last digit of Ri[KI] is different, the
algorithm can still link Ri and Rj:
Rec. KI K2
Ri id: E(572) id: E(HL4)
hd: E(51HL4)->E(71HL4)->E(21HL4)
Rj id: E(578) id: E(HL4)
hd: E(51HL4)->E(71HL4)->E(81HL4)
Other variables, including their character-by-character comparison, can be used, too. The
theoretical notions of the information value of fields we described through all of Section
3.2.2 can be used as well. Both security and matching should improve.
Reidentification of units in the validation file is possible via the key from the foundation
algorithm. The key is used to decrypt the full linkage fields from the matched records,
e.g., the R[Ki.id] or R[K2.id], as needed.
3.4.1 Assessing Security of Solution
The proposed approach meets security and functionality framework requirements. We
first examine the intra-organizational version of the security and functionality framework
since we are focused on privacy protection for the internal BQMA. Subsequently we
discuss security within the inter-organizational context. We first discuss the security of
exposing a field's characters. The above example will be assessed to show approach
compliance. First, our approach is somewhat efficient. For a linkage field that needs to be
character-analyzed, our approach stores the field's encryption and a list of ciphertexts. If
nl is the number of characters comprising the Ki to be character-analyzed, the linked list
contains nl ciphertexts. An encryption of each field that will not be character-analyzed
will also be stored for basic comparisons. Other approaches below entail more storage
use, as well as other difficulties, as will be shown. Next, the security framework's "small
secrets" tenet is supported. All the individual character plaintexts are securely encrypted,
and the secret for decoding remains with the foundation algorithm's small encryption
key. The proposed approach is public and not proprietary.
We discuss security against the AAE. We need to analyze the security of the foundation
algorithm a deterministic encryption scheme. As mentioned in the security and
functionality framework, full plaintext fields or individual characters should not be
surmised due to the approach's transformations. Imagine that K, is broken down by
characters, padded with K2 in each record Ri. Imagine that N is the total number of
records in a validation file. After deidentification, for each Ri[K1] we have new data
structures Ri[D], i=l ... N. Ri[D.id] and Ri[D.hd] are specified. Ri[K 2.id] has also been
created.
First, notice that surmising individual characters by recognizing their distribution in
various Ri would be unsuccessful. If through a ciphertext-only attack, for example, an
employee were to observe only the ciphertexts, he could not surmise individual
characters by recognizing the characters' frequencies. Suppose that Ki is broken into
characters. If E is the foundation algorithm, due to the K2 padding, the frequency of
E(Rj[KI][q]) for some q across all j=l ... N has no relation to the frequency of the
underlying plaintext character Rj[K1][q] in the original linkage fields. The assumption is
that K2 is the same for identical units but different across different units across all their
records, just like in the case of claims data representing different people, for example.
The resulting E(Rj[Ki][q]) ciphertexts are much more distributed for all j=1 ... N. All the
other AAE, beyond the ciphertext-only attack, can lead to the case where some number of
Ri and their corresponding transformed privacy-protecting data structures become known.
The other attacks signify that Ri[Kl][q] and E(Ri[Ki][q]) for q = 1...nl for some Ri have
been discovered by an organizational employee. Without padding, this employee could
easily find other j and r such that E(Rj[Ki][r]) = E(Ri[KI][q]) for some Rj, i, and q, which
were not part of the original data available via the AAE attacks. Other deterministically
encrypted characters in other records will equal the encrypted positions of known Ri
because, presumably, characters making up an identifier will be chosen from a relatively
limited set of values. Padding stops such a vulnerability. The individual characters are the
same for the same unit but different for all others, preventing any relationship to be
surmised among the enciphered codes.467
467 It's important to note that equal characters within a particular identifier might be surmised depending on
actual distribution of characters within identifiers. As an illustration, if the 3" and 4th characters of a given
set of last names are always "ee," equal ciphertexts generated by deterministic encryption would be
produced for these two letters within all these last names. The same corresponding padding is used for all
3.4.1.1 Exposure and Solutions for Using Identical Identifiers
There is more exposure of plaintexts, partial or full, involving fields belonging to the
same units. Consider the discovery of other full fields belonging to the same unit. An
employee can go through the rest of the validation file and find all other records
belonging to the same units. Imagine k stands for K, or K2, for illustration. If the
plaintext for Ri[k] becomes known for some i as part of the AAE, an employee can find
other j such that Rj[k.id] = Ri[k.id] since the same deterministic ciphertexts can be
compared. For example, PM staff can even run the PM software and link all possible
records for a given member id as the software will find equal member ids to link the
claims records. These can be considered data compromises as such data were not
uncovered earlier. Indeed, how does one perform record linkage while securing against
the AAE? From a theoretical perspective, how can one determine equality of two
messages when the system is subject to one of the more advanced attacks, such as at least
a known-plaintext attack? Using a provided equality function, which can equate
deidentified data, one can find all other equal messages in the data by simply calling this
function to find the equal data. We should point out this is not just a problem of just our
scheme but of any deterministic encryption scheme. Since one can compare the equality
of deterministically-encrypted data one can find other equal records for exposed units.
To prevent such a disclosure, the system can prevent the employee from issuing direct
commands to find specific identifiers. In the case of PM, PM staff could issue PM
commands to find chronically ill patients; however, it could not specifically ask for all
records associated with particular enciphered ids. Access to the sensitive Ri[D.id] or
Ri[D.hd] structures could be placed behind a mechanism preventing the issuance of
sensitive direct identifier comparisons or other sensitive queries. If the application staff
doesn't need to see the identifiers but only to be assured that they are properly linked, the
approach we describe should be appropriate. Behind a query restriction, our approach
would link data for application operations. Further identifier access would not be needed
if linkage were the main reason for the access.
records. Hence, depending on the broader values of last names within the domain of last names, it's
possible to recognize that when the enciphered 3" and 4th characters equal each other in certain last names,
the 3rd and 4" positions of those last names must be the popular "ee." For example, if in a particular data set
few other 3rd and 4" character positions equal, those that do will probably be the "ee" characters.
Deterministic encryption preserves equal values. To address this problem, different padding could be used.
For example, the 3 " character can always be padded with, for example, column 7 from the same validation
record. The 4 th character can always be padded with, for example, column 11 from the same validation
record. Equality within identifiers would now fail because different padding is used for the 3rd and 4t
characters. Equality across equivalent characters between records for the same person would succeed--
subject to the caveat in the text that padding itself can also be in error, and thus undermine equality-
because the same consistent padding has been used for those letters. Thus, linkage across records can be
examined. The whole operation, including the comparison of enciphered letters, can also be placed behind
an access control and new pseudonyms can be created for the application. We will discuss this latter
approach further in the text as one approach for improving linkage security.
If some identifiers are necessary for operations, one method to provide access is to use
new obfuscated identifiers. Such identifiers can be randomly assigned when two records
are linked behind an access control mechanism. They would replace the Ri[D] data
structures as the visible identifiers available to the application. When looking for
specific units, the staff could supply such pseudonyms to locate those units' records. One
way to create such identifiers would be to re-encrypt, i.e., use the encryption function
again, on all validation file records. The value of linkage fields would not stay equal for
long periods of time. A public key encryption system, such as one based on El Gamal,
which allows for re-encryption, could be used. 469 Needed ciphertext, i.e., R[i][D]
components, can be re-encrypted many times, each time producing successively unrelated
ciphertexts. However, recovery of the original plaintext would still take only one
decryption, which would be used for reidentification as needed by Enhancement 1. At a
given frequency a background process could re-encrypt all the linkage identifiers,
replacing each old one with a new one in its data set location. By the time an employee
wants to learn more about the units he's found, the pseudonyms he supplies will have
already been replaced and would not match the pseudonyms of the actual data. However,
a shortcoming of creating new pseudonyms is worsened linkage. Unless intermediate
obfuscated identifiers are kept when using this approach, it will be impossible to link data
from a validation file to data from any prior validation file after the pseudonyms are
recreated. The linkage fields would be different and direct equality comparisons of
ciphertexts would be impossible.
Another way to address this problem is to recognize the particular needs of the
application. It might be possible to construct a software "middle layer" between the
application and data. 470 Such an application programming interface (API) or other
software paradigm can provide suitable data access or answers to application
computations, but would not allow for sensitive data access. This middle layer can be the
work of future research and could be more flexible than the mere hiding of sensitive
Ri[D] data structures behind a query restriction, as above. As an example of this idea, in a
database context, a SELECT statement with a WHERE clause specifying a single
enciphered linkage identifier from a table column may not be allowed, which would
address our dilemma above of how to do linkage yet not access enciphered identifiers.
The "small secrets" tenet of the security and functionality framework would not be
violated with such a "middle layer," however. Large quantities of deidentified, not
identifiable, data are being placed behind for example an API. At worst, additional
records of units already exposed via the AAE can be found. Data unrelated to the AAE-
exposed data should remain secure as they are already deidentified.
When our approach is examined from an inter-organizational perspective, protecting
from the above AAE exposure is hardly necessary. As long as the data are secure from a
468 This is again specific to the organization's linkage data set implementation. In a database scheme, for
instance, a new identifier column could be created.
469 See "Special Topics in Cryptography: Electronic Voting: Why?" (class notes), 2004,
<http://theory.lcs.mit.edu/classes/6.897/spring04/L17.pdf> (14 May 2005).
470 See K.S. Candan, Sushil Jajodia, and V.S. Subrahmanian, "Secure Mediated Databases" (Proceedings-
International Conference on Data Engineering, 1996), 28-9.
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ciphertext-only attack they should remain secure as no additional practical threats could
be possible. If record linkage is done inter-organizationally, as is more common for
record linkage applications and data are exported by an organization to other entities for
analysis, the ability to mount an AAE attack beyond a ciphertext-only attack is much less
possible. The employees of the receiving entity should have minimal or no access to
original plaintext data at the data-producing organization. They are not, presumably,
employed by the data-producing organization. They can mount the ciphertext-only attack
by, for example, trying to recognize original plaintext frequencies in the data. However,
they cannot mount more advanced AAE attacks as they cannot see the original plaintexts
or the encryption system which transformed them.
A plaintext-brute force attack is not feasible on our approach because the foundation
algorithm was chosen to be secure against a key-brute force attack. Since the right key for
our key-based scheme cannot be found, systematically going through all the plaintexts
and generating the right ciphertexts is not possible.
3.4.2 Other Approaches to Protect Record Linkage
Other approaches cannot provide the needed security and functionality for Enhancement
1. We review several approaches to understand the challenges involved.4 71 We examine
approaches from an intra-organizational perspective as we are primarily focused on
internal applications such as the BQMA. Less insecurity would be found examining the
approaches from an inter-organizational perspective. Less protection is needed when
attackers have minimal knowledge about an organization's internal data deidentification
procedures. Our solution is more secure than other approaches in such a context, too,
since we better protect against character frequency attacks, i.e., a type of ciphertext-only
attack. Also, we will focus on solutions to the character-analysis dilemma. It is more
challenging to solve since individual characters must be protected rather than fields in
their entirety. If such a problem can be addressed, deidentifying fields in their entirety
could be more easily addressed as well.
471 We only discuss some possible approaches in the text. However, in addition to the approaches we
discuss the following approaches have similar difficulties to those in the text: Rakesh Agrawal, Alexandre
Evfimievski, and Ramakrishnan Srikant, "Information Sharing Across Private Databases" (Association for
Computing Machinery, Special Interest Group on Management of Data, June 9-12, 2003); Josh Cohen
Benaloh, "Cryptographic Capsules: A Disjunctive Primitive for Interactive Protocols" (Proceedings on
Advances in Cryptology - CRYPTO '86, Santa Barbara, California), 213-222; Ronald Fagin, Moni Naor,
and Peter Winkler, "Comparing Information without Leaking It," Communications of the ACM, 39 (1996):
77-85; Ronald Rivest, L. Adleman, and M. L. Dertouzos, "On Data Banks and Privacy Homomorphisms,"
in Foundations of Secure Computation, ed. R.A. DeMillo, 169-177 (New York: Academic Press, 1978);
G.R. Blakley and Catherine Meadows, "A Database Encryption Scheme which Allows the Computation of
Statistics using Encrypted Data" (IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy, April 22-24, 1985), 116-122;
Catherine Quantin, Frangois-Andrd Allaert, and Liliane Dusserre, "Anonymous Statistical Methods versus
Cryptographic Methods in Epidemiology," International Journal of Medical Informatics, 60 (2000): 177-
83; Josep Domingo-Ferrer, "A Provably Secure Additive and Multiplicative Privacy Homomorphism," in
Lecture Notes in Computer Science 2433, ed. AH Chan, 471-483 (London: Springer-Verlag, 2002).
101
Technical solutions to provide Enhancement 1 can be broadly classified as restricting
access to data or changing the data themselves. Enhancement 1 can be classified as a
secure function evaluation.472 Linkage identifiers must be kept hidden. At the same time,
employees must compute information based on individual characters to resolve linkage
identifier errors. The literature demonstrates two possible solutions.4 73 474 475 476 477 478 479
480 481 482 483 484 485 To keep data secret, one can restrict access to them. For example,
access restriction systems include access control systems, which can limit access to data
in databases and file systems.486 487 The data can also be modified to make them
undistinguishable. For example, data perturbation approaches include methods such as
adding noise. The point is presumably to make data less representative of actual facts.488
3.4.2.1 Access Restriction
Given the security and functionality framework, however, access restriction systems
alone would be inappropriate for our character-level linkage paradigm. Such approaches
are less secure per the security and functionality framework. Assume a function is written
that does a needed string comparison computation behind an access control. A record
linkage application requests computations over the original data without accessing the
original data. The application may have sensitive linkage fields of many units to protect.
For example, the PM application uses up to half a million, if not several million claims
records, as discussed before. There would be a considerable amount of sensitive data to
store behind the access control. Per the security and functionality framework, since
472 Moni Naor and Kobbi Nissim, "Communication Preserving Protocols for Secure Function Evaluation,"
<http://www.wisdom.weizmann.ac.il/-kobbi/papers/sfe proc.ps> (31 August 2005).
473 Sweeney, Computational Disclosure Control: A Primer on Data Privacy Protection, 63.
474 Ravi Sandhu and Pierangela Samarati, "Access Control: Principles and Practice," IEEE
Communications Magazine, 32 (1994): 44.
475 C.J. Date, Introduction to Database Systems, Sixth Edition (Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley Publishing
Company, 1995), 417.
476 Russell.
477 Shafi Goldwasser, "Lecture 7: Zero Knowledge" (handout given at lecture at MIT, August 2001).
478 David Chaum, Claude Crepeau, and Ivan Damgard, "Multiparty Unconditionally Secure Protocols"
(Proceedings of the 20th Symposium on the Theory of Computing, 1988).
479 David Chaum, Ivan Damgard, and Jeroen van de Graaf, "Multiparty Computations Ensuring Privacy of
Each Party's Input and Correctness of the Result," Lecture Notes in Computer Science, 293 (1988): 90-93.
480 Zero Knowledge Systems, "Private Credentials," November 2000, 12-13,
<http://osiris.978.org/-brianr/crypto-research/anon/www.freedom.net/products/whitepapers/credsnew.pdf>
(31 August 2005).
481 Goldwasser, Lecture Notes on Cryptography, 215-218.
482 Catherine Quantin, "Anonymous Statistical Methods versus Cryptographic Methods in Epidemiology."
483 Josep Domingo-Ferrer, "Advances in Inference Control in Statistical Databases: An Overview,"
<http://neon.vb.cbs.nl/casc/overview.pdf> (14 October 2003).484 Josep Domingo-Ferrer, "A Provably Secure Additive and Multiplicative Privacy Homomorphism."
485 Dawn Xiaodong Song, David Wagner, and Adrian Perrig, "Practical Techniques for Searches on
Encrypted Data" (IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy, 2000).
486 Date, 417.
487 Russell.
488 Sweeney, Computational Disclosure Control: A Primer on Data Privacy Protection, 62.
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smaller secrets are easier to protect than larger ones, such an approach, alone, would not
be as secure. In our discussion of a "middle layer" between an employee and the sensitive
data earlier, the idea was to place deidentified, not identifiable fields behind the "middle
layer" to decrease potential for plaintext mishandling. We examine data perturbation
solutions for Enhancement 1.
3.4.2.2 Non-cryptographic Data Perturbation
Data perturbation includes encryption and hashing and non-encryption and non-hashing
techniques. Non-cryptographic techniques on their own would be inappropriate. For
example, methods such as swapping or suppression may render data deidentified.4 89
However, such methods may also undermine record linkage. Linkage fields would
become perturbed, or removed, in case of suppression. 490 Linking records becomes much
more difficult, if not impossible, as a consistent field is no longer available. Although
encryption and hashing techniques appear appropriate, existing work does not appear
useful. Consider relevant deterministic schemes that transform the same plaintexts into
the same ciphertexts. We examine several schemes.
3.4.2.3 Summary of Our Scheme
We should remember, our approach to securely address linkage identifier errors encrypts
the individual characters to be character-analyzed after concatenating them with padding,
which is another field from the same validation record. As long as the padding is error-
free, any algorithm which compares the equality of individual characters in the compared
fields can be implemented using our scheme. A robust string comparator might be
utilized with our scheme to, for example, compute the distance between two fields in
spite of deidentification. Equality of enciphered corresponding or non-corresponding
characters between two fields may be compared since the enciphered characters should
preserve any original plaintext distance relationship. We compare such capability with
the similar capability and privacy protection of other approaches.
3.4.2.4 Encrypted Search with Identifier Errors
Song offers an approach for untrusted users to find words on behalf of trusted users in
encrypted documents. 49 1 However, her idea is inappropriate due to the need to enumerate
errors, which may not be readily done. The basic approach is a comparison of
489 See for example Sweeney, Computational Disclosure Control: A Primer on Data Privacy Protection,
62.
490 See Sweeney, Computational Disclosure Control: A Primer on Data Privacy Protection, 58.
491 Dawn Xiaodong Song.
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deterministically encrypted text. A deterministically encrypted word is compared to a
deterministically encrypted word combined with a pseudo-random (random-like) word in
a document containing many such words, i.e., each encrypted with a different pseudo-
random word. To find a word in the document, the desired word is first deterministically
encrypted. If this word and a particular word in the document equal after basic
deterministic transformations, the plaintexts equal, and the position in the document may
be returned to a requesting user. The location of the requested word has been found. In
the record linkage context, such a scheme could be simplified to a comparison of
deterministically encrypted identifiers. It can be the case of seeing if a word exists in a
"document" which is itself only one word long. If ciphertexts equal the plaintexts equal
due to the deterministic transformations. Song proposes that regular expressions be used
for error handling. When examining deterministically encrypted words, specific character
positions in the word can be generically specified to allow for various words matching
those positions to be compared. The system encrypts all the possible resulting words for
comparison. For example, comparing the word "ab[a-z]" may generate a list of 26
enciphered words: "aba" through "abz"-each would be compared to words combined
with pseudo-random words in a document, as described above. However, such an
approach would not be useful for our context. The approach suggests that the user may
know which errors might be possible. Such knowledge would feed the encryption
algorithm. A given field would be converted into several versions of itself to cover
several possible errors for comparison. This greatly limits the approach as users may not
know all relevant errors. They might have general perceptions of error types, they might
even examine the training file, but they may not be aware of the full range of errors
which can arise within a validation file due to prior processing, error cleaning, etc.
Matching performance might decline.
3.4.2.5 Matrix of String Comparison Metrics
Du presents ideas which appear more appropriate for our context. 492 The intent is to pre-
compute all comparison results between deidentified linkage identifiers instead of pre-
computing just some results as Song's error-handling ideas suggest. However, these ideas
are also inappropriate because under a BQMA context, using Du's scheme would entail
unrealizable storage and could lead to discovery of considerable plaintext in dense space.
Du attempts to securely calculate pattern matching scores between a query and a database
of records just as in our string comparator discussions. Various scenarios are presented
depending on who owns the database, which of several parties performs the query, and
from whom information must be hidden, for example, from the owner of the database or
from an intermediary helping perform the query. Assume b is an n-character length query
and t is one of the n-character length strings in the database. A pattern matching score S
is to be computed:
492 Wenliang Du and Mikhail Atallah, "Protocols for Secure Remote Database Access with Approximate
Matching" (7th ACM Conference on Computer and Communications Security (ACMCCS 2000), The First
Workshop on Security and Privacy in E-Commerce): 1-25.
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S = f (bk, tk)
k=1
The function f is a basic metric between two strings, such as functions like Ibk - tkl, (bk -
tk)2, etc., similar to our string comparisons from before.4 93 To compute score S securely,
Du suggests that the values S for b and every t in the database be calculated ahead of
time. 4 Rather than computing such a score in real-time, the score is pre-computed to be
referenced later. We'll consider one implementation to understand the challenges
involved. Applying such an approach to record linkage, since this approach compares two
linkage fields, any one of them can be the "b" or the "t" as needed. A large matrix
structure can be created allowing all linkage fields to act as the needed "b" or "t"
identifiers. We first discuss the case when all possible units are included. We will
investigate below what happens when we pre-compute only some of the linkage field
combinations based on units that actually exist in the validation file, which might be
more secure. Also, instead of computing just a summation of individual-letter metrics
across two strings, we can compute a single score as a function of both full strings. This
should offer more flexibility for error-handling as full strings can be accessed and non-
corresponding characters can be examined.
The created matrix will contain scores S. A given score will represent the comparison of
a linkage field in that cell's row to a linkage field in that cell's column. A pseudonym can
be assigned to each linkage field for reference purposes. Any secure encryption
scheme--indeed, any consistent secure string transformation--can be used to create the
pseudonyms. The pseudonyms would be assigned to the row and column positions in the
matrix corresponding to the linkage fields they represent, and they would replace the
fields in the actual records in the validation file to do the field comparisons. During field
comparison, the application can obtain the two pseudonyms from the two compared file
records, check the row of one and the column of the other in the matrix, and find the
appropriate score S to determine those linkage fields' equality. Such an approach will not
work in our context, however. First, it is very inefficient. To create the matrix itself,
space would have to be allocated for M * M pre-computations, where M is the total
number of values in a linkage field namespace for a unit. In the 0000000000 -
9999999999 domain of member ids for PM, as before, room for 10,000,000,0002 scores S
would have to be allotted. This would involve unrealistic storage given today's
computational capabilities.
Also the approach is less secure than our proposal of securely encrypting a linkage
variable's individual characters. An important question is how to create the matrix so that
assignment of pseudonyms to file records is straightforward. Record linkage fields can be
easily transformed before they enter a validation file. One way is to create the matrix with
each column and row representing a systematic increase in linkage fields. For example, in
the case of PM, the columns of the matrix can systematically increase from 0000000000
to 9999999999, for example, from left to right. Each column would hold the place for the
member id of that value and contain a randomly generated pseudonym which would
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493 Du, 17.
494 Du, 15.
represent the member id. Similarly, rows can systematically increase in the same range
from top to bottom. Each row would hold the place for the member id of that value and
contain a pseudonym equal to the pseudonym of the same column number because both
row and column must represent the same member id. Assigning the proper randomly
generated pseudonym to a linkage field for an incoming validation file record is easy.
The staff/process generates the pseudonym for the linkage identifier, finds the linkage
field's ordered row and column positions in the matrix, places the pseudonym into these
two locations, and switches the linkage field in the file record to the same pseudonym.
However, when the matrix is published for the application to perform variable
comparisons using pseudonyms, the employee operating the application and any others
would immediately know exactly what is the plaintext corresponding to the pseudonym
for a given linkage field in a file record. Since the matrix is ordered from top to bottom
and left to right, an employee can recognize the original plaintext value. The distance
between the beginning of the plaintext namespace to the identifier value is the same as
the distance between the beginning of the matrix and the pseudonym's row or column
position. Thus, the original plaintext value is the difference between the beginning of the
matrix and the pseudonym's row or column position, added to the beginning of the
plaintext identifier namespace.
The columns and rows can be randomized. Random columns can be switched with each
other, and random rows can be switched with each other, all while preserving the pattern
matching score S in each matrix cell. Such switching would prevent the "decryption"
attack just described. In addition, only the "active" columns and rows can be released to
the application, not the entire matrix. Staff will have access to rows and columns only for
the units for which records are available. In the PM analogue, member ids of policy-
holders who actually used the health care system in a given past period, a period specified
by the PM application, but often a rolling 6 or 12 month claims period, would be the ones
whose member ids and scores are included. Scores for non-users would be absent. This
should further limit any use of the matrix to decrypt pseudonyms as many intermediate
pseudonyms used for "decryption," i.e., guiding, comparative purposes would not be
available.
However, neither approach will suffice. Sometimes the matrix is relatively full. For
example, the copy data store may be dense and diverse regarding member ids in a typical
12 month period, as was one of our assumptions before. For a given linkage field, many
if not most of the values in its namespace should be present in the matrix, despite
attempts to publish only active linkage fields. Combining this fact with any of the attacks
against encryption (AAE) at least as strong as a known-plaintext attack, and, indeed, the
pattern matching scores available in the matrix, might allow for an employee to decrypt a
number of pseudonyms beyond those available to her via the AAE. Staff can plug in the
plaintexts it knows of and other alphanumerically close linkage variables into function f,
the basic comparison between two strings. Function f should be public, otherwise, Du's
approach would be less secure per the security andfunctionality framework as f is
proprietary. Staff can generate scores S and compare them to those in the matrix under
the column or row positions of the pseudonyms it has available via the AAE. For each S,
staff may find several or possibly even one matrix cell which contains the same score(s).
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The pseudonym(s) associated with that row or column must correspond to the plaintexts
for which score S was just computed. Since staff knows the linkage fields it supplied for
the f computation, a pseudonym(s) close to one of the pseudonyms uncovered via the
AAE has just been uncovered, as its underlying linkage identifier(s) was used for the f
computation. This can happen for all the plaintext-ciphertext pairs available to an
employee via the AAE, exposing considerable plaintext.
3.4.2.6 Hashed Linkage Field Characters
Churches' method comes closer than the above approaches. 495 The idea is to use hashed
bigrams of the linkage identifiers to compare the identifiers' similarity in real-time
instead of pre-computing the comparisons. However, his ideas are still less appropriate
than our approach as the ability to recover a number of smaller units of plaintexts is a key
weakness. Churches tries to implement a "blindfolded" record linkage process similar in
spirit to the approach of this thesis. An analyst must link two data sets without knowing
the values of the linkage variables. Each record in each data set has multiple fields on
which record linkage can be performed. When comparing two analogous fields X and Y,
one from each record, a dice coefficient value, a string comparator value, can be
calculated measuring the two fields' similarity:496
Dice coefficient = 2 * Ibigrams(X) fl bigrams(Y)j / (Ibigrams(X)l + Jbigrams(Y)I)
The function bigrams(X) takes word X and breaks it into its bigrams, which are all the
overlapping subwords of X of length 2. Record linkage is done as before. During system
training, the dice coefficient across all fields to be matched is computed. The resulting
values feed directly into a weighting process. For example, the agreement and
disagreement weights for equality and inequality patterns can be computed. During
matching, the sum of the weights is compared to a threshold which signals if the two
records represent a match. To preserve the privacy of such an approach, Churches creates
a data structure which is substituted for each linkage identifier in each record just as in
our proposed approach. First, Churches creates a power set of each bigram set, i.e., an
exhaustive set of subsets of bigrams(X) for each field X to be linked. Next, Churches
Ihashes each such subset with a Hashed Message Authentication Code (HMAC),
essentially a keyed hash function. Using an HMAC prevents a plaintext-bruteforce
attack.497 Systemically hashing all possible plaintexts to find the hash codes available in
the system is not possible without knowing the key, which presumably would not be
available to staff. The hashed results, the length of the hashed subset, and the length of
the original number of bigrams are all inserted into a new privacy-protective data
495 Tim Churches and Peter Christen, "Some Methods for Blindfolded Record Linkage," BMC Medical
Informatics andDecision Making, 4 (2004): 1-17, <http://www.biomedcentral.com/content/pdf/1472-6947-
4-9.pdf> (24 May 2005).
496 Sam's String Metrics, "Dice's Coefficient," <http://www.dcs.shef.ac.uk/-sam/stringmetrics.html#dice>
(30 May 2005).
497 Churches, 4.
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structure. For example, the following table, taken from Churches' article, represents
elements of such a structure when the linkage field to be used for comparison has value
,"peter.," 498
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498 Churches, 6.
List of bigram subsets, their hashes, sizes of subsets, and size of bigram('peter')
A A.a
record bigram
key subset
A.a_ bigram_combination_digest A.a_bigram_ A.a_length
combination_ length
10 ('er')
10 ('et')
10 ('pe')
10 ('te')
10 ('er',
'et')
10 ('er',
'pe')
10 ('er',
'te')
10 ('et',
'pe')
10 ('et',
'te')
10 ('pe',
'te')
10 ('er',
'et',
'pe')
10 ('er',
'et',
'te')
10 ('er',
'pe',
'te')
10 ('et',
'pe',
'te')
10 ('er',
'et',
'pe',
'te')
Oa3be282870998fe7332ae0fecff68ccOd370152
8898f53d6225f464bb2640779cbl7b9378237149
6fc83a87ee04335a58aa576cb5157625blb5c51b
f2bcfb3d76d7fc1OOe3adc08663090f29c5e928a
f86abbOc84889d004b817e86199b3837708d70e9
df99d8658d8165af4552f60ade3662ba98006298
edfb618d37ecfafc9735e6ad4675245a4071aa9d
bd7adaOOOc2b9004b7519b989bfcfdff7ad36678
fdcb71db96d2da9bld19b62944c5f36448cb2668
71322eeebabff9828aeed3281a86577163el6a78
8bf2788ef28443b7a0298fl9defa5532db40f63a
c7e9a32e54ba33d3769c4813616fdfcc6306459c
33287ce86aa02afOf31d4857a79671clf4645277
ecd7bl51291fl612595c9f8f385e9f71119alaeO
65e568493a08a3428595b8be35f6ae2aOf48dl70
The second column in this data structure represents the power set of the bigram set, i.e.,
the exhaustive set of subsets of bigrams(X). The third column contains the corresponding
hashed values of these subsets. The fourth column is the size of the subset investigated in
column two. The fifth column is the size of the original bigrams(X) result. In the case of
"peter" there are four total bigrams, as shown at the bottom of column two. The third,
fourth and fifth columns enter Churches' privacy-protective data structure.
When comparing two validation files, the records of which are to be matched (or one file,
if linking a file to itself), an analyst performs an inner join of the third column in the table
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across all the corresponding fields in both files to form a cross-product. All matching
hashed values from the data structures representing particular record fields in the two
different data sets to be linked are found. For each row in the inner join, the analyst
computes the dice coefficient. Imagine using the above dice coefficient formula and the
above table columns which are now in the privacy-protective data structures. For field X
in one validation file and corresponding field Y in the other file, the above dice
coefficient formula becomes:
2 * the fourth column of X / (the fifth column of X + the fifth column of Y)
Based on such a computation the system can assess match status. The highest dice
coefficient value is selected for each unique pair of fields X and Y across both validation
files. This value feeds the weighting and matching process as described in our record
linkage discussion in Section 3.2.2.2. If two records produce a total weight, comprised, in
part, of the weights based on the calculated dice coefficient values across the compared
fields for which the dice coefficient was computed, at least as high as the threshold, the
records match.
Such an approach would be inappropriate for our context. First, the use of hash functions
is inappropriate. Hashing is an irreversible process. As referenced before, it's not possible
to "de-hash" the ciphertexts and obtain the original variables. Reidentifying data subjects
would not be possible. Of course, staff can get the HMAC key and go through the entire
list of possible linkage fields, hashing each one to find the enciphered linkage fields in
their possession (essentially a plaintext-bruteforce attack on the results generated by the
application). The original fields could be found when the hash codes generated equaled
those available. This is a less efficient approach.
However, a larger problem is the use of bigrams. Due to the more advanced AAE, if
some plaintext linkage fields and their corresponding ciphertexts become known,
considerably more information can be learned about plaintexts of linkage fields unrelated
to those discovered. Assume that the plaintext for some single bigrams and their hashes
become known. Presumably a number of identical characters exist in other linkage fields
due to character homogeneity in the domain of a linkage identifier. Namespaces should
not be created anew for each identifier. Therefore, other equal 2-character plaintexts
could be found by comparing equal ciphertexts available via the AAE. In Churches
approach, therefore, a number of equal 2-character plaintexts for units could be
discovered, unrelated to those of units already found.
3.4.2.7 Secure Function Computation
Feige presents a general way to compute any function. 499 However, Feige's approach is
also inappropriate for our context as impractical amounts of storage are involved.
499 Uri Feige, Joe Kilian, and Moni Naor, "A Minimal Model for Secure Computation," 1-15,
<http://www.wisdom.weizmann.ac.il/~naor/PAPERS/fln.pdf> (24 May 2005).
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Specifically, Alice and Bob, possessing inputs a and b respectively, preprocess them and
give the results to third party Carol. Carol will compute F(a,b), yet she should not be able
to surmise a or b. We can explore Feige's case for F(a,b) = 0 or 1, i.e., a Boolean
function. Equality can be considered Boolean. Linkage identifiers either equal or do not.
However, when they have errors, equality may not be Boolean. A metric, such as from a
Levenshtein string comparator, might be assigned to indicate degree of equality. We'll
explore the Boolean case to understand the challenges involved. We should point out,
however, that this three-party paradigm differs from many other secure function
evaluation approaches in the cryptographic literature. They typically focus only on two
parties, e.g., Alice and Bob, performing local computations on their inputs and
communicating to compute a given function without one party learning of the inputs of
the other. Such an interactive two party framework would be inappropriate for our record
linkage paradigm as there is no "interaction" within our paradigm, and the analyst
running the software should not know of any of the inputs. Deidentification may happen
in another department within the same organization or in two different organizations if
data are to be obtained from multiple sources for centralized analysis. The process
obfuscating one linkage identifier value has no need to "hide" that value from another
process obfuscating another field value as they are only trying to protect against a
downstream user. Also, the record linkage analyst will only have access to masked data,
and, by intent, should not know any of the original plaintext data.
In Feige's approach, Carol computes the needed F(a,b) result by processing a list of pre-
computed intermediate results created by Alice and Bob. First, Alice and Bob pick
common random bits, which will hide their values a and b, respectively. Alice pre-
computes F(a,b) for every b in the domain. In particular, she uses some of the random
bits selected with Bob to permute the order of her F(a,b)'s. To each F(a,b) result she
XORs one of the remaining random bits. Both of these transformations will be reversed
by Carol. At the same time, Bob uses some of the same random bits to hide his b by
permuting its structure. This b will become an index within Alice's list, used to locate the
F(a,b) results. Alice sends her permuted list to Carol, and Bob sends his permuted b to
Carol. Also, Bob sends the appropriate random bit to Carol to ultimately de-randomize
the F(a,b) value. To compute F(a,b), the created permutation and randomization must be
reversed. Carol selects the proper F(a,b) from Alice's list based on Bob's permuted
index; she follows the pointer b to get an intermediate F(a,b) value which reverses the
permutation Alice originally created. To get the final F(a,b) value, Carol decrypts the
intermediate value and XOR's it with Bob's random bit, i.e., de-randomizing the value.
To make this approach work in our context, a linkage field's permutation can become its
pseudonym. This pseudonym could be used for comparison: when this linkage variable is
compared with another, the comparison result could be found by using the linkage
variable pseudonym as an index into the other linkage variable's comparison list to find
the intermediate result. The de-randomization bit could be stored with every linkage field
and applied to this result to get the final comparison result between two fields, i.e., a
Boolean 0 or 1.
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However, such an approach would not be applicable to our context because it requires
unrealizable storage. First, to make it workable, each comparison list and each linkage
field would need the same permutations and randomization bits. Otherwise, an unrealistic
amount of storage would be required. First, assume the approach implements the same
permutations and randomization bits. The proposal would still be inefficient. Each
identifier must contain a permuted list L to compare that identifier with all others in the
domain to get final F(a,b) results. Each identifier in the domain could be represented by
the index b, pointing to a particular position in L, and the de-randomizing bit to get the
Boolean "F(a,b)" result representing the equality comparison between that identifier and
the L identifier. If PM member id values are 0000000000 - 9999999999, as before, this
namespace could be represented by at most 34 bits. Feige's approach ultimately operates
at the bit level, therefore, 234 values would need to be allocated to represent this 10-
billion identifier domain. Two lists each with 234 items would have to be constructed. The
first list will be all the L identifiers permuted in the same way, each representing a
different member id. The second list will contain tuples representing all the member ids
represented as index b and the particular derandomization bit based on a particular set of
randomization bits. To compute final F(a,b) values will thus require 2 * 234 or 235 stored
items. A given member id will point to a particular place within an L identifier. The
associated derandomization bit will be applied to this found result to get the final F(a,b)
value. Having 235 stored items would be unrealizable given today's computational
capacity. Having different permutations and sets of randomization bits to randomize the
member id namespace in different ways would require even more storage. In this case,
23 5 billion new items would have to be constructed for each unique combination of
permutation and randomization bits, because in addition to the lists as described above
data would have to be stored indicating which permutation and randomization bits a
particular comparison requires. Such storage requirements may be even less practical.
Approaches involving more complicated F(a,b) calculations beyond Boolean would also
involve more storage. Simplifying this approach and having, for example, a single matrix
with pre-computed results of every linkage variable compared with every other is a
possibility. The comparison protocol is simplified. There are problems with such an
approach, too, as was discussed regarding Du's article above.
3.5 Predictive Modeling Experiment
To demonstrate the practicality of our Safe Harbor deidentification and identifier error
mitigation approaches we conducted an experiment with a PM application as used by
insurance organizations. Our results suggest that privacy protection can be practically
implemented within the BQMA. We licensed a PM application from DxCG, a company
that creates predictive models for a variety of health industry stakeholders. 500 501 DxCG
clients, such as health plans and providers, currently cover 62 million lives. The DxCG
PM examines patient diagnoses and basic demographic data to predict the medical risk
500 DxCG, <http://www.dxcg.com/> (1 September 2005).
50o DxCG, About the Company, <http://www.dxcg.com/about/index.html> (3 April 2005).
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and financial cost of managing such patients from a health insurance perspective. Our
goal was to compare the DxCG PM performance using identifiable versus deidentified
data, the latter created as per the Safe Harbor principle. We obtained billing data from the
Beth Israel Deaconess Medical Center (BIDMC), a hospital in Boston, MA. This billing
data would be used to construct the UB92 records that a provider would submit to
insurance organizations, which in turn would use the data to identify and risk stratify
chronically ill and high-risk individuals using PM. The BIDMC Institutional Review
Board approved our usage of the data. The DxCG PM RiskSmart version 2.0.2 was used
for our analysis. We used the MySQL 4.1 open source database to store the data, link
them, and deidentify them for DxCG PM operations. 502
We used DxCG PM's ability to predict future financial cost of patients, modeling a real
disease management application as used by insurance organizations. 503 504 We used the
DxCG PM to predict costs for the subset of 32,294 patients in 2004, for which
demographic data were available, who were hospitalized in 2003.505 In 2003, 12,754 of
these 32,294 individuals had a total of 258,570 hospitalization diagnoses with a number
of people having multiple diagnoses. We focused on DxCG PM's ability to predict 2003
individuals who would cost at least $25,000 in 2004, focusing on high-cost ("high-risk")
patients.5 06 507 The 2004 expenses predicted by the model for the 32,294 individuals were
compared to the actual expenses BIDMC incurred in 2004. The model's predictive
performance was quantified using positive predictive value (PPV) and sensitivity.
Enhancements 1 through 6, from Section 3.1.1, can impact an application's performance
in two ways. They can undermine application performance because data fields are
removed or modified, limiting computation. They can improve application performance
because despite record linkage variables being deidentified, data can be better linked
which can improve analysis. The intent of our experiment was to isolate the impact of
both effects to test each.
We tested the performance of the DxCG PM on fully identifiable data, a control scenario.
PPV and sensitivity were 43% and 35%, respectively. 50 8
502 MySQL, <http://www.mysql.com/> (1 September 2005).
503 DxCG, RiskSmart Models and Methodologies (2002), 5-15.
504 Ingenix Corporation, "Identification and Management of High Risk Patients Using a Claims-based
Predictive Model," <http://www.ingenix.com/esg/resourceCenter/10/-dt pyr wp 1-03.pdf> (1 September
2005).
505 Throughout this experiment we configured the DxCG PM with the following standard configuration
parameters: commercial population; inpatient model; explanation model; prospective model; model
predicts medical expenses only without truncation. (See DxCG, DxCG RiskSmart StandAlone User Guide
Version 2.0.1, 8). Also, as will be seen in the text, the DxCG PM allows one to specify how many months
during the year a patient was eligible for health insurance to properly predict risk. This value was allowed
to default to 12 in our case, a generic value, as the Beth Israel Deaconess Medical Center, a hospital, does
not have insurance eligibility information.
506 DxCG, RiskSmart Models and Methodologies, 5-15.
507 Ingenix Corporation, "Identification and Management of High Risk Patients Using a Claims-based
Predictive Model."
508 In discussing our experiment with DxCG staff to ensure proper DxCG PM use, a DxCG staff member
recommended the DxCG PM output be "normalized" to our population. (Katherine Salerno, DxCG staff,
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3.5.1 Deidentifying Claims Data
We deidentified the data.509 To understand how deidentification impacted the data, we
describe the data structures and data relationships in the DxCG PM. The DxCG PM relies
on patient diagnoses, date of birth, gender, and eligibility months for prediction purposes.
These items are spread between the DxCG PM's diagnosis file and eligibility file. The
diagnoses and medical record numbers are in the diagnosis file, representing individuals
with particular conditions. The eligibility file contains the eligibility months, i.e., the
number of months individuals were eligible for health insurance; genders; birthdates; and
medical record numbers associated with the individuals. Independent risk factors for
gender, age, and all of a person's diagnoses produce separate risk scores which are added
together and combined with the number of months a person was eligible to produce a
person's total financial projected cost. 510
Eligibility months or gender were not changed per Enhancements 1 through 6, which
allow these values to remain unaltered.
Diagnoses were slightly changed based on the requirement to remove "any other unique
identifying number, characteristic, or code," point 14 in the Safe Harbor list from before.
It is unclear what exactly is meant by "unique identifying" in the HIPAA language as the
law is still relatively new. However, one possible explanation is that the prevalence of the
condition represented by the diagnosis must be very low in a local area or nationwide. 511
512 We ran a histogram on the 1,546,963 diagnoses in the full file which was used in the
DxCG PM of which the 258,570 diagnoses were utilized for our experiment.
Approximately 850 diagnoses were unique. Treating such codes as "unique" per Safe
email to author on September 29, 2005). The BIDMC data showed that the hospital's patients were more ill
than the population on which the DxCG PM was calibrated, requiring an inflation to the program's risk
scores to properly predict risk. Throughout our experiment, the following computations were done on the
output from every DxCG PM run: 1) the "prospective relative risk score" for each patient, i.e., the predicted
risk score generated by the software, was divided by the average prospective relative risk score for our
population of 32,294 patients; 2) the resulting risk score for every patient was multiplied by the average
actual future (i.e., 2004) costs in our population. These "normalized" costs became the predicted costs on
which PPV and sensitivity for the DxCG PM were computed in our analysis.
509 Besides Enhancements 1 through 5, no further deidentification was done as a result of "actual
knowledge" analysis, Enhancement 6. The BIDMC apparently does not require further data
deidentification. (Implied, Meghan Dierks, M.D, Instructor in Medicine, Harvard Medical School, personal
interview, July 21, 2005). The Massachusetts Institute of Technology also does not require additional
deidentification beyond the removal of the Safe Harbor items mentioned in Section 3.1.1 in the text.
(Massachusetts Institute of Technology, "De-identified Data," Committee on the Use of Humans as
Experimental Subjects, 30 November 2004, <http://web.mit.edu/committees/couhes/defmitions.shtml#De-
identifiedData> (1 September 2005)). As we are following common institutional practices, we also did not
analyze or remove any data further. Future change in practice might change this analysis.
10o DxCG, RiskSmart Models and Methodologies, 5-6.
5" Shannon Hartsfield, attorney and HIPAA specialist, telephone interview with author, February 26, 2004.
512 Taken from John Neiditz, attorney and HIPAA specialist, telephone interview with author, February 26,
2004.
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Harbor, because they were unduplicated, we shortened all these diagnoses to 3 digits
from 5, generalizing the diagnoses to more common illnesses. We ran another histogram,
and the diagnoses that continued to be unduplicated were deleted.
Date of birth (DOB) was changed to age, as allowed by Enhancement 3. Enhancement 3
also requires people over 90 to be aggregated into a single age category. Individuals over
90 were relabeled to 90 years of age.
The deidentified data produced the same PPV and sensitivity. The diagnoses changes did
not change PM performance since other diagnoses for individuals in the eligibility file
were sufficient to properly categorize individuals' risk. The DxCG PM could use age
instead of DOB as the model could be specified to work with age as an input parameter.
Within our population, the future cost of people over 90 years of age did not apparently
materially differ from those of age 90.
Some PM applications rely only on diagnosis, number of months covered by the health
insurer, age, and gender for prediction purposes, suggesting that a number of PM
applications in US health insurance organizations may work in a deidentified fashion.51 3
514 515
3.5.2 Improving Linkage of Claims Data
Allowing for deidentified variables to fix record linkage errors improved the DxCG PM's
performance as data synthesis improved. To control the linkage process, two linkage
variables were created. A linkage field, KI, was created from a consistent patient
identifier in the BIDMC data with the following properties:
Number of character positions in K, = 10
Range of each character position = 10 (i.e., each character could be digits 0-9)
A second linkage variable, K2, was created from the same consistent identifier from the
BIDMC data with the following properties:
Number of character positions in K2 = 12
Range of each character position = 10
As indicated before, we assume a uniform distribution of all values in the namespace for
K1 and K2 for simpler presentation. Our analysis can be carried out with the non-uniform
namespace constructions more typically found in practice. We first tested a system with
fully identifiable data using only KI for linkage. PM performance worsened when we
5 3 DxCG, DxCG RiskSmart Stand Alone User Guide Version 2.0.1, 24-29.
514 Symmetry, 5-6.
515 Arlene Ash, Yang Zhao, Randall Ellis, and Marilyn Schlein Kramer, "Finding Future High-cost Cases:
Comparing Prior Cost versus Diagnosis-based Methods," Health Services Research, 36 (2001): 195.
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introduced errors into the linkage variable. We randomly altered K, for roughly 25% of
the 258,570 diagnosis records for the 12,754 year 2003 patients in the diagnosis file. PPV
of the model slipped to 41% while sensitivity remained at 35%. The diagnoses for some
individuals had medical record numbers in the diagnosis file which no longer mapped to
the medical record numbers of particular individuals in the eligibility file. In other cases,
new diagnoses were created for existing people by transposing the medical record
numbers of unrelated individuals into their medical record numbers. Some people
appeared to acquire new health status.
Using a better K2 enhanced record linkage. We introduced a 5% error into K2 before data
deidentification. Afterwards we encrypted K2 with a deterministic method and
deidentified the rest of the data as before.
K2 was a useful field for the system. Despite deidentification, we could still use our
record linkage techniques from earlier. Comparing field length and error rates, which can
be provided to PM staff by the staff or process deidentifying the K1 and K2 earlier, PM
staff can find another optimal field for linkage. It can compute equation (17) from
Section 3.2.2.3.3 and determine whether a new field would fix the mistakes of existing
linkage variables. In the case of K2, (17) was satisfied:
(pln')*(1 - 2*e)*(2*f) < (2*e)*(p 2n2)*(1 - 2*f)
+(101o)*(1-2*0.25)*(2*0.05) < (2*0.25)*(1012)*(1-2*0.05)
+5.0*10E+8 < 4.5*10E+11
Again, we stress these computations are based on the assumption of the uniformity of the
K1 and K2 namespace distributions. Since our theory can be converted to work with the
more common non-uniform distributions in practice, a similar analysis to the one here
can be constructed. The deidentified K2 also introduced fewer overall errors into the
system, meeting (19):
(l/p2) n 2 + 2*f < 2*e + (l/pi) n l
_(1/10)12 + 2*(0.05) < 2*(0.25) + (1/10)'0
40.1 + 1.0*10E-12 < 0.5 + 1.0*10E-10
When linking the data using the deidentified K2 and KI some errors created when only
the plaintext K, was used were fixed by the K2 field. PPV rose to 42% while sensitivity
remained at 35%.
3.5.3 Additional Techniques for Claims Deidentification
As indicated in Enhancements 1 through 6, Safe Harbor also requires deidentifying
several other items in a UB92 not used by the DxCG PM, including:
* Patient Address. The zip code can remain, but can be no longer than 3 digits.
* Patient Name, Insured Name.
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* Several dates: Admission Date, Occurrence Span "From" Date, Occurrence Span
"Through" Date, and other dates. Only the year can remain for such dates.
* Treatment Authorization Codes. These should be unique for each patient and
therefore must be removed.
* Employer Name, Employer Location. These must be removed per the Office for
Civil Rights, as referenced earlier.516
* Provider information such as Provider Number or Other Physician Ids (up to 2 of
them).
* Remarks. This free-form text field must be removed as it may contain unique
information that may help identify individuals.
* Other fields with very unique values or claim records with combinations of
deidentified fields that are unique in the claims data. The former types of fields
must be removed. In the latter case, the entire claim record must be deleted, some
of its fields must be generalized, or other deidentification techniques be applied as
policy-holders might be identifiable based on "actual knowledge" analysis due to
unique data combinations. Unique records within a file might be linked to other
data sources which can help reidentify individuals.
However, the original unaltered fields may be usable by a PM application:
* A full zip code can be used.517 For example, a zip code may imply a higher
probability of acquiring particular chronic conditions. 51 8
* Removing an individual's name would prevent the recognition of her ethnicity or
race, which may be needed by PM to characterize risk.5 9 520 521
* Removing day and month in dates would undermine detailed date analysis, which
may be needed by PM. For example, some applications compute hospital length
of stay; recognize a patient's accelerating utilization of health services; or try to
understand the patient's prescription compliance pattern to better identify high-
516 US Department of Health and Human Services, Office for Civil Rights, "Standards for Privacy of
Individually Identifiable Health Information."
517 Laura Benko, "Long-range Forecast: Partly Healthy, Chance of Storms," 26.
518 Tatlow showed that the geographic density of alcohol outlets within a zip code was a significant
predictor of alcohol-related hospital admissions. (See James Tatlow, John D. Clapp, and Melinda M.
Hohman, "The Relationship between the Geographic Density of Alcohol Outlets and Alcohol-related
Hospital Admissions in San Diego County," Journal of Community Health, 25 (2000): 79). Alcoholism
might be considered a chronic condition as it often can only be controlled and not cured. (Lander
University, class notes for NURS 416, <http://www.lander.edu/bfreese/416%20Notes%20Ch%202 I1.doc>
(14 October 2003)).
519 Kiran Nanchahal, Punam Mangtani, Mark Alston, and Isabel dos Santos Silva, "Development and
Validation of a Computerized South Asian Names and Group Recognition Algorithm (SANGRA) for Use
in British Health-related Studies," Journal of Public Health Medicine, 23 (2001): 279.
520 Iezzoni, 45.
521 Joe V. Selby, Andrew J. Karter, Lynn M. Ackerson, Assiamira Ferrara, and Jennifer Liu, "Developing a
Prediction Rule from Automated Clinical Databases to Identify High-risk Patients in a Large Population
with Diabetes," Diabetes Care, 24 (2001): 1550.
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risk individuals. 522 523 524 525 526 In addition, full dates of birth and ages beyond 90
as deidentified by Safe Harbor may also be predictive of patient cost. 527 528 For
example, a newborn's date of birth can identify the season when he was born,
which may make him more susceptible to certain health problems. 529 Perls found
people over 90, unexpectedly, might have health care costs lower than 65-90 year
old individuals. 530 Perls showed that 90+ individuals might have already
experienced a particular condition, and thus don't need as intensive treatment as
those 65-90 years old because the condition is not affecting them for the first
time, as well as other reasons, why their care costs might be lower than for
individuals 65-90 years old.531
* Care authorization information can be used to predict care utilization.532 Liu
showed how number of visits authorized to a mental health provider by a
managed care mental health organization was less than the number of visits that
could have been desired by the provider. However, providers did not renew
patient authorizations' and thus did not offer patients maximal possible
treatments. They may have perceived administrative difficulties in seeking
reauthorizations, or were concerned that the mental health organization might
view them less favorably compared to others within the provider network who
treated patients with fewer visits. 533
* Employer information may be predictive of high risk as some occupational
environments create increased risk for certain health maladies. 534
* The nature of a provider's practice may be used to assess patient care quality
implications inherent in the practice. 535 536
522 Samuel Forman, Matthew Kelliher, and Gary Wood, "Clinical Improvement with Bottom-line Impact:
Custom Care Planning for Patients with Acute and Chronic Illnesses in a Managed Care Setting," The
American Journal of Managed Care, 3 (1997): 1041.
523 Ingenix Corporation, "Identification and Management of High Risk Patients Using a Claims-based
Predictive Model."524 John Lynch, Samuel A. Forman, Sandy Graff, and Mark C. Gunby, "High-risk Population Health
Management - Achieving Improved Patient Outcomes and Near-term Financial Results," The American
Journal of Managed Care, 6 (2000): 782.
525 Goodwin, 65.526 Henry Dove, Ian Duncan, and Arthur Robb, "A Prediction Model for Targeting Low-cost, High-risk
Members of Managed Care Organizations," The American Journal of Managed Care, 9 (2003): 385.527 Thomas Perls and Elizabeth R. Wood, "Acute Care Costs of the Oldest Old: They Cost Less, Their Case
Intensity is Less, and They Go to Nonteaching Hospitals," Archives ofInternal Medicine, 156 (1996): 754.
528 Chap T. Le, Ping Liu, Bruce R. Lindgren, Kathleen A. Daly, and G. Scott Giebink, "Some Statistical
Methods for Investigating the Date of Birth as a Disease Indicator," Statistics in Medicine, 22 (2003): 2128.
529 Chap T. Le, 2127-8.
530 Perls, 759.
53' Perls, 759.532 See Xiaofeng Liu, Roland Sturm, and Brian J. Cuffel, "The Impact of Prior Authorization on Outpatient
Utilization in Managed Behavioral Health Plans," Medical Care Research and Review, 57 (2000): 182.
53 Implied, Liu, "The Impact of Prior Authorization on Outpatient Utilization in Managed Behavioral
Health Plans," 185, 192.
534 K. T. Palmer, M. J. Griffin, H. E. Syddall, A. Davis, B. Pannett, and D. Coggon, "Occupational
Exposure to Noise and the Attributable Burden of Hearing Difficulties in Great Britain," Occupational and
Environmental Medicine, 59 (2002): 634.
535 Dimitri Christakis, Anne Kazak, Jeffrey Wright, Frederick Zimmerman, Alta Bassett, Frederick Connell,
"What factors are associated with achieving high continuity of care?" Family Medicine, 36 (2004): 55-57.
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* Unstructured text can be mined by a PM-like application to identify an individual
at higher risk for using extended health services. 537
* If unique values from records are removed, or entire claims records are deleted or
obfuscated, PM may not identify such individuals. Disease management cost
savings to the insurer might be undermined.
3.5.3.1 Security and Weights for Linear Regression Predictive Model
Such fields can be deidentified while preserving the above analyses. We explore the
methods involved using one common PM approach, linear regression. 538 When PM is
predicting costs or illness, the different data items analyzed are represented by numerical
weights. The weights are combined to compute a total weight, which represents an
individual's future predicted risk. PM can compare this value to a threshold and decide to
enroll the individual in a disease management program. To deidentify the zip code field
the entire 5-digit zip code could be encrypted and a lookup table be created, mapping the
encrypted zip code to its associated weight. Zip codes would be identically encrypted in
claim records during claim record deidentification before the claim records arrive at the
copy data store. PM would obtain an encrypted zip code from a claim record and look up
its ciphertext in the table to find the weight, which should be added to the total weight,
which in turn can be compared to a threshold. Note, although HIPAA implies, via the
reidentification code discussion in Section 3.1.1, that generating pseudonyms as a
function of the original data should not be allowed we once again reference the argument
in that section. If a statistician determines that there is a very low risk of reidentifying
data subjects the transformation function should be permissible. We rely on such an
argument here, i.e. using HIPAA's statistical method, as the mechanism for zip code
deidentification and the other deidentifications which we will discuss below.
The same deidentification process as for patient zip code can be followed regarding a
patient's name. Nanchahal creates directories describing the ethnic origin corresponding
to a person's name. 539 Nanchahal studies how South Asian people's names may identify
their South Asian origin. A regression weight can be assigned to each individual's name,
representing the risk associated with her race. 540 The race weight could be obtained from
other health services research, outside of Nanchahal's work, quantifying the risks of a
race. To deidentify the lookup operation, the name in the claim records and in the
directories, which could be constructed to map names to associated risk weights, can be
deterministically encrypted with the same encryption function during claim record
536 Jonathan P. Weiner, Stephen T. Parente, Deborah W. Garnick, Jinnet Fowles, Ann G. Lawthers, R.
Heather Palmer, "Variation in Office-Based Quality: A Claims-Based Profile of Care Provided To
Medicare Patients With Diabetes," JAMA, 273 (1995): 1503.
537 Daniel Heinze, Mark L. Morsch, and John Holbrook, "Mining Free-text Medical Records" (Proceedings
of the American Medical Informatics Association, 2001), 254-8.
538 Ingenix Corporation, "Identification and Management of High Risk Patients Using a Claims-based
Predictive Model."
539Nanchahal, 279.
540 See Nanchahal, 279.
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deidentification. Upon encountering an encrypted name in a claims record PM can look
up the proper weight for the individual's race risk in a table, which can be added to the
total weight.
The month and day of dates can also be deidentified. The length of activity can be
provided in the UB92 instead of the "from" and "to" dates, as Enhancement 4 describes.
This date difference would address the need to know the length of an activity. However,
computing date order and date difference across multiple claim records can be important,
too, as described in Section 3.5.3. The month and day of dates can be encrypted during
claim record deidentification. The ciphertexts created, representing January 1 through
December 31, can be placed behind an access control in a list in the order as the
chronological order of the plaintexts. A function can be set up behind the access control.
PM would take two encrypted dates and their unencrypted years from one or more claim
records when processing the deidentified copy data store, and call the function behind the
access control indicating whether it wants date order or date difference computed. If PM
needs date order, the function would examine the supplied unencrypted years of the
dates. If the years are different, the function would return to PM the date with the later
year. It represents the later date. If the supplied years are the same, the function would
compare the orders of both enciphered day-month values with the ordered list. It would
return to PM the ciphertext of the date closest to the end of the list, which represents the
later date. To obtain date difference, the function would subtract the order of one date
from the order of the other using the orders in the enciphered chronological list. It would
return to PM the difference, in total number of days, including an additional 365 days for
each year difference between the unencrypted date years.
Other variables can be deidentified similarly. Date of birth (DOB) can be handled like the
patient zip code field. The day, month, and year, or just year above 90, if more
granularity is not necessary for PM, can be encrypted. A table can be set up mapping the
encrypted DOBs to their associated risk weights. DOBs would be encrypted in claims
records during claim record deidentification. PM can look up the encrypted DOBs it finds
in the claims to find the needed weights, which would be added to the total weight. The
presence of an authorization can be preserved by encrypting the authorization field.541
The employer name field can be handled like the patient zip code field. It can be
encrypted and a table be made available indicating the weight assigned to each employer.
The employer name would be encrypted. PM could look up encrypted employer names in
claims records in the created table while processing the deidentified claims data to find
the needed weights. These weights could represent the employers' risks. Employer
address can also be handled like patient zip code: parts of employer address (e.g., zip
code) can be encrypted and a table mapping ciphertexts to weights can be created. PM
would look up the encrypted parts in the claims data in the table to obtain the needed
weights. Provider information, including the provider identifiers and the zip code in the
Provider Name/Address/Phone Number field could also be handled like the above fields.
A table can be made available mapping enciphered provider information to
corresponding weights. Provider variables would be encrypted during claim record
541 Liu, "The Impact of Prior Authorization on Outpatient Utilization in Managed Behavioral Health Plans,"
187.
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deidentification. PM would look up the weight when processing the deidentified claims
and add the weight to the total weight. The logic for analyzing and creating the weight for
free-form text can be installed earlier. The weight can be computed during claim record
deidentification. During deidentification, the claim record can be analyzed and the
computed weight provided in some location within the claim record. The free-form text
data would be deleted. The provided weight can be added to the total weight later by PM.
Unique values could be encrypted, and a lookup table mapping ciphertexts to weights can
be created as for patient zip code. The values would be encrypted in claims records
during claim record deidentification. PM would find the encrypted values in claim
records when processing the copy data store and look them up to obtain the needed
weights. Some of the deidentified items making a tuple unique in claims data can be
similarly encrypted. A lookup table with needed weights can be created. The values
making the tuple unique would be encrypted during claim record deidentification and PM
would look up the needed weights when processing the deidentified claims.
The weight usage process described above can be made more secure. One security
problem is that hiding plaintexts behind encryption yet exposing the needed weights to
PM may allow for reidentification of the encrypted fields. For example, if somehow the
weight associated with a zip code can be obtained from published literature, the zip code
plaintext can be recoverable. One can simply look up the weight from the literature in the
table available to PM and find the corresponding zip code pseudonym. By locating that
pseudonym in the deidentified claims, the zip code value for those records has now been
reidentified. The plaintext value from the literature underlies the pseudonym. To address
this problem, one could place all the tables and all the weight mappings behind an access
control. Instead of looking up each weight singularly, PM would work with a special
function which would operate on a claims record in its entirety. The function would
compute all the individual weights behind the access control and provide to PM a sum.
Plaintext recovery has been considerably mitigated because a given weight is concealed
by the sum, provided to PM, of several weights, and individual weights should no longer
be discernable.
3.6 Chapter Conclusion
We have now shown that technically we can accomplish stronger privacy protection
within applications like the BQMA. A linkage mechanism was introduced which securely
improved the linkage of records in software applications. Also, we have demonstrated
how a number of current installations of PM within insurance organizations relying on
basic data, as well as PM platforms using more diversified data, may be run in a
deidentified fashion. Since PM is operationally similar to the other BQMA, as shown in
Section 1.3.2, the other BQMA may also be run in such a manner. In addition, other
insurance applications might also be deidentified. Insurance organizations might have 12
or more different applications operating and computing like the BQMA. This includes the
BQMA. Besides the BQMA, the insurer may have several other claims applications each
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with an independent data source: claims data capture, fraud analysis, claims adjudication,
claims reports/document (such as the explanation of benefits sent to policy-holders),
coordination of benefits, and premium setting.542 543 544 545 546 Data sets containing
enrollment data and policy-holder surveys may be additional data sets within an
insurance organization with their own applications. 547 Since many of these applications
process claims data and all of them need to link data, the BQMA and similar major
applications within insurance organizations may be run in a privacy-preserving manner.
Internal identifiable PHI can be better secured.
542 Tricare, "Tricare Benefits for College Students," 26 February 2004,
<http://www.tricare.osd.mil/collegestudents/TRICAREClaims.cfm> (5 September 2005).
543 TMG Health, "Services," <http://www.tmghealth.com/services/claims.html> (5 September 2005).
544 Interim Healthcare, "Retrospective Claims Analysis,"
<http://www.interimhealthcare.com/biz/CorpRetailPharma/EmpWellnessProgram/RetrospectiveClaimsAna
lysis.asp> (5 September 2005).
545 Tufts Health Plan, "Claims Procedures," Billing Guidelines,
<http://www.tuftshealthplan.com/providers/provider.php?sec=administrative resources&content=b COB&
rightnav=billing> (5 September 2005).
546 Health Data Management, "Easy Access to Data Helps Insurers Make Timely Decisions,"
<http://www.healthdatamanagement.com/html/guide/toptech3alisting.cfmn?AdvertiserlD=753> (5
September 2005).
547 America's Health Insurance Plans, "Personal Health Information, Health Plans, and Consumers."
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4 Thesis Conclusion and Future Research
This thesis has demonstrated people's concern regarding medical privacy. At times,
health organizations do not protect patient data. There are environmental, economic,
organizational, and technical factors which appear to encourage less privacy protection.
Legislation does not appear to encourage certain privacy protections. The economic costs
and especially benefits of improved privacy protection are hard to quantify. Analysis of
the impact of incorporating privacy protections on quality of care is unclear. Current
technical approaches do not allow for easy linkage of erroneous data in a privacy-
preserving way, an important utility for healthcare software applications. We showed
how such beliefs may be reversed when privacy-related data are analyzed in more depth.
We showed how pending 2005 legislation may be passed to encourage additional privacy
protections; demonstrated how financial benefits of providing extra privacy
enhancements for a set of key routine insurance software applications may exceed
implementation costs for those applications within nine, but, most likely, considerably
fewer years; explained how adopting a privacy-enhancing technology within those
routine applications might improve care for policy-holders; and created techniques for
protecting data while allowing for record linkage. A cryptographic threat model was
created demonstrating how to evaluate security solutions when linking data obtained
from internal or external organizations. More security must be provided if data are
internally generated because the security protocol must guard against "internal"
knowledge. We demonstrated how Predictive Modeling, one key insurance application
among the routine applications we examined, could be run in a deidentified manner.
4.1 Future Work
Future research can expand upon our work. Our cost model can be elaborated. The
valuation for deidentifying applications such as the BQMA to prevent the misuse of
identifiable data could be expanded. The losses we used for computation only involved the
costs to restore normal IT operations and manage the confidentiality breach. 548 549The
losses only focused on attacks from internal employees. Losses were based on all employees
in the organization regardless of whether they could, in fact, misuse data. A more robust
valuation would incorporate all financial impacts properly apportioned. Total losses would
hopefully include intangible losses. If data can only be abused by internal staff, total insider
losses should only be divided by the number of employees who have access to identifiable
data. If external attacks are possible, then external losses should obviously be included.
The number of data sets within the organization and the characteristics of the attackers could
also enter the loss valuation. If the data within an organization are centralized in a single
548 Computer Security Institute, "2005 CSI/FBI Computer Crime and Security Survey," 15.
549 CRICO/RMF data.
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data source, such as in a data warehouse, the valuation for securing the data would be the
total losses suffered by the organization. All attacks against identifiable data should be
mitigated as the single data source has been secured. Therefore, the valuation would be
based on all potential losses. If there are multiple independent data sources, dividing the
total number of losses by the number of data sources would yield a loss per every data set.
Imagine an insurer suffers a loss of $250,000 because an employee obtained and publicized
sensitive internal PHI.550 To incorporate such a cost into the cost model, the $250,000
would have to be divided by 12 or more different data sources to compute the benefit of
adding privacy protection to every data set. Recall 12 is roughly the number of data sets
an average health insurer may have, as per Section 3.6. Protecting each data set would
thus provide the corresponding fraction of the overall benefit to the organization. The
valuation of privacy protection will be higher if the attackers possess characteristics leading
to greater breach success. The attackers might have considerable financial resources, be
technical experts, or be focused on a particular data set to the exclusion of others. A higher
percentage of total losses could be apportioned to particularly vulnerable data or type of
individuals as the probability of their attack success on particular data is greater.
4.1.1 Confirming Consumer Behavior
Social science research can verify the behavioral assumptions in our model. Surveys or
experimental designs can be used. Will a small percent of individuals switch to the health
plan of the insurer that provides additional BQMA privacy protection within a
competitive insurance market? Will about 3.02% of individuals stop paying an average of
$180 (2001 dollars) out of pocket and start submitting claims to an insurer if it provides
extra BQMA privacy protection? To answer this question we must first confirm if the
roughly $180 willingness-to-pay (WTP) behavior shown for 2001 also happens in 2005
or 2006. That is, is the behavior current? One concern with WTP behavior is poor survey
response. People state their WTP based on what they may feel are "desired" responses, or
cannot remember what they paid to protect their privacy when asked.55' Given that
salient privacy concerns continue today, including individuals' propensity to action as
described in Section 2.2.1.1, current out-of-pocket payments should be like the California
HealthCare Foundation Survey's 1999 results.
Can the insurer recover the individuals' WTP based on the accounting and health benefit
redesigns it may undertake, as discussed in Section 2.2.3.1? This answer is also yes. First,
in general, in business, past sales are strong predictors of future sales. 552 People should
pay today what they paid for similar products before. Past payments for privacy
.50 For example, a hospital suffered a loss for this amount for the same reason: "Jury Orders Hospital to Pay
$250,000 for Invasion of Privacy," Aids Policy & Law, 15 (2000): 10.
551 Yaniv Poria and Harmen Oppewal, "Student Preferences for Room Attributes at University Halls of
Residence: An Application of the Willingness to Pay Technique," Tourism and Hospitality Research, 4
(2002): 119.
552 Tutor2u, "Sales Forecasting," <http://www.tutor2u.net/business/marketing/sales forecasting.asp> (5
September 2005).
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preservation may predict future privacy protection payments. Consider adolescents.
When such individuals receive medical care, a variety of privacy concerns can arise,
including those with billing or reimbursement procedures, scheduling notification, and
privacy of medical records. 553 To alleviate such concerns, a youth can visit a variety of
health care settings, including community centers, school-based and school-linked health
clinics, and family planning clinics. 554 All these institutions can protect against the same
privacy concerns. For example, the federal Title X Family Planning Program includes
strong confidentiality protections at payment rates based on a sliding fee scale of the
adolescent's (not his parents') income.555 If he's uncomfortable at one Title X institution,
the youth can visit a different one. He would pay the same amount to get the same
privacy protection. Such behavior suggests that in a supportive context, paying one sum
to protect privacy at one time may be indicative of an individual's capability in paying a
similar sum to protect privacy at another time. Consequently, people may pay the insurer
the same amount to protect their privacy as they used to pay their doctors out-of-pocket
to protect the same kind of privacy.
In addition, in the insurance context, the insurer might need to recover the WTP to
provide consistent health insurance. An additional roughly $4 million annual expense, as
described before, may prevent the insurer from offering stable coverage to policy-holders
due to this large expense. Since policy-holders want insurance, as they purchased it, the
insurer can request they pay their WTP through one of the methods discussed before.
This would be particularly true in a marketplace where it is the dominant insurer. The
insurer might curtail coverage otherwise as it lacks the funding to provide consistent
coverage.
How will women with preterm labor or individuals with other privacy-sensitive
conditions behave? Will they pay out of pocket or avoid care at the beginning of their
medical condition to maintain privacy protection or will they pay for the specific more
"sensitive" medical visits during the care continuum to protect privacy just during those
times?
4.1.2 Research to Frame "Partial" Privacy Protection
Critical to these questions is the notion of BQMA privacy protection. I refer to such
privacy protection as partial privacy protection. BQMA privacy may be protected, but we
do not know if other applications within the organization protect privacy. They might
offer less privacy protection. Future research can examine the notion of incremental
privacy provision. Organizations may not always protect privacy at all times due to costs,
logistics, or unharmonized standards as this thesis has indicated. How do individuals
perceive variable privacy protection? Do people believe organizations protect privacy
based on the percent of the organization's internal software applications that protect
553 Ford, 162.
554 Ford, 165.
s55 Ford, 165.
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privacy? If a certain minimum percent of applications is protected, for example 80%, is the
organization seen as protecting privacy? Do people believe organizations protect privacy
based on the types of applications that are protected? It's important for organizations to
protect customer data for marketing or medical research applications. Protecting privacy
within an actuarial application is less critical.
Similar to such a framing question, do people understand the effectiveness of given privacy
protections? Many privacy definitions exist and many technical approaches protect data. Do
consumers perceive the different risks based on an organization's privacy practices?
Consider the Ethical Force Program (EFP) recommended privacy protections from before.
What if, due to unharmonized standards or due to an organization's gradual implementation
of privacy-protective practices, an organization at first only offers the Transparency aspect
of all the EFP tenets, a notice of privacy practices? Would this be sufficient privacy
protection for some individuals? 56 What if due to the same implementation issues the
organization offers the EFP tenets of Transparency, Consent, Security, Data Quality, and
Collection Limitation, but does not offer the tenets of Individual Access, Information Use
Limitation, or Accountability, as described before? Is this appropriate privacy protection? Is
privacy preserved only when all EFP tenets are enforced? Consider technical approaches.
How does an organization explain to consumers that it is safeguarding privacy when the
algorithms used are secure in certain data contexts but insecure in others? For example,
consider the ciphertext-only attack. Imagine that an organization uses deterministic
encryption to securely encrypt customers' last names. If clients have last names that are
uniformly distributed among all the clients, the users of the deidentified data would not
recognize the frequencies of particular last names because all frequencies should be similar.
Deterministic encryption, which preserves plaintext distributions, is secure in this context
because customer last names cannot be identified. If the organization acquires new clients,
and the frequencies of these clients' last names differ-perhaps they are of a particular
ethnic background and certain last names are much more prevalent than others-
deterministic encryption may now allow the data users to guess the last names of some
customers. The distributions of the enciphered last names would match the distributions of
the original plaintexts because, again, deterministic encryption preserves the distributions.
Would consumers understand such risks? What if a particular security protocol used to be
secure, but was then "broken" because the cost of computational power declined making
such a protocol breakable, or because someone discovered an actual flaw in the protocol?
How is risk and security perceived by consumers?
4.1.3 Future Technical Enhancements
Future work can expand on a variety of technical issues. From the theoretical perspective on
how to improve record linkage, the different distributions of the namespace of a field and
the frequency of a field within a training file can be incorporated into our record linkage
model. Weight and threshold computations would improve. For example, in our current
556 See for instance Federal Trade Commission, "Online Profiling: A Report to Congress, Part 2
Recommendations," July 2000, <http://www.fic.gov/os/2000/07/onlineprofiling.htm> (6 September 2005).
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model the namespace is uniformly distributed. As a result, the probability of two fields in
two records equaling when the records don't match is (l/pl)nl where nl is the number of
character positions in the field and pl is the number of uniform values per position. A more
realistic representation would note the frequency of different values for the specific field in a
training file, e.g., f1,...,fk. The possibility of two fields equaling in a validation file when
their records don't match would then be approximately
k
q=1
The first fq is the probability of selecting that particular field value in the validation file and
the second fq is the probability of selecting another equal field value. The theoretical
construction deciding whether to employ a string comparator for a field can be elaborated,
going beyond the numerical example we provided. Recall one weight construction is:
Wcomparator = log (P ( convert (compare(Ri[K], Rj[K]) ) = z
Ri and Rj match) /
P ( convert (compare(Ri[K], Rj[K]) ) = z
Ri and Rj don't match))
Given a particular error and string comparator, a theoretical specification for Wcompartor can
be provided just as for [Ki]Wagree and [KI]Wdisagree as before. These results can be
extended with a theoretical or empirical investigation of Wcomparator when each field
character is encrypted using our approach with padding. Wcomparator will differ. When
computing Wcomparator for a field, the padding should come from a field different from the
field being compared. Otherwise matching using character-level analysis would perform
like full-field matching. Any two fields being compared would precisely not equal when
one or both fields are in error regardless of whether the fields are encrypted at the
character level or fully encrypted. A full field becomes the basis for an enciphered
comparison because it is fully enciphered or fully used as padding. The error of the field
used for padding and the original field's error would have to be simultaneously examined
because the errors would interact. The software "middle layer" to provide the ability to
compute results based on deidentified data yet restrict analysis to prevent discovery of
additional information about units could be created. Basic primitives such as addition,
equality, or order of deidentified data could be provided. These primitives can be invoked
directly or a toolkit can be created.
From a cryptographic point of view, one interesting idea would be to create a secure hash
or encryption function that preserves differences between underlying plaintexts. Such a
technique would be more elegant than our approach because no padding is used. Akin to
string comparators, a metric might be devised describing the similarity of ciphertexts
based on a function describing similarity of plaintexts. Security would have to be
redefined since encryption or hashing schemes typically transform slightly different
plaintexts into fully different ciphertexts. Plaintext similarity is purposefully destroyed. In
this case, some local plaintext structure must be preserved as some messages now have to
be labeled as "close" to others.
127
4.2 Thesis Conclusion
As health insurance organizations increase the scope of their IT activities, privacy
concerns may undermine decision-making. People's defensive behavior and data errors
are creating suboptimal data. Technical and contextual factors are coalescing to
encourage insurers to provide better privacy protection. The use of privacy enhancing
technologies is becoming possible for applications. Such approaches should be
considered in earnest by insurance managers. Otherwise, insurers might suffer financial,
environmental, and quality of care consequences, as this thesis has shown.
This research, however, is useful beyond the health insurance marketplace. Other health
care organizations may suffer similar consequences. Other health organizations would
adopt technology for similar reasons as health insurers because in the health industry
many organizations may have similar goals, as illustrated in Section 1.4. Other health
organizations also use quality control applications like Utilization Review, Predictive
Modeling, etc. This thesis has shown the benefits of adding stronger privacy protections
to such applications: probable profitability, potentially less regulation, and enhanced
patient health status. Other health organizations would want to adopt such protections in
these and similar internal applications, too, to satisfy their aims. Our frameworks can be
extended to other contexts. The secure linkage mechanism we created is a generic
approach and is thus applicable to a wide variety of software applications. Testing
robustness of Predictive Modeling for disease management can be extended to testing
other data mining applications involving different methods of deidentification.
Methodologies for testing the practicality of deidentified computation and analysis can
improve. Frameworks quantifying the impact of data quality on high-risk pregnant
women can be expanded to quantify the impact of data quality on e-commerce, national
security, fraud analysis, and other information-driven domains.
In this thesis, we have constructed frameworks and technologies to improve
organizational decision-making regarding privacy protection and information. We have
shown how benefits provided by strategic applications to organizations are improved by
improving underlying data quality. Our results show the enhanced business operations
organizations can expect by improving consumer privacy. Privacy protection offers
unmistakable value to organizations.
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Glossary
AAE = Attacks Against Encryption. A set of realistic cryptographic attacks against
software applications protected by encryption within an organizational context based on
theoretical encryption notions.
BFA = Brute Force Attack. Traversing through all original messages or all cryptographic
keys with regard to an encryption or hashing scheme to compromise the scheme by
finding the encryption or hashing key or some or all of the original plaintext messages.
BQMA = Basic Quality Management Applications. A set of software applications used
by health insurance organizations to process patient data for organizational quality
control purposes.
EFP = Ethical Force Program. A policy group related to the American Medical
Association that created a list of managerial, operational, and technical principles
describing how to protect health information within organizations.
HEDIS = Health Plan Employer Data and Information Set. A health insurance
organization's operational data used to quantify the insurer's performance regarding its
coverage and services.
HHS = US Department of Health and Human Services.
HIPAA = Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act. The federal law
describing the protection that must be offered to health information by "covered" health
organizations, such as health insurers and providers, which manage this information.
NICU = Neonatal Intensive Care Unit. A specially equipped nursery to care for ill
newborns.
OCR = Office for Civil Rights. US Department of Health and Human Services office that
enforces the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act.
PHI = Protected Health Information. Any individually-identifiable health information
relating to the data subject's medical care, the delivery of that care, or the payment for
that care (as defined by the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act).
PM = Predictive Modeling. One of the software platforms making up the Basic Quality
Management Applications. It identifies individuals for disease management, which is a
set of programs attempting to care for chronically ill or "high-risk" individuals and
reduce the costs of their care.
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UB92 = A type of health care claims record used by health insurance companies. Such
records may be used by PM or other BQMA software.
WTP = Willingness To Pay. A social science term. An individual's stated, as opposed to
revealed, payment preference for a particular item or service.
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